One of the first postwar reconstruction reviews of the recent campaign in Iraq was performed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). They performed an assessment mission of the rebuilding of Iraq from June 27 to July 7, 2003 at the request of Rumsfeld and Bremer. [81] Their report provides a clear account of the successes and failures of the rebuilding process and gives specific recommendations for improving the process. Their recommendations were given in July. The following table displays their recommendations and the outcomes of their recommendations at the time of the writing of this report.

 

Focus Area	Outcome [82]
Establish public safety in all regions.	It has gotten worse in all areas of the country.
Provide to the Iraqis a sense of ownership of the rebuilding process on national, provincial and local levels.	In some areas, such as Kirkuk, there has been a sense of ownership of the process. However, in southern areas that are thought not to be ready for self-governance, there has been a sense of US intrusion.
Put unemployed Iraqis to work and provide basic economic and social services to avoid increasing political and security problems.	The collapse of the government, dismissal of Baathists and dismantling of the army has increased discontent throughout Iraq. Unemployment rates remained near 75 percent, three months after the report was published.
Decentralize businesses.	Over 150 industries have been decentralized. The lifting of sanctions has flooded the markets with new commercial growth. Effects are being felt throughout the country.
Change the political mindsets of Iraqis.	In the north, people are happy with the occupation. However, in the rest of the country, Iraqis are extremely displeased with and distrust the Americans.
Get other countries involved in the rebuilding process.	Recent summits have gotten other countries to pledge more money to Iraq. However, attacks on aid agencies have forced international organizations to leave Iraq. This includes a skeleton UN workforce in Baghdad.
Make money more forthcoming and more flexible.	An $87 billion aid package to Iraq and Afghanistan was passed since the writing of the report.

 

The significance of this report is that the United States still has a myriad of tasks left to accomplish. By no means will rebuilding be a short process, with immediate results. Following are six recommendations, which lay out a specific path to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq.

Recommendations

Maintain an occupying force, but push it outside of the urban areas. By moving the troops outside the cities, they will be able to secure vital transport and infrastructure. Building a larger Iraqi army more quickly will become necessary to maintain security within the cities. The sooner US troops get out of the urban areas, the less animosity there will be towards the occupation. It will also allow Iraqis to govern Iraqis.

Cancel nonvital contracts with US contractors. Give the jobs that are cancelled to the Iraqis themselves. Provide them with technical assistance and funds to purchase the materials, and then let them do the work. Most importantly, build relationships with local officials. Remember that the Marshall Plan did not come into effect until three years after the end of World War II. It is still possible to forge relationships with Iraqis only a half a year from the end of the Iraq War.

This step will provide the Iraqis with a greater sense of ownership of rebuilding, and provide them with jobs. Currently many projects run by US contractors are inefficient and have left the Iraqis frustrated by the contractors’ ineptness. Furthermore, the contractors typically charge more than a local Iraqi would charge for the same work. Canceling nonvital contracts will also decrease the overall amount of aid that would be necessary for US taxpayers to give Iraq. Furthermore, it will remove the foreign US faces from areas that are hostile to the occupation.

Iraqis have the local knowledge to handle reconstruction. As opposed to the Kuwaitis, who let the United States do all of the reconstruction in their country, Iraqis want to take part in the process. Such a strategy is similar to making the Europeans do the reconstruction in Europe with the Marshall Plan and the Lebanese rebuilding Beirut themselves.

Broaden the coalition of countries. If more countries pledge sending troops to the region, the morale of US troops will improve—largely because some US troops will be able to return to the United States, at least for temporary periods.

One way to encourage other countries to pledge support is to ask for small amounts of military and financial aid. Asking for smaller amounts of aid, or less dangerous assignments for troops from other countries will be possible because troops would not be as present in urban areas and the rebuilding process will cost less because of the use of Iraqi labor.

Allow Iraqis to decide on local and provincial issues with only US technical assistance, and allow them to help shape national policy. Adopting this approach will allow Iraqis to have control over issues that affect them directly. Providing technical assistance in shaping local and provincial governments should accompany this recommendation. Iraqis have not experienced full local control, with the government until recently being highly centralized. US know-how would be welcome in providing assistance in shaping local governments.

The United States should have a larger say on issues concerning national government, because the central focus of invading Iraq was to change their national power structure. It would seem illogical not to try to shape Iraqi national policy to be friendlier towards US strategic policy. This is similar to the post­World War II Japanese rebuilding experience. The Iraqis should, however, be the main shapers of national policy. This will effectively hand Iraq back to Iraqis and should help speed up the rebuilding process.

Encourage quelling of ethnic tensions through conflict resolution. Eliminating the threat of civil war is crucial to the stability of Iraq. Short of creating a security state, conflict resolution is the best way to keep the different ethnic groups from attacking one another. Accomplishing this measure would require that the United Nations send a conflict resolution task force to come into Iraq. In order for the United Nations to make such a commitment, the security situation in Iraq must be stable enough to be plausible for the United Nations to increase its role in the area. Pursuing conflict resolution would not add to the US responsibilities in the region, because the United Nations would handle it. The result of bringing in conflict resolution teams would be increased security through a lack of violence and a more stable national situation.

Be Patient. Complete reconstruction cannot occur overnight. Expecting that Iraqi businesses and government would be functioning perfectly only six months after the war is woefully optimistic. Even a country such as Kuwait, which allowed the United States to do as it pleased in its reconstruction after the 1991 Gulf War, needed a few years to be fully functioning again. Outlining realistic goals and objectives is critical in winning public opinion.