The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the rebuilding of Iraq. It is based upon newspaper and magazine articles, websites, lectures, books, and reports produced by organizations evaluating the rebuilding process. After providing a synopsis of the current situation, examples will be drawn from past countries that have undergone rebuilding after war. These examples will then be compared to the current Iraqi situation. Based on the analysis of the information, recommendations for future actions will be defined. Besides providing recommendations for rebuilding Iraq, this paper should serve as a blueprint for macrolevel planning for rebuilding nations after war.

The rationale for looking to past examples to help address a current situation is based on Richard Neustadt and Ernest May’s book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers. They observed that George Marshall, father of the Marshall Plan, developed the idea of time as a stream, rather than a single isolated event in history. Marshall realized that by learning from past wars such as World War I, valuable information could be gained for the future. This helped him plan to rebuild Europe after World War II. [6]

Current Situation

The United States views the situation in Iraq as one of repairing, not rebuilding. In a June 19, 2003 New York Times article, Andrew Natsios, the director of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), stated, “You won’t see a lot of new buildings. We are going to take the existing infrastructure and repair it.” At that time, he predicted that the United States would not increase its budget past $2.4 billion for rebuilding. [7] However, Natsios miscalculated the figure. Even more appalling was an estimated total cost of $50 to $60 million for rebuilding presented by Mitch Daniels, who led a group in the National Security Council. [8] Contradicting earlier estimates, President George W. Bush sent a bill to Congress in September 2003 to increase spending in Iraq. The bill requested $87 billion for US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, with $20.3 billion going towards Iraqi reconstruction and the rest towards military expenditures. [9] Why there was such a large discrepancy between the first estimate of needed repair costs and the later figures is explained below.

 

World Bank rebuilding cost estimates are higher than expected and have necessitated vast foreign aid. [10]

 

One outcome of the war that was not expected was the constant sabotage on the Iraqi infrastructure and the assaults on coalition troops and supporters. On June 23, 2003, a forty-inch oil export line was ruptured by an explosive. Subsequently, Iraqis have worked to fix the line, but this situation has become common. [11] Sabotage has caused the oil business to stagnate. [12] What is so critical about the oil exports is that they were supposed to help fund the reconstruction effort. [13]

Aerial bombing during the war and sabotage have also led to a nonfunctioning power grid. A May 26 Chicago Tribune article reported:

Before the war, Hussein ordered tiny homing devices be put atop dozens of transmission towers to trick US pilots into thinking the towers were military targets, Iraqi electrical engineers said. More than forty towers were destroyed or damaged by US bombers not intending to target the power system.

In addition, looters have stolen parts and equipment from the system. [14]

However, there has been progress in the challenge to restore power. By October 6, 2003, power in Iraq had been restored to prewar levels. Natsios said that USAID, with the help of the Bechtel Corporation, plans to have power restored to 75 percent of Iraqis by 2004. Currently Iraq is producing 4,400 megawatts of power with a demand of roughly 9,000 megawatts. Another part of the power grid project is to build smaller generators to power the water and sewer services. This would ensure basic services even if the power goes down again. [15]

What has surprised the US postwar administration the most has been the constant string of attacks on US soldiers. The administration thought that the hardships were over relatively early in the military campaign. This is evident by a May 1 speech by President Bush in which he said, “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended.” [16] However, nearly every day a US soldier has died. In a July 5 Chicago Tribune report, it was disclosed that Iraqi insurgents launched an attack on a US patrol and wounded sixteen soldiers. This was preceded by a message sent by Saddam Hussein calling for “days of hardship” for coalition troops. [17] In a July 4 New York Times piece, a US general declared that the US was “still at war.” This was two months after President Bush declared an end to major combat. [18] These attacks have continued and intensified up to the time of this writing.

Constant attacks have taken place throughout Iraq since the end of major combat. [19]

The United States further incited the resistance by disbanding the Iraqi army in May. This put thousands of armed Iraqis into the street without pay and without reason to be loyal to the US peacekeeping and rebuilding efforts. In December, a commission created by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University had argued that if the Iraqi army was retrained to restore civil order in the streets, they could have ensured peace and stability. [20]        

What makes this a larger issue are the sheer numbers of unemployed soldiers. The 250,000 former soldiers out of work make up two-thirds of the entire workforce. [21] This is a serious problem because it leaves them without purchasing power, anything to do and causes their frustrations to grow throughout the population.

The United States has since realized this blunder and started to train police and a militia. The United States is also building a new Iraqi army, to which they plan on giving the role of protecting infrastructure. This would reduce the burden of the coalition militaries from providing security to all aspects of Iraq. By July 22, 2003, 7,400 new Iraqi security officials were trained and hired. Already at the time, 32,000 police were working. The United States has begun giving Iraqi soldiers who are still unemployed transitional payments so they can reintegrate into society. [22]

Perhaps the biggest blow to the coalition in postwar reconstruction efforts was the bombing of the UN headquarters in August 2003. More than twenty people were killed, including UN special envoy Sergio Viera de Mello, and over one hundred were injured when a cement truck with a bomb blew up inside the building. The explosion was the worst attack on a UN civilian complex in the international organization’s history. [23] The bombing has caused the United Nations to pull its employees because of the severe security situation in Iraq. This leaves more of the burden on the Americans and the British.

Furthermore, an attack in late October 2003 on the International Red Cross in Baghdad has been the cause for many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to rethink their roles in Iraq. Many organizations are now pulling their aid workers out of Iraq, even though the Iraqis want them to stay. [24] The United Nations also decided to temporarily pull all of their Baghdad staff, so they could reassess the security situation and their roles in Iraq. [25]

Constant attacks, growing frustration from the Iraqis, and a sense of helplessness have contributed to reduction in the morale of the coalition troops. In addition, troops will be staying longer than expected. “Not since the Vietnam war have the families of American servicemen expressed such deep disquiet,” said an article in The Economist. Since other foreign countries have rejected the call to send troops to Iraq, the Department of Defense has extended the overseas missions for reservists and national guardsmen. [26]

“We all feel betrayed” is how one sergeant has put it. In several instances, officers have told their troops that they would be going home soon. “Before the war, one of the generals sending us off told us he’d bet his one star that we’d be home sixty days after the war,” another soldier explained. Perhaps best illustrating the feelings of the troops was a mock tombstone placed in the ground, with the word “morale” written on it. [27] The question then becomes how is it possible to transform a country that is hostile towards the foreign troops when the foreign troops are unmotivated to do the job.

One morale booster was the killing of Saddam Hussein’s two sons. They were behind many of the attacks on US troops in the region, and were second in command beneath their father. [28] The United States then showed journalists pictures of the dead Husseins, in an attempt to show the Iraqis that they were in less danger and to provide some sense of security to the US troops. However, the deaths of the Husseins have not stopped the daily attacks on US military servicemen.

Along with the burden of dealing with constant attacks, US troops and aid workers are charged with changing Iraqi society. USAID is trying to develop a market economy and privatize industry in Iraq. [29] This has been difficult because of the attacks and the inability of the United States to provide the necessities to run a business. In a May 27, 2003 Chicago Tribune article, an Iraqi businessman said, “We hoped we would have some benefit from the United States and all of its science and technology, but now it seems they can’t even do the simplest thing: electricity.” [30]

In addition, the communication and transportation networks have been interrupted. Businesses cannot communicate with suppliers. The local banks are also not functioning, which means that the businesses cannot get money to pay suppliers or employees. Security issues including looting, sabotage, and security for employees also play a part in business. [31]

According to L. Paul Bremer, the chief US administrator in Iraq, the economic situation is improving. The administration has begun paying for emergency construction projects and paying pensions to Iraqis. [32] “More than $2 billion have already been spent on food, health, electricity, and schools, and general reconstruction,” Natsios said. [33] These measures have not, however, provided enough of a boost to the Iraqi economy as would be desirable. Improving and securing the infrastructure is fundamental in advancing the economy of Iraq.

 

While there has been progress made in the reconstruction process, much work is left to be done. [34]

 

The problems with the economy have angered many Iraqis and have caused further disintegration of support for the US­British occupation. On October 1, 2003, a group of unemployed men rioted in central Baghdad. They had bribed police $100 to give them jobs. When the police officers reneged on their end of the deal, the men became enraged. A similar incident also took place in Mosul. [35] Iraqis are tiring of the occupation, and the situation is getting worse.

When all of the tensions and frustrations in Iraq are added up, a situation of turmoil is evident. All of this is left to be dealt with by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which is the title of the US­British leadership in Iraq. Bremer is faced with a great challenge, as a result of several factors. One is that Iraq has not experienced democracy. A totalitarian government ruled the people for thirty-five years. In the former Soviet Union, de-Stalinization occurred over several years. In Iraq, however, Saddam was removed in three weeks. Another reason is that Iraq’s neighbors, like Iran and Syria, want to see the new Iraq fail. Iraqi failure for these countries would mean that the US objective of changing the Middle East, hence reform of their governments, would not occur. [36]

The Iraqi Interim Governing Council operates under the jurisdiction of the coalition. This group consists of Iraqi leaders, selected by the CPA. Iraqi political, religious, and tribal leaders of most Iraqi ethnicities are part of this group. Their purpose is to lead the transition towards a democratic country. Their powers include filling vacant cabinet positions with interim ministers, appointing Iraqi representatives to the United Nations and drafting a constitution that will later be ratified by the Iraqi people. They have been recognized by the Arab League and have a representative. [37] The council has largely been successful in its duties.

 However, the Interim Governing Council has had many challenges. On September 25, 2003 Akila al-Hashimi, one of three women on the council, died of gunshot wounds. [38] The resistance is particularly resentful of the council, because of their cooperation with the United States and Great Britain.

Other problems in governing Iraq have been the double standards set up by the US administration. In Kirkuk, which is a vital oil town, a council of Kurdish people held an election and selected a mayor. US officials marked it as a significant step in the road to democracy. [39] The Kurds were important during the war as they fought alongside Americans. Similarly, in the southern city of Najaf, US marines helped organize an open election. Bremer, however, unilaterally cancelled the election because he did not think that the conditions in Najaf were ripe for a vote. [40] Najaf is a city that did not aid coalition troops in the war and therefore one could argue it did not receive the same benefits that northern-Kurdish towns received. This double standard has left much of the Iraqi public sympathizing with the resistance and calling into question cooperation with the coalition.

US officials have realized some of their mistakes and have shifted the control of Iraq into different departments. On October 7, 2003, a White House panel was created to oversee and make decisions on rebuilding Iraq. This was a major shift because originally most of the control lay with the Department of Defense. Some see this move as a way to create greater multi-agency cooperation. Many government agencies were critical of Department of Defense decision-making and were not able to assert their position in the reconstruction. [41]

In addition to this overview of the current situation in Iraq, it will be beneficial to look at past experiences of rebuilding after war. Several relevant historical cases will be examined and positive methods will be analyzed for their applicability to the current Iraqi effort.