The most succinct method to describing what drives Chinese foreign policy is to highlight what is suggested to be the “informal ideology” of the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese view of themselves is the following:

1) The Chinese are a great people, and China is a great nation, 2) The Chinese nation deserves a much better fate than that which it has experienced in the modern world, 3) China should be accorded compensatory treatment from those powers which have insulted or injured it in the past, and 4) As a great nation, China naturally occupies a central potion in world affairs and must be treated as a great power.[14]

This aura of arrogance and greatness has been carried in the minds of the Chinese for centuries and modernization efforts have rekindled such calls to eminence. As the investigation of China’s foreign policies continues, it is essential to bear in mind that the above mentioned characteristics motivate policy as an intangible feeling that drives the country and its population towards the goal of global leadership.

Nationalism reflects the psychological necessary [sic] to draw a boundary between the Chinese and those who are accused of imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism.[15]

However, China avoids the identity question by turning around and first identifying the “other”—most notably Japan, the United States, and the former Soviet Union—instead of themselves.[16] Thus, one can see the apparent schism in China, whereby the government and population are proud and determined to ascend in the international community, yet remain unsure about the means they should be advancing—peaceful integration with the international system or confrontational competition.

As these sentiments and desires are molded into a comprehensive, grand national strategy, the Chinese leadership seeks to assure that China will rise to great power status by shaping the conduct of the international system rather than responding to its conditions.[17] As such the intention seems to be focused on forming the international conditions that provide the opportunity to increase the relative capabilities of the Chinese and in doing so work to prevent the United States from usurping China’s rise. To that end, China views military power as the primary guarantor of “comprehensive security,” while viewing and embracing multilateral diplomatic efforts as partial and conditional.[18] This point seems to pose one explanation as to why China asserts that disputes concerning sovereignty issues ought to be set aside rather than settled in multilateral fora as there is much more to be obtained in terms of relative capabilities by keeping the sovereignty question undecided, especially out of the hands of the major powers and largest international decision-making bodies. Where it suits the PRC to do so, though, China’s government has integrated a policy of “partnership cultivation” to deflect and avoid controversy during its period of economic and military expansion. The Chinese leadership believes that if great powers are put in a position to press China on controversial issues, the benefits that China can potentially reap from the relationship such as trade and investment will be put into jeopardy. Rather it seems more beneficial to employ policies that make China attractive to great powers while at the same time remaining flexible by avoiding decisive alignments with particular states.[19] As such, the Chinese are pursuing a setting that is most conducive to successful pursuit of Chinese national interests.

Even within such a foreign policy framework, one of the most contentious aspects of the PRC’s foreign policy remains its stance on sovereignty. This matter is further complicated by China’s perception of sovereignty as,

Such an abstract concept that China would have to decide case by case if a certain issue involves the principle of sovereignty. There is no guarantee, however, that an issue previously not considered to have involved sovereignty concerns will not have sovereignty implications the next time. It would appear that what sovereignty is about is itself an abstract issue.[20]

With these overarching remarks about the PRC’s foreign policy mentality, this work’s analysis of how China’s practical experiences in foreign policy line up with defensive realism’s postulations can begin.

Crises and Chinese Power Projections

After dividing realism into offensive and defensive sectors in part one, the author stated that the presence of policies consistent with establishing a defensive perimeter would be central to defending the idea that China was a defensive realist state. Additionally, defensive realism postulates that China will not be the initiator in the vast majority of its crisis situation. In order to solidify these propositions, this paper will make use of Correlates of War (COW) data[21] on Chinese power projections and incidents of militarized disputes. For the purposes of this paper, the COW data used will begin at 1978. This is the year that scholars have designated as the end (and failure) of the Chinese Cultural Revolution when the Chinese leadership was forced to give a significant degree of economic power and independence back to the provinces. As China’s government ended the era of The Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, it subsequently moved into its modern era of foreign policy.

The COW data is presented in three sections in order to model the same analysis that this paper has pursued. COW data is presented in terms of Chinese incidents with the United States, Taiwan, and countries within the defensive perimeter with which this paper has concerned itself (projections towards the Middle East are not included as none appeared within the COW data up to 1992[22]). The countries/islands that have been included within the defensive perimeter include Indonesia, North and South Vietnam, the Spratley Islands and other off-shore islands, and the Philippines.[23] These countries and regions have been selected because they make claims to disputed territories and/or make direct threats to the South China Sea region, which the Chinese have claimed as a defensive perimeter.

Between 1978 and 1992, there were no militarized incidents between the United States and China. Once in 1994 and twice in 2001, the United States and China had militarized disputes regarding US reconnaissance of Chinese territories. In 1994, the Chinese responded to the US dropping of sonar buoys to track a Chinese submarine and in 2001 the Chinese fired warning shots over the bow of a US Navy oceanographic vessel because the Chinese felt that the ship was intruding on its territorial waters. Similarly in April 2001, the Chinese downed a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane after claiming that it was intruding in airspace above China’s territorial waters. In 2000, the Chinese also conducted further tests of their ICBMs in protest of the possibility of future US sales of advanced weaponry to Taiwan. This evidence is very consistent with the theoretical suggestions of defensive realism. This paper argues that the Chinese are currently not able to militarily challenge US hegemonic status. However, saber-rattling techniques such as the two disputes in 2001 support the idea that China will show its objections militarily to any other states’ intrusion on the defensive perimeter that it feels it has the right to defend. Furthermore, while China retains a significant military loss of strength gradient that precludes it from challenging the United States on a global scale, the Chinese will confront the United States within its defensive perimeter where it feels that it has the political reasoning and military resources to do so. Additionally, while the Chinese would claim that the United States initiated these crises by violating China’s territorial sovereignty, it is evident that like defensive realism predicts, the Chinese initiated the conflict only as a response to what were perceived as inflammatory moves by the United States within its defensive zone.

Between 1978 and 1992, there were three militarized disputes between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. The three disputes occurred in 1987, 1988, and 1991 and were considered to be instigated equally by both countries. The levels of violence included two raids and a threat to blockade; however, none of the disputes reached very high levels of conflict. Following 1992, there has been a dramatic increase of militarized incidents between the two states. In 1993 and 1994, China issued multiple alerts and deployed military exercises mostly in protest of Taiwan’s push for greater international attention and what China viewed as political aggressiveness geared towards gaining independence. In 1995 and 1996, there were multiple incidents in which China would show its force through military deployments and exercises in order to assert control over the South China Sea and to protest further developments towards independence in Taiwan. 1999 was a very tumultuous year for the two states as China tested missiles over Taiwan as well as deployed air sorties over the island in response to pro-independence remarks by the Taiwanese President concerning the desire to engage China on a “state-to-state” level. The year culminated with China’s deployment of 100 M-Class guided missiles across the Taiwan Strait. Commensurate with Taiwanese elections in 2000, in which a pro-independence candidate was elected, shows of force by the Chinese greatly increased. These continued into 2001, with large-scale Chinese military exercises and the confrontation with Australian ships that were passing too close to sensitive areas of Taiwan and the South China Sea that the Chinese argued that they controlled.

The dynamics of the cross-strait relationship in the past twenty-four years function according to the predictions of a defensive realist state’s crisis behavior. China does not act as a blatant initiator of confrontations, but rather seems to be responding to aggressive political rhetoric by the Taiwanese pro-independence movement. Furthermore, the somewhat restrained nature of the disputes seems to reflect the idea that China does not feel the need to project its power inside its defensive perimeter unless it feels a great enough challenge, such as an overt declaration of independence by Taiwan. In the future, it is most likely that a similar relationship will endure unless one or both of the following circumstances develop: 1) Taiwan declares independence, which would almost assuredly bring about a full deployment of Chinese assets to reclaim the territory, or 2) a significant development in the Chinese military enables the Chinese to overcome its own military challenges to reclaiming the island with minimal collateral damage.

Finally, within the pre-determined defensive perimeter, between 1978 and 1992 there were sixteen militarized disputes. The majority of these disputes were within the dyadic relationship between China and South Vietnam. Of the sixteen disputes, ten belonged to the ongoing feud between China and South Vietnam, which included seizures and all-out interstate war. The rest of the disputes included shows of force, alerts, and the threat to use force. Only in two disputes did a seizure and border violation follow as a part of the crisis. Following 1992, China has employed blockades and utilized its military as a show of force towards Vietnam concerning the Spratley Islands. Until recent years, the Chinese have also been involved in militarized disputes with the Japanese over control of the Senaku Islands. China has also used its navy nearly every year as a show of force towards the Philippines to assert control over the Spratley Islands. Lastly, in 1996 there were shows of force by the Chinese directed towards the Indonesians regarding the Natuna Islands.

The evidence regarding China’s use of force within its defensive perimeter is very consistent with the predictions of a defensive realist state. In all of the sixteen disputes found before 1992, the responsibility for beginning the crisis was shared equally between the states involved. Following 1992, the incidents that occurred seem to indicate a very similar trend, in that China responds to other states taking aggressive stances on the same territorial claims as China with shows of force and blockades. Additionally, the increased pace of militarized disputes within the defensive zone seems to parallel China’s increased military and economic influence within the region.

Hegemonic and imperialistic policies were not at the roots of China’s modern power projections. Instead, the intrusion into what China tacitly viewed as its territory and area of influence resulted in conflict. Based on the COW data up to 1992 and newspaper reports to date, the overall trend has been an increase in the number of times that China has projected its power. Including those incidents involving the United States, with very few exceptions, all of China’s modern power projections have occurred within the region including Taiwan, the disputed territories, and the South China Sea—just as this analysis hypothesize.

Although nearly every instance of past Chinese force projection is limited to a clearly defined theater, two caveats must be made. Between 1978 and 1986 there were five militarized disputes between China and Russia, of which four were clashes and the fifth, interstate war. Of the five disputes, only one was clearly instigated by the Chinese. Additionally, China confronted India in 1979 and 1985 with an alert and a military clash, respectively. In both of these disputes, though, COW data suggests that both India and China equally initiated the dispute. Although confrontations between these two countries and China may contradict the expectations of a defensive realist state according to the idea of a defensive perimeter, two points can be made in defense of these expectations. First, as defensive realism suggests, with the exception of one dispute, none of these conflicts were clearly initiated by the Chinese. Second, the idea of a defensive perimeter was based early in this paper on the idea of jing gho, the need for China’s borders to be secure. A challenge to the security of its northern and western borders by Russia and India respectively may be part of the explanation for such disputes outside of China’s defensive zone.

Military Modernization and Weapons Buildup

Military modernizations have by far brought the most scrutiny to the evolving policies of the People’s Republic of China. The most important questions that policymakers and scholars alike have been asking are: 1) what are the capabilities of the modern Chinese war-fighting machine? and 2) what are the intentions of the regime with a newly modernized military? The most recent catalyst of all of this analysis was the announcement early in 2001 that the PRC would increase military expenditures by 17 percent.[24] In order to understand the implications of such a policy initiative, however, one must consider some basic theories concerning arming and the propensity to go to war.

One such argument is that of para bellum, which makes the case for a deterrent strategy, whereby if one desires peace then one must prepare for war.[25] At the same time, though,

…Arms buildups may only represent a shift in the balance of power that is fundamentally more significant to the relationship than the military buildup itself.[26]

A country will arm itself for a variety of reasons: in response to arms buildups in a rivalry, national pride, defensive means, future plans of projecting power in order to achieve policy objectives, and the list goes on. This paper and adherents to defensive realism argue that a country will arm itself and modernize its military to the point of parity or near-parity with its nearest strategic competitor. Additionally, the defensive realist state seeks to establish a minimum credible deterrent whereby it has the military force to back up it claims to and its projections within its defensive sphere. The objective will be to create both a theater denial capability, especially in terms of US access to the Pacific region,[27] and the means to effectively decide military incidents with other states in the region. In the case of China, building up its military will hopefully create a credible deterrent and thus avoid the need to project significant amounts of force into its defensive zone.

Realism suggests that displays of resolve and capability will deter aggression, so arms and allies could help avoid unwanted conflict escalation. If that fails, however, they are useful tools for fighting a war.[28]

Accordingly, the conclusion of this brief section on the impact of military modernizations is that the actual buildup cannot be considered a threat in and of itself. Part of the explanation for this is that military expenditures are highly correlated with GNP, and therefore countries will arms themselves more as they have more resources. Based on China’s rapid growth in GNP in recent decades, it should not be all that surprising that resources dedicated to modernizing the military have increased. However, the threat emerges when one considers how China will project its newfound military power based on its increasingly nationalistic political and socio-economic agenda.

The rest of this section will be divided into three main sub-sections: the buildup of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenals in the Chinese military, the increase and modernization of conventional forces, and the threat posed by continuing proliferation efforts of the People’s Republic of China.

Nuclear Weapons Modernization Efforts

According to estimates, the People’s Republic of China’s current nuclear arsenal consists of about:

400 devices, 300 of which consist of warheads and gravity [dumb] bombs for use on its strategic “triad” of land-based ballistic missiles, bomber and attack aircraft, and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)…[and] has enough fissile material to double or triple its arsenal.[29]

Moreover,

China is nearing an historic convergence between doctrine and capability, allowing it to increasingly achieve a degree of credible minimal deterrence vis-à-vis the continental United States—a convergence of its doctrine and capability it has not confidently possessed since the weaponization of China’s nuclear program in the mid-1960s.[30]

That doctrine can be seen in the statements, informal motivations, and beliefs of modern Chinese foreign policy. This effective growth in power projection capability coupled with a long-standing animosity towards the so-called Western imperialists makes for a very tumultuous situation. The theoretical framework under which the paper operates would conclude that China would use nuclear weapons as an “offensive, preventive war strategy.” As modernization is still under way, there is no way that the PRC could detect, let alone defend, an incoming attack.[31] What this suggests is that China intends on continuing its nuclear buildup, albeit at lower levels, and with a greater emphasis on more technologically advanced weapons rather than sheer numbers of nuclear warheads and related delivery vehicles. According to intelligence community estimates, much of the doctrine that has directed the nuclear drive and other military modernizations still carries from the policies implored by Mao Zedong.

…Chinese communist military success of “People’s War” emphasized guerilla tactics within a protracted war strategy, the importance of manpower over technology, the moral and physical attrition of the enemy over times, and the importance of controlling the strategic “hinterland” to surround the enemy’s base in the developed urban centers. For nuclear doctrine, this translated into 1) opposition to quick or preemptive military action from a position of weakness, 2) an appreciation for “strategic retreat” and the primacy of defense in the interest of eventual victory, 3) a subordination of a strictly military viewpoint to the political-military goals of the revolution and 4) the ultimate superiority of man over weapons and technology.[32]

This was the military doctrine that Mao preached would help the Chinese to emerge as a global power. Even today, China’s strategy focuses on winning without fighting, transforming its capabilities “beyond limited war,” and employing asymmetric and irregular warfare tactics to defeat enemies with overwhelming strength and deployment capabilities.[33] Additionally, the last point that Mao highlights—the superiority of man over technology—seems to carry some explanation for the reason that the Chinese WMD program has progressed in the manner that has been observed. The Chinese nuclear arsenal is still extremely limited and although it has the capability to hit the continental United States, a credible minimal deterrent threshold (at least from the US perspective of mutual assured destruction from the Cold War) has not yet been attained.

To underscore China’s strategy, during a meeting between a retired American military official and a high-ranking People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer statements were issued in which tensions flared over US support of Taiwan’s autonomy from the mainland and the use of nuclear weapons. During the exchange, the PLA officer stated that under no circumstances would the United States deploy nuclear weapons against mainland China, for they care more about Los Angeles than about Taipei and the rest of Taiwan. In the end, the PLA officer stated, “If you hit us, we will hit you too.”[34] This anecdote stresses the feelings that the Chinese hold and the motivation behind their buildup of nuclear arms.

First, China’s historical perceptions of itself as a “victim” at the hands of aggressive, more powerful states limited political choices—especially in the early years of China’s nuclear weapons development—which may have favored more offensive and threatening nuclear postures. Second, the period of China’s early development and eventual deployment of its rudimentary nuclear arsenal coincided closely with a turbulent period of domestic political upheaval.[35]

China’s official policy on the use of nuclear weapons is that they were developed simply for defensive purposes and that China has adopted a no-first use policy. The damning part of this argument is that the no-first use policy only applies to states that China views as independent of itself. Regions such as Taiwan, the Spratley Islands, and other territory in the South China Sea to which China has laid claim are not necessarily included in such a no-first use policy (it is essential to note of course that the use of nuclear weapons in situations such as the above mentioned is highly unlikely, for it would undoubtedly “mutilate the prize in the process”[36]). Additionally, the possible futility of China’s no-first use policy simply fits with the capabilities of its current arsenal and the failure to actually assert a credible minimum deterrent.[37]

Conventional Force Modernizations

In addition to the growth in nuclear arsenals, during the 1991 Gulf War the Chinese finally saw the true capabilities of the US military and its advanced laser-guided munitions (LGMs). Such precision in weaponry posed a direct threat to the growing Chinese arsenals and provided a further impetus for the development of highly developed military assets. As such, in its White Paper on Defense Policy in 2000, the Chinese government stated that its objective was to maintain a new kind of regional stability and security and to prevent the encroachment of foreign governments on China’s sovereign interests in the South China Sea.[38] Such a statement is very consistent with the rhetoric and military posture that one could expect from a defensive realist state. China’s conventional forces have been undergoing rapid modernization efforts and engaging in regular war games as a form of foreign policy. It is in this sector of the Chinese military that conventional deterrence is established. With a recent concentration on rapid mobility operations, maritime denial, long-range air raids, and various air combat missions,[39] China has striven towards forming joint operations command systems and joint logistics systems,[40] seemingly directing military planning towards commodity consolidation.

The modernization efforts have increased the effectiveness of the Chinese military, yet their military still remains significantly below levels of parity with the US military in the Asia-Pacific region. The People’s Liberation Army has undergone considerable changes in recent years. The national government, in attempts to appear less corrupt to the international community, has worked to divest national industries from PLA influence. Additionally, the 1.7 million man ground forces that comprise the PLA have been shaved down in order to be a more flexible structure to face the challenges of modern warfare,[41] and seems to represent a more defensive move rather than an offensive buildup. The result of this move will be to increase the mobility of ground forces, enable the military to rapidly deploy, and decrease the amount of bureaucracy in the PLA. The greatest hindrance, though, remains the PLA’s sealift capability, which can only carry between 10,000 and 15,000 PLA troops (plus vehicles and paratroopers).[42] This deficiency places the potential for a successful amphibious assault on Taiwan as poor at best. However, recent modernizations and decreases in the size of the infantry will arguably make this a concern in the near term if these efforts are successful in making the PLA a more flexible and transportable fighting asset.

Together with large-scale weapons sales from Russia, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), has boosted its capabilities. The disclosure of plans to acquire two 8,000-ton Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers (DDGs)[43]—whose principle aim will be to reject the sea lanes of the South China Sea to anyone opposing China’s policies in its defensive perimeter—reinforces the growth in the blue-water naval capacity of the PLAN. One expert defense analyst posits that,

The trend in modern naval warfare in the 21^st century…will likely involve states which seek to deny control of some portion of the sea to the powerful navies, whether at a critical choke point or in the waters adjacent to their coast.[44]

Recent naval acquisitions and military exercises by the Chinese support this claim as a means of defending their defensive zone.

Finally, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is also benefiting from advanced Russian deliveries. The Su-20MKK deep-strike and interceptor and the Su-27UBK fighter have increased the PLAAF’s regional air superiority.[45] Although by Western military standards these do not pose a credible threat to global air superiority, in regional and localized conflicts such improvements increase Chinese capabilities tremendously and are thus very much in line with the predictions of defensive realism’s military buildup. As an aside, it is important to note that in the 1990s Israel opted at the last minute not to sell the Phalcon airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft to China; however, reports following the take down of the US Navy EP-3 plane suggest that the Chinese F-8 jet was armed with Israeli-sold Python-3 missiles. This weapons sales path will have to be closely monitored in the future, not only to see how far the Chinese are progressing, but how much of Israel’s advanced weapons systems that are indigenously created by the United States are being sold to the Chinese. Such sales of US-originated technology pose a threat to the United States as its military secrets are sold by a close ally to a threat in the Asia-Pacific theater. However, the Sino-Israeli relationship that involves the proliferation of US weaponry is a subject in and of itself that must be explored in further analyses.

Finally, while still undergoing military modernizations, China conducts annual (if not more frequent) war games in the South China Sea and in the Straits of Taiwan. The use of commercial frigates and freighters in these exercises puts into question how much the Chinese need to streamline their army in order to be able to transport more of the PLA in an amphibious attack.[46] According to reports by Beijing sources,

…The main goals of the exercises are to practice “attacking and occupying an outlying Taiwanese island and fighting off an aircraft carrier.” The mention of an aircraft carrier was seen as a reference to the U.S. Navy.[47]

Such a statement of definitive purpose in the exercises underscores that the Chinese would militarily confront the United States, but only in the sphere of influence where China asserts a defensive realist posture. Although the modern Chinese military has increased its professionalism and its level of technology, the Communist Party still strives to ensure unwavering loyalty to the Party through mandatory ideological training for the rank and file military personnel.[48] The Chinese government’s social policy of maintaining control over its citizenry is easily implemented within the military structure and as such, the result is a military force always willing to execute the policies of the central government.

By all indications, China has geared its modernization efforts into what it views as a defensive posture. More precisely, China has streamlined its infantry and armored divisions for rapid deployment, acquired sea vessels capable of denying access to foreign navies into the South China Sea, and bought advanced fighter aircraft capable of regional deployments and engagements. These developments seem indicative of a very restrained offensive buildup, capable of exacting itself anywhere within China’s defensive perimeter. It is in this respect that these moves can be viewed as defensive, for China will most likely need to respond rapidly to a crisis within its defensive zone instigated by another state. Based on this analysis of Chinese military developments, it seems that all of them are consistent with the suggestions of defensive realism.

Chinese Proliferation Policies

Coupled with nuclear and conventional military modernizations are the proliferation policies in which the Chinese regularly engage. Reports indicate that the Chinese assisted the Iraqis, against UN sanctions, in laying fiber optic cable that linked Iraqi missile batteries and their long-range radar deployments.[49] Additionally, on May 1, 2001 a US spy satellite observed the shipment of nuclear-capable missile components entering Pakistan from across the Chinese border.[50] The Bush Administration has also placed sanctions on the Chinese arms manufacturer, China Metallurgical Equipment, for continued sales of missile technology to Pakistan.[51] Although some may argue that China’s proliferation to Pakistan merely seeks to offset China’s regional competitor in India,[52] fears of continued Chinese proliferation not only threaten stability of the regions to which Chinese weapons are being proliferated but also jeopardize overarching US foreign policy concerns. The biggest recipients of Chinese-proliferated weapons are North Korea, Pakistan, and Iraq—three countries that the United States has at some point deemed as rogue states and against which the United States intends to deploy a national missile defense (NMD). Finally, compounding the extensions of the Sino-Russian Friendship Pact are reports by the US intelligence community (IC) that Russia and China are working jointly in developing systems capable of cyber attacks against the United States through information warfare.[53]

Sales of technology further assist the growing Chinese economy and fund the modernizing Chinese military projects. Policymakers in China see arms sales as a foreign policy tool and a way for China to create new political ties with other countries.[54] Such a strategy of proliferation is much more representative of a defensive realist state than an offensive state. If China’s ambition is to create alliances and friendly political relations and in doing so is able to benefit their economy, its behavior is most consistent with a defensive realist state. Regardless of the destabilizing effect of weapons sales to the regions to which China proliferates, if the goal of selling arms is to gain partners then the Chinese display defensive realist traits. The IC’s assessment of China’s current activities is as follows:

…In the last two decades the overall scope of Chinese proliferation activities has declined across the board. The geographic distribution of Chinese proliferation-relevant exports has narrowed from almost a dozen countries to three: Iran, Pakistan, and to a lesser extent North Korea.[55]

In the Sino-Iranian relationship, it is important to note that reports have surfaced suggesting that Chinese weapons sales to Iran have been conducted in exchange for Iran’s non-interference with upheaval in China’s Muslim-dominated Xinjiang province. Chinese firms, outside of the central government, have also been found to be selling dual-use missile technology products to other countries, such as to Syria, Libya, and Iraq.[56]

The best way to interpret recent military modernization by the PRC is that the increased capabilities of the PLA is a military advantage in the PRC’s dyadic relationship with Taiwan and has increased the possibility for a much more belligerent Chinese stance on reunification.[57]

In sum, a few points need to be reiterated concerning the modernization of China’s military. Defensive realism theorizes that a state will increase its military assets to the point of near-parity with its closest strategic competitor and in doing so will seek to establish a credible minimal deterrent. Coupling this is the defensive realist state’s desire to establish a defensive perimeter within which it can effectively project its power. China has increased its military assets in some places, utilized technological advances to increase its lethality, and streamlined other portions of its war-fighting machine to respond to warfare challenges in the twenty-first century. The result has been the creation of a military force posture geared to defending a defensive zone that still retains a significant Chinese loss of strength gradient outside of this perimeter. China’s military has created a nuclear deterrent in its region and embarked on an air force and naval doctrine centered on theater denial capability. Finally, its ground forces have been improved to create the ability for rapid mobilization within the defensive perimeter. As such, all of the developments of the PLA are consistent with those predictions of the defensive realist state.

Chinese Domestic Social Policy

Mao Zedong once referred to the United States as a “paper tiger,” and as such any serious test of America’s resolve and ability to fight and win a war against the Chinese would be unsuccessful. Most people would heartily reject this notion in the twenty-first century with the United States at the head of a unipolar, hegemonic system. Instead, although Mao made this statement years ago, it continues to apply to the Chinese foreign policy making machine as it is representative of an enduring nationalistic call to right the humiliation of the Chinese at the hands of the West during the nineteenth century. Just one example of this comes from China’s ordinary citizens following the attacks on the United States on September 11. Being described as a “dangerous sign of political immaturity and chip-on-the-shoulder nationalism,” internet chat rooms on September 11, 2001 had comments that read, “Now the day has come for the American dogs…Serves ‘em right…So cool to see America bombed. Guys, let’s use the Internet to wage war on ‘em as well.”[58] Although not representative of the overarching political attitude in the People’s Republic of China, these statements go a long way in expressing underlying social feelings. Considering the impact of the downfall of China following the era of dynasties, though, it should not be surprising at all that many Chinese have adopted the feeling of jing gho or safe and secure borders for China. This idea conveys the feeling that the Chinese want to be free from what they view as corrupting influences from Western nations and wish to secure their own borders for internal growth and ascension.

Part of China’s nationalism is rooted in its domestic social policy. This internal policy is a good indicator of how foreign policy will be formed on a few different levels. First, criticism of China’s social and human rights policies by members of the international community inevitably sours relations on other foreign policy matters and incites a more belligerent stance by the Chinese. Second, part of China’s nationalist agenda demands that it present a unified front to the world. The backbone of this unification is a suppressive domestic social policy. Finally, as Table 1 indicated earlier in this paper, a defensive realist state will have very clear political policy objectives and an attempt to subvert these will result in power projection. One of these objectives is the international recognition of the right to national sovereignty. The Chinese are ardent in their belief that one nation should not meddle in another sovereign country’s issues. As such, a social policy that operates without regard for international condemnation supports this belief. Accordingly, if the Chinese deem it inappropriate for members of the international community to comment on its social policy, then surely much stronger objections will follow in foreign policy decisions such as Taiwan, which China believes to be the issue of a sovereign nation.

Typically, realism does not allow for one to inspect the domestic factors that motivate state policy because it assumes a unitary state. However, this component of realism must be relaxed, as China’s nationalist agenda demands a unified front to present to the world. In order to create this singularity, China’s central government has suppressed various internal voices within the state. Accordingly, the social aspects of Chinese domestic and international affairs in recent times must be analyzed in order to predict effectively how its government will project its power in the near term. Defensive realism has incorporated this flexibility into its interpretation of realism and theorizes about likely domestic policies for a nation. It suggests that a state will control internal dissent to the point that it appears unified in its national policies to the international community. A defensive realist state will be able to be differentiated from an offensive realist state, though, in that it will respond to some degree to international pressures against the suppression of minorities and opposition voices.

Although many inside the mainland hold deep sentiments about the aura of greatness to which they believe China is intrinsically blessed, there are social groups that are ostracized by the communist regime in hopes of retaining a firm hold over the population and conveying a unified image to the rest of the world. Much of this internal strife is concentrated in the Xinjiang Province of Western China. There, the communist Chinese forces continue to crack down on Muslim separatists in what remains a tremendous human rights problem in the country. This region, comprised heavily of Uighurs, a Turkic-speaking group of Muslims, is a locale of continuing government persecution and the only place that people are regularly put to death by the regime for trying to divide the country.[59]

The Chinese government says that the executions are meant to keep the separatist threat in check, arguing that Beijing is battling Islamic terrorists not unlike those the United States is fighting in Afghanistan, just a few hundred miles away.[60]

Though the United States is currently waging a war against terrorism, the threat from within China is not commensurate with the type of crackdowns being observed. This justification by the Chinese is part of the fine line between offensive and defensive realist social policy. The Chinese responded to international criticism of the treatment of Muslim citizens by trying to rationalize the policy in terms of the US war on terrorism, something to which the United States and international community could relate. Innocent and guilty alike are executed regularly with no clear explanation or warning to their families. Additionally, the observance of Muslim holidays such as Ramadan are discouraged by tax breaks for stores and restaurants that stay open during prayer hours, and children are encouraged to eat meals during the fast at school.[61] All of this state violence continues, even though the Uighurs pose little to no violent threat to the state apparatus. Continuing instability in the Xinjiang region also threatens oil exploration efforts and pipeline construction between China and Central Asian reserves that have been seen as a potential alternative to growing Chinese-Middle Eastern oil dependency.[62] Not only are pipelines in jeopardy for their own security, but also the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang is arguably the biggest domestic oil production possibility in the near term.[63] Disruption and sabotage of refining and extraction efforts by separatist Uighuirs threatens the greatest hope for a modicum of Chinese self-dependence.

In addition to the suppression of minority Muslim rights in the Xinjiang Province, workers’ rights have been compromised in the movement towards incorporation into the global capitalist market.

As private and foreign companies race ahead in newer industrial centers…a new kind of working class is emerging, one dominated by rural migrants who have no tradition of unions or the security once enjoyed in state enterprises.[64]

Instead of receiving proper rights such as fair pay, health care, adequate working conditions, and fair hours of labor, this new breed of workers in the multinational corporation factories that have proliferated in China for the cheap labor have been exploited in hopes of obtaining a slightly cheaper product.

Working to join the WTO and to be a sponsor of the Olympics underscores the Chinese desire to push concerns for these domestic human rights abuses out of the way of international scrutiny so that China’s image can continue to rise as defensive realism would predict. Additionally, working to join the WTO is an objective also rather close to the hypotheses of defensive realism. In order to respond to international pressures concerning workers’ rights, China worked to increase the stakes for continued international objections by incorporating the protests into the framework of trade relationships instead of acceding to the remonstrations of other countries.

Additionally, in seeking to maintain its image as a unified and effective Communist regime, the Chinese government monitors tens of thousands of its own citizens in order to assure Party loyalty and in order to crackdown on any persons that attempt to challenge its rule.[65] Part of this involves the continuing crackdowns on personal freedoms by the communist regime through attempts to curb the proliferation of internet usage in the country, by imposing restrictions on websites that run counter to the Party’s objectives in what has been termed the “Great Firewall of China.”[66]

On the whole, domestic social policy is one of the more difficult aspects of defensive realism to prove. Part of this draws from the natural schism that exists between realism and internal state policies. However, social policy provides a gauge by which one can predict foreign policy direction based on the treatment of domestic social groups. In China’s case, the international community has voiced its disapproval of China’s human rights record. However, China has been able to sidestep the issue without ignoring the international community and other nations, but by increasing the stakes of protesting by inciting fear of trade disruptions. Consequently, based on the cases of domestic social policy presented above, it is the conclusion of this author that were the international community to take a firm enough stance and demand reform within China and present repercussions for non-compliance, China would likely acquiesce to some degree. It is for that reason that China represents a defensive realist state with respect to domestic social policy more so than an offensive realist nation.

Political Rhetoric in Communist China

In the late Stalin era, the principles of Communist foreign policy that were shared by all such states at the time argued the world was composed of two hostile camps in which the Socialist states and its allies are aligned against the so-called imperialist states.[67] Over a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, China still views itself entrenched in a rivalry with the Western states, namely the United States.

[O]ld paranoias and antagonisms, lurking beneath the surface of China’s status quo internationalism, surfaced after 4 June 1989, reminding us that at least the Old Guard and its designated successors to the ideological presuppositions and reflexes of forty years ago were still present.[68]

Instead of trying to confront its adversary in a lopsided military confrontation, China has adopted a policy by which it shuns the outside world and seeks to maintain control over its defensive sphere of influence. Defensive realism claims that a state will have clearly-defined political objectives, whereas the offensive realist state will employ open and aggressive political rhetoric with intentions that are unclear at best.

Scholars of the Chinese political system argue that were the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy ever to come under serious threat (although an internal threat), no rhetoric or diplomatic coercion by the United States could halt a massive Chinese military engagement with any of its competitors, notably Taiwan.[69] Such an argument represents two very clear political objectives that theorists of defensive realism have argued would exist. One is the necessity of the survival of the Chinese Communist Party and the second is the retention of Taiwan as part of mainland China. In the previous section, it was argued that China views its crackdown of separatists in the Xinjiang region as a justified move, much like the retaliatory strikes executed by the United States on targets in Afghanistan after September 11. At the same time, though, the official statement by the Chinese government was “wary support” for the American strikes. The Chinese continue to offer political acquiescence to the West that is motivated by the need for continued help in the economic modernization process.[70] This is evidence that the government in Beijing tends to remain rather schizophrenic in order to appease the West for continued support and in terms of its own human rights abuses, but then only offers marginal support for Western policies when they are seen as potentially inflammatory to the domestic political scene in China. Were China to be an offensive realist state, one would more likely observe much more belligerent political rhetoric and a fundamental lack of support for any US or Western initiative that did not directly support Chinese control of its defensive perimeter and economic growth and prosperity. Part of the need to avoid aggressive rhetoric that does not show clear Chinese intentions is a limit on how far Beijing can take economic warfare through rhetoric and policy without damaging ties to the United States and Japan, and keep sources of foreign investment which are vital to economic growth and survival of Communist Party power.[71]

Central to maintaining an environment favorable to the Communist Party are lessons learned from the Soviet experience. The Chinese witnessed the ill effects of glasnost and perestroika and thus the Chinese Communist Party is reluctant to introduce reforms.[72] Additionally, creating positive relations with other countries is crucial for continued growth of China. Clear and transparent rhetoric, followed by logical policies is the only way for such an environment to be fostered. One example of this is that tight ties with Russia are needed to solidify opportunities for necessary arms transfers and trade.[73] Only by using rational and controlled political rhetoric and policies by which defensive realism is characterized can the Chinese enjoy the benefits of positive relations.

On the other hand, the future of Chinese foreign policy may hinge on underlying political attitudes and perceptions by the Chinese government. Feelings of soft containment and strategic isolation of China by the United States could cause China to become more aggressive and less cooperative.[74] For example, recent efforts by the United States to strengthen relations with Russia and Japan may be viewed by China as a form of isolation. Consequently, China’s political rhetoric, especially with respect to policy within its defensive perimeter would likely become stronger and quarrelsome. It is believed that China is greatly concerned with the US willingness to deploy forces to the Straits of Taiwan in defense of Taiwan as well as the warming relations of the United States with Australia and Japan. In many respects, the Chinese not only fear that Japan would become more active in the Straits due to US pressures, but more broadly perceive the onset of a wave of policies designed to contain China.[75] With the recent inclusion of the Russian Federation as a junior NATO partner, China’s fears of being isolated within the East Asia and Pacific region seem likely to be agitated even further.

Political rhetoric, much like domestic social policy, does not directly impact foreign policy as much as the other components of Table 1. However, like social policy, it acts as a litmus test by which one can estimate China’s future foreign policies. Defensive realism proposes that a state will use clear policy objectives as opposed to open and aggressive language. China has been very clear about its intentions to defend and project power into areas of its defensive zone. It has also been clear, more so by China’s attitudes than rhetoric, that continued threats or perceived threats to either the survival of the Communist Party or continued growth in China will result in stronger articulations of its policies and intentions.

Policy on Territory and Territorial Claims

One of the central, if not the central, tenets of defensive realism is that a state will view a target area as a defensive zone within which it is willing to project its power as necessary. Therefore, it would likely follow that a state’s policy on territory and territorial claims would incorporate those territories to which it lays claim. Additionally, a state is willing to conquer those territories that it claims as its own if a great enough threat to its defensive perimeter is perceived. In the case of China, one additional argument is made with respect to territorial claims and sovereignty issues. As a part of China’s policy of claiming a defensive zone, it cites the need for respect for national sovereignty. Accordingly, wherever a crisis arises in the world where territorial sovereignty issues are even a question, one can expect the rights of the nation being intruded upon to be eagerly defended by China.

Part of China’s defensive perimeter stems from Chinese claims to 80 percent of the territory within the South China Sea. Problems such as the fact that 70 percent of Japanese oil imports travel through this territory and past confrontations with the Australians over such waterways underscore that a defensive cordon has been implemented by the Chinese consistent with the hypotheses of defensive realism. Extensive analysis has already been conducted concerning power projections into China’s defensive zone and need not be revisited extensively in this section. Needless to say, crisis behavior, military modernization trends, and political rhetoric all support the notion that China has created a defensive perimeter within which the territories and countries are subject to Chinese power projections.

Additionally, as a part of China’s defense of territorial sovereignty issues, the Chinese have continued to defy Western powers, especially the United States, in their policy towards Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. China’s policy stance on Iraq serves two purposes in the Chinese political machine. First, the supposed erosion of national sovereignty is very similar to the argument used against US assistance to Taiwan. Issuing such an opinion towards the Iraqi situation deflects attention that this might be an argument for reunification with Taiwan. Second, as was discussed in the earlier sections concerning economic and military modernization, China’s flow of oil from the region and its sale of weapons systems to Iraq are greatly compromised if a continuation of sanctions policy against Iraq continues or if the United States deploys its military to oust the Hussein regime. As such, China’s official position remains that the

Sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Iraq must be preserved and any such violation of these rights is and should be punished as violations of international law.[76]

This statement provides a validation for why the Chinese are able to create and project into a defensive zone. The true test of this belief will remain to be seen if and when the Chinese are placed in a situation where any aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom or any subsequent operations within Iraq are voted on in the UN Security Council and the PRC is placed in a situation where it would decide to either vote for or against, abstain or exercise its veto. Additionally, because they have the clear political objective of maintaining control or at least status quo power over its defensive perimeter, China has satisfied two core arguments of defensive realism: political rhetoric and territorial policy.

International Organizations and Alliance Formation

In the past decades, as China’s economy, military, and political institutions have modernized, so too has its behavior with regard to international organizations and its willingness to enter into alliances. Defensive realism argues that a state will adopt cooperative behavior so long as it remains beneficial to the state’s power amalgamation and does not interfere with a nation’s securing of its defensive zone. However, defensive realism states that regional rivalries will be rampant and therefore a defensive realist state will only include itself in a regional alliance if it will play into that states’ potential to become a regional hegemon. Consequently, any alliance that exists on a regional level will be states weakly tied together, and instead the defensive realist state will participate in large-scale international organizations. On the whole, China’s behavior coincides very closely with these postulations.

A 1959 Sino-Soviet friendship pact underscored potential for cooperative behavior by the Chinese and on July 16, 2001, the two states once again signed an agreement of friendship and cooperation which opposed US NMD plans and backed China in its pursuit to reunify Taiwan with mainland China.[77] Such a political move underscores the transient nature of the Stalin-era rhetoric elaborated on in the section concerning political rhetoric, and reinforces the belief that China still feels a high degree of competition with Western nations. This Russian-Chinese alliance, though, is not even close to the strength of the 1959 treatise because the two nations are still very suspicious of one another—consistent with defensive realism’s theory on regional alliances. At the same time, though, $1.5 billion has been traded from Russia to China and 40 percent of Russian arms exports are destined for China.[78] One perspective of this modern relationship is that China views working cooperatively with the Russians as a defensive policy, working to craft foreign policy that will balance against the United States. As defensive realism purports, China has adopted a policy of cooperation that suits its purposes of offsetting the US global influence, specifically in China’s theater of operations.

Additionally, in the past five years or so, China has geared its economic and trade policy towards joining the World Trade Organization. General trade and work to gain admittance into the WTO comprise an essential part of the economic segment of Chinese foreign policy. China’s ascension into the WTO offers promise for much of the American business community, but also threatens the ability of the United States to protest extreme violations of international human rights norms and will thus throw such arguments into the international forum. Therefore, as defensive realism suggests, joining the WTO allows the Chinese to appear to be a responsible and peaceful participant in a large-scale international organization. The economic benefits of the WTO provide China with unparalleled opportunities for trade and economic expansion. Such involvement also serves a dual purpose of restricting the degree to which other states, namely the United States, can protests China’s domestic social policies or any power projections within its defensive perimeter.

Finally, China’s bid to harness power in a centralized regional arc is underscored by its moves to gain political leverage with states of the region.

As more and more Pacific nations suffer from political upheaval and aid dependency on the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, it appears China is offering millions of dollars in untied “grants” to governments in the region that seek an alternative.[79]

This alternative to international lending houses could arguably lead to a regional hegemony that could be defended by the modernized military and growth in economic strength seen in China’s recent development. Beijing has also used membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum to fend off efforts to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea.[80] Both of these policies of the Chinese government are consistent with defensive realism’s argument that a state is self-serving in the degree to which it is cooperative with other nations in the region. In both of the above cases, China has appeared cooperative in order to gain financial leverage over other Asian-Pacific nations. Additionally, efforts to use ASEAN underscores the argument that China will appear to be an active member in international organizations so long as this involvement assists in securing a defensive zone and thus status as a regional hegemon.

Economic Components of Chinese Foreign Policy

As scholars debate China’s growth and its future role in the international community, the topic of debate that typically arises just after military modernization is that of the immense growth in Chinese gross domestic product (GDP). China’s increasing economic strength and influence has placed it in a position of great leverage with its trading partners. Moreover, it has become incumbent upon the Chinese government to ensure economic growth to buttress a political order whose ideology collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union.[81] Defensive realism makes the argument that a state will work to champion regional resources, join global trade organizations, and exploit cheap domestic labor, as these actions suit a policy of economic growth. China’s economic policy has been somewhat hampered by its dependence on resources and capital, namely oil and other energy products, to sustain its growth. The growth in China’s economy and its policies regarding power projections and the need to have a military to defend its economic assets are commensurate with this dependence and defensive realism.

One of the greatest problems of Chinese dependence is domestic oil consumption. Such a large emphasis is placed on this policy because problems concerning the control and security of oil deposits could prompt the sale of conventional weapons and development and proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to maintain these resource flows.[82] In 1998, China’s dependence on external oil imports had grown to 26 percent and domestic demand for crude oil products has continued to rise.[83]

With fuel oil, LPG [liquefied petroleum gas], and diesel demand likely to continue steady growth in 1999, particularly as the government continues its large-scale infrastructure investment projects, oil consumption is likely to increase by a further 1.5 to 3.0%.[84]

The growth in government-sponsored investment projects, coupled with a trend already having domestic demands in excess of domestic production potential, provided the impetus for an increase in dependence on foreign oil imports. A continuation of current trends suggests that by 2020, China’s domestic demand for petrol products would exceed its domestic production by a factor of two.[85] Compounding this trend are estimates that by 2020, China could be 90 percent dependent on oil exports from the Middle East.[86] Such forecasts suggest that the exorbitant sums of money that are sure to reach the Middle East from China will arguably become entangled with a growing arms and technology trade pipeline between the two regions, destabilizing two already insecure regions.

 

Figure 1

 

In working to solve its oil deficit, the PRC has looked to places such as Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Sudan, Iraq, and Peru for oil imports.[87] It may not be surprising to note the connection between potential oil suppliers such as Sudan and Iraq and the appearance of Chinese-sold weapons systems.

They’re paranoid about it…China and India will grow more aligned to the Middle East. It’s a good bet that China will barter weapons for some of the oil…a mysterious trading company under the Chinese Defense Ministry—outside of the normal state oil-importing apparatus—imports 150,000-plus barrels a day from Iran. China’s oil insecurity helps to explain its interest in building a navy. Indonesian waters are infested with pirates and the archipelago is in danger of a social meltdown. Millions of barrels of oil a day already flow through the choke point of the Strait of Malacca to Northeast Asia.[88]

Herein lies the connection between possible oil-for-weapons programs conducted by the Chinese government and part of a desire to have a regional monopoly on blue-water naval capabilities. Most of the motivation behind this is the future threat to export routes in the oil market generated by localized conflicts and regional instability.[89] The problem is complicated by the crossing of multinational oil trade routes through the region and multiple territorial claims on waterways and lands that are in the middle of these same routes. As China’s oil imports increase, they will attempt to safeguard their oil lanes. China claims 80 percent of the South China Sea as Chinese territory and 70 percent of all of Japan’s oil imports pass through this same South China Sea.[90] This clash of interests suggests that the tumultuous situation may only get worse if these disputes are not adjudicated and current oil consumption and military modernization trends continue. China’s energy policy will become a much greater focal point for potential conflict in the future if its current net importation trends continue and its desire to become further involved in the global economy based on an oil-dependent infrastructure continue. Consequently, claims to oil-rich regions in the South China Sea may become a much greater concern for military deployments and a source of insecurity in the region,[91] as defensive realism predicts.

While expanding its economy, the People’s Republic of China has created an enormous trade imbalance with the United States. By utilizing cheap domestic labor and resource prices, the Chinese have gained leverage over the United States that poses a threat to future US economic security. The evolution of this dyadic trade relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.[92]

Figure 2

 

The gap between the United States and China and indications of growing discontinuity in the trade balance endangers prospects for a fair bilateral trade relationship in the future. Hopefully, admittance and faithful participation in the WTO will bring about the idea of free and fair trade in the global community. In addition, reports in the early days of George W. Bush’s administration indicated that China’s need for the United States as a viable and growing market in the future would outweigh its anger at many US policies such as those in Iraq, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and the militarized dispute over the downing of the US Navy reconnaissance plane.[93] Moreover, if China becomes confrontational with the United States, its opportunities for increased integration into the global economy are compromised in addition to providing the United States with wiggle room to strengthen its ties with Taiwan.[94]

Economic explosions in Taiwan and in Hong Kong have arguably motivated mainland China to expand its economic potential to new heights. From Taiwan’s perspective, there has been a significantly increasing outflow of high-tech companies to the mainland in search of cheap labor.[95] The trend that is emerging is of a Taiwan that is tied to the mainland to a much higher degree then they ever could have predicted or probably desired. One example of this trend is the lifting of investment curbs with the mainland by Taiwan to provided China with the infrastructure to pair with its large engineering-trained workforce to produce raw materials for advanced microchips.[96] Logically, Taiwan may face the same fate of a trade deficit as the United States; however the stakes for Taiwan will be much greater.

Growing trade deficits between China and the United States and Taiwan reveals a lot about the prospects for conflict in the future. As the United States and Taiwan both become more dependent on Chinese products, the potential for China to project its power increases dramatically. The growing degree of China’s economic leverage increases the costs for any military intervention by the United States in response to China’s foreign policy initiatives. Additionally, as Taiwan’s dependence on China’s economy increases, its ability to implement inflammatory policies such as pro-independence statements diminishes greatly.

Based on the economic case study of China, nearly all of its economic policies are consistent with a defensive realist state’s traits. The policies that China has adopted have resulted in such remarkable economic expansion that now position China in a leveraging stance, whereby it can defend its power projections into its defensive perimeter. Moreover, many scholars point to China’s behavior during the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis in which China opted not to devalue the yen, accepting the costly effects of such a decision in light of stabilizing the precarious economic situation. As observers speculated about the potential devaluation of the yen, holding off on such a move arguably increased Beijing’s repuational payoff.[97] By increasing its influence on global trade, China has increased the stakes of intervention by any of its biggest trading partners. Of the Chinese policies most likely to elicit strong international objections, the most noteworthy are power projections intent on securing oil trade routes from the Middle East. Additionally, as defensive realism argues, China is seeking to champion regional resources and oil extraction projects inside of its defensive zone. Such a circumstance would be the best situation for the Chinese, whereby it could secure energy resources via power projection, yet limit international sanctioning of such policies by maintaining growing global trade imbalances in its favor.