Return to the Abstract for The French Desire for Uranium
Introduction
The Fifth French Republic was officially created on September 28, 1958, but the French view of the world and how they fit into it is a result of actions that have occurred long before that date. Past events in French history such as the defeat in the Franco-Prussian war, the events of World War I, the abandonment at Dunkirk and the events of World War II, the Suez crisis, their humiliation in Indochina and the rebellion in Algeria are just a few of the many events that have not only molded the French into what they are today but also have plotted the course of French policy since the creation of the Fifth Republic. All of the above mentioned events are not only well-documented, but also their effects on French foreign policy are easily understood because of the extensive research and examination done on those events and their aftermaths. Harder to examine and qualify are the other types of things that have shaped French policy, the desires and needs that French leaders have felt, insisted, and even demanded France have. This Thesis intends to be an in-depth examination of one such French desire, not only the cause for the desire, but also how the desire was fulfilled, and whether or not the fulfillment of the desire shaped French policy. This Thesis will examine France’s need for uranium and the effect that need had in forming French foreign and domestic policy, specifically, France’s foreign policy towards its former African colonies.
French involvement in Africa began long before any of the events mentioned above. Obviously France did not become interested in Africa for its uranium, because uranium had not even been discovered when France made her first foray into the African continent. The reason why France invested so much in Africa is tied to some of the events mentioned above and will be examined. Eventually, France became the most dominant European power in Africa. France also held on to its colonies in Africa longer than any other colonial European power. When France finally gave the African colonies their independence, it continued to be extensively involved in a majority of its former colonies. The French believed they had a "special" relationship with these former colonies, one that was mutually beneficial to both the French and the former colonies. But what did France stand to gain from continued financial, military and international support of their former African colonies?
The answer to the above question is tied into the French, and in particular Charles de Gaulle’s, desire to be militarily and economically independent from foreign nations, especially the superpowers. One aspect of this desired independence was not to rely on the Americans or Soviets for help in developing military and civilian uses of nuclear energy. French leaders felt the need for the French to be the sole protectors of France, not part of conglomeration of defense forces that might once again abandon France. The easiest way, de Gaulle and the other leaders determined, was to develop nuclear weapons.
It was in the aftermath of World War II that France began to investigate harnessing the atom for civilian uses. The expertise France gained with its civilian nuclear program soon turned to military uses of nuclear energy. Today, France generates over seventy-five percent of her energy from nuclear power and maintains a something on the order of 450 nuclear weapons for her defense. To run this considerable amount of nuclear power and weaponry requires a significant source of fissile materials, specifically uranium. France exhausted most of her supply of readily extractable uranium while undertaking exploration and mining activities in its colonies in Africa. The only colonies that had suitable amounts of uranium available were Niger and Gabon. When granting independence to its former colonies, France now had a classic quandary, how to get a reliable supply of the special material it needed from Niger and Gabon at an acceptable price. The Thesis will examine the methodology France used in those former colonies to make sure that the flow of uranium did not stop.
This Thesis will also examine several pivotal events involving the French in Gabon and Niger. It will analyze each event, determining the cause of the event, the French role within the event, and the benefits/detriments of the outcome. Some of these events include French military interventions into these two countries, especially the French intervention in the 1964 coup in Gabon.
The picture that will be painted is one of the French desiring a rare resource that had been discovered in some of her former colonies. Rather than having to rely on an unstable world market, France would continue to influence and intervene in those countries in order to make sure the country had all of the uranium it needed to keep up with its civilian and military needs. The French policy towards its African nations might not have been neocolonial in actuality, but it was almost undoubtedly a patron-client relationship.
In the last decade, the French policy towards its former colonies in Africa has begun to change. This change has taken the form of reduced military actions and a reduction in the amount of economic support provided. There are many reasons for this change in policy, one of which is the lack of need for France to get certain raw materials from those countries. With the new willingness of the French to procure their uranium on the world market, France no longer solely needs to depend on its former colonies.