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ACDIS Microbiologist Addresses Audience in Washington, DC on Global Health Security Challenges

Published June 28, 2008
by Richelle Bernazzoli


Brenda Wilson  

With the US security establishment focusing much of its time and resources on bioterrorism preparedness in anticipation of intentional biological attacks, many biosecurity authorities are increasingly recognizing the need for better integration between the various communities of experts who possess the knowledge and skills necessary to attain such preparedness.

As a member of one such community of experts, University of Illinois Department of Microbiology professor and ACDIS faculty member Brenda Wilson was recently invited to Washington, DC to take part in a panel discussion on the challenges to biosecurity arising from a lack of communication between scientists and policy makers.

The meeting, entitled “Global Health Security: Overcoming the barriers among the health, scientific and security communities,” was organized by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy and was intended to foster discussion between the public health, scientific and security communities about how they can better integrate their approaches to biosecurity.

Representing the scientific community before an audience of congressional aides and representatives from government agencies such as the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, Wilson opened with the point that barriers among the health, scientific and security communities exist in part because of misconceptions from nonscientists “about what scientists do.” And yet, she noted, it is the nonscientists who “make up an overwhelming majority of the security and policy communities.”

Wilson then provided an overview of the university science and research community mindset before addressing the issue of biosecurity from the science perspective and finishing with a discussion of barriers to integration between the three communities.

The science and research community mindset

A major difference between the policy community and the science community, Wilson noted, is that the former often must think in terms of immediate concerns and goals, while the latter is more usually concerned with what is best in the long run. Thus, from the academic scientist perspective, bridging the gap between the communities in an effort to enhance biosecurity must be achieved without “compromising academic values in generating and disseminating knowledge.”

In order to successfully accomplish this, she remarked, “active, practicing scientists must be engaged [in matters of security policy], but this can only happen if there are adequate incentives or rewards for such participation.” However, in the present academic climate, such participation on the part of academic scientists is not always encouraged or rewarded.

Moreover, the growing concerns among scientists over censorship of scientific endeavor, tightening security restrictions which hamper research programs, and what many scientists feel is an exaggerated bioterrorism threat, all must be addressed, said Wilson.

The biosecurity problem from the science perspective

With regard to agricultural and food defense capabilities, Wilson said, the main question for scientists is, “Exactly what level of security do the people of the USA want the agricultural industry to achieve, and our government to enforce, in terms of food safety and biosecurity?”

Drawing upon the example of the recent E. coli outbreak resulting from contaminated spinach, she discussed some of the “looming natural threats” that she and her colleagues view as much more likely to afflict the American public than are acts of bioterror.

Scientists see methods such as food irradiation as viable solutions to some of these natural threats, though implementing the technology has proven challenging, due to some of the differences and misconceptions noted earlier between the public, policy makers, and scientists.

Additionally, Wilson commented, educators and scientists face the quandary of wishing to inform the public in a responsible way, yet fearing the consequences of being misunderstood or misinterpreted by nonscientific entities such as the media and policy makers. A list of areas in which scientists feel that their expertise was not consulted, to the detriment of scientific progress, further illustrated this point.

Barriers to integration

Wilson closed her talk by stressing that the participation of expert individuals in decision-making must be invited and strongly encouraged by the policy community. However, in her estimation, three primary barriers remain.

For one, most scientists avoid the policy arena, as they feel unqualified to participate in such activities. Thus, policy makers, with the help of scientific agencies, should seek out individuals with relevant specialties and well-developed research programs and invite them to participate in the security policy dialogue.

Secondly, in a time of reduced scientific funding, highly qualified academic researchers are under more pressure than ever to sustain research programs, leaving little time for “non-science activities” such as informing policy. Hence, more research funding is needed, which would create more freedom for scientists to contribute to policy.

Finally, non-science-related activities are not rewarded, and in fact may even be implicitly discouraged or penalized. Consequently, academic scientists have little choice but to focus all of their time and energy on excelling in research and teaching; to do otherwise may imperil their chances for advancement in their fields. Unfortunately, Wilson noted, a paradigm shift is needed within the academy in order to overcome this obstacle.

In an interview following her appearance in DC, Wilson commented on the value of such events, calling them a “good venue to bring in true, practicing scientists to bridge the gap in communications with policymakers.” But, she cautioned, these meetings need to include still more expert voices. Even if policy makers have a science background, she said, it is difficult for them to maintain that foundation and keep up with emerging issues once they leave the academic environment. In fact, many in the audience expressed genuine surprise when she described the challenges practicing scientists face when balancing concerns over career progression with a desire to contribute to policy and public safety.


Brenda Wilson is a professor of microbiology and a faculty member of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS). She is an expert in bacterial protein toxins. Her laboratory is currently working on, among other projects, the development of post-exposure anti-toxin therapeutics. In response to post-9/11 concerns, Prof. Wilson utilized her expertise in a series of public engagement activities: organizing public forums on bioterror risks, serving on bioterror study panels, and appearing on the news to discuss biological security. More recently, she has provided input to Congress on food safety legislation.

A forthcoming article from Prof. Wilson, to appear in the journal Complexity, discusses many of the issues surrounding biosecurity strategy, including more in-depth coverage of some of the points from her presentation to the AAAS.