Return to Section X: Changes in French Policy towards Africa

Analysis

Trying to determine how much French foreign policy in Africa was affected by the French desire to obtain uranium is a difficult task. There was no recorded decision by the French leaders who formed the French African policy that can be related to uranium extraction rates. Instead the historical facts, rhetoric, and events and their outcomes must be investigated. By examining the history relating France to its former African colonies, one can only surmise how much French foreign policy was influenced by the uranium needs of the country. Any such analysis revolves in a large part around Charles de Gaulle.

If there was a key player that had shaped French foreign policy, not only African but also all French foreign policy, then it had to be de Gaulle. He not only helped to build the Fourth Republic after World War II; he was instrumental in the construction of the Fifth Republic. All French leaders since de Gaulle have trod in his footsteps and followed his lead on most issues, until at least very recently. It was de Gaulle’s decision that led France to first begin exploring nuclear power, with his establishment of the French CEA in 1945. The French CEA was the governing agency that not only brought civilian uses of nuclear energy to France, but also allowed France to develop military uses of nuclear energy.

However, de Gaulle’s influence on France and Africa did not stop with the simple creation of the CEA or any government agency: he had a much greater impact. It was de Gaulle who realized that France was going to eventually have to release its colonies in Africa. It was de Gaulle who decided on a course of action that would not only ease the transition of the African countries from colony to independent nation, but also would allow France to keep some influence in these countries. Thus came de Gaulle’s idea of the Community. Through the Community, France would lead its former colonies to independence while also retaining some authority with these nations. The Community would not last long though.

With the collapse of the Community and the subsequent independence of most of the former colonies, France stood poised to lose its influence over these countries. However, under de Gaulle several long-lasting ties between France and these new independent countries were established. These ties took different forms but one of them was the various defense and technical agreements between France and the colonies. Another was a special French governmental office, the Ministry of Co-operation. Instead of lumping relations with the new African countries into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, de Gaulle created an entirely new Ministry office to handle the former African colonies themselves. However, this was not the largest string that attached France to her former colonies.

Perhaps the most binding creation between the French and her former colonies was the establishment of the Franc Zone. This monetary conglomeration was tied into the French Ministry of Treasury. The Zone allowed the newly developing countries to have increased currency stability, decreased inflation rates, direct conduits to trade, and increased the interdependence of the African colonies on each other. However, what were the advantages to the French that they would keep such an operation running, especially with it being so draining to the French treasury? Obviously, the French knew that with the creation of the Franc Zone, they now had an extremely strong economic link to these African countries. Thereby, France could obtain the goods and raw materials they desired from these African countries before any other countries had a chance to purchase them. While the benefits of the Franc Zone to the former African colonies were enormous, the benefits that the French gained are not to be overlooked.

But the direct influence that he gave and the decisions that Charles de Gaulle made on French foreign policy was perhaps his most lasting contribution to France and her relationship with her former African colonies. De Gaulle’s foreign policy towards the rest of the world had been the subject of many books and articles. One thing that clearly resonates from all of de Gaulle’s actions, speeches and publications is his desire for France to avoid dependence on other major powers. He wanted France to not have to rely on either superpower for defense, economic support, or bargaining power. Things that De Gaulle encountered before returning to power in 1958 only strengthened this stance. The lack of American support during the Suez crisis was only the first event that de Gaulle witnessed that made him want to cut the ties between France and the US.

The next main event that deepened de Gaulle’s mistrust of the U.S. as an ally was the change in United States’, and the U.S. dominated NATO, policy in case of a Soviet attack into Western Europe. The old policy had been one of massive retaliation, and the French felt this was a great deterrence to any Soviet aggression. However, under President Kennedy, the U.S. changes to a flexible response scenario that would only punish the Soviets with a proportional response to their invasion. France and de Gaulle felt like this policy allowed the United States to abandon France if the United States felt this was necessary. This was one of the major events that led de Gaulle to the conclusion that France must build her own defense force.

Furthermore, de Gaulle felt that NATO was no more than a convenient cover that allowed the United States to be in control of foreign country’s military forces. De Gaulle and the rest of France felt that Frenchmen, and not Americans, should control the French military forces. It was this thinking that prompted de Gaulle to remove France from NATO in 1966. This removal required France to develop her own defense force to remain a power on the world stage.

In the background of all these events was the burgeoning French nuclear arsenal and its development. It was once again de Gaulle who urged the government of the Fourth Republic to begin developing nuclear weapons. De Gaulle had returned to power in 1958 and was the one who ordered the first French nuclear weapon to be detonated. Using the arguments that France needed to be able to defend itself against any threat, de Gaulle envisioned and set to working on creating the force de frappe. This would afford the French not only international respect, but also allow the French a bigger chip at the bargaining table as well as providing for France’s ultimate defense in case of attack by any foreign country. Before he left office, de Gaulle laid the groundwork for an upgrade to the force de frappe to make it more deadly and respected. No longer would the nuclear arsenal of France have to be delivered by jets; now it would be deliverable by ballistic missiles. De Gaulle resigned from office soon after the decision to strengthen the force de frappe, but he left an enduring mark on French nuclear policy.

One aspect that needs to be mentioned is the growing French need for uranium. With de Gaulle’s insistence on the development of the force de frappe, France needed uranium. But more important to the French need for uranium than the military uses of nuclear energy were the civilian uses. The civilian and military nuclear programs were managerially integrated, and both represented thrusts in the general direction of political independence from allied military power and other countries’ energy resources, respectively. France had an increasing number of nuclear power plants under order and under construction. France itself had a moderate amount of uranium for military purposes, but it would not be enough to meet the needs of France’s upcoming fleet of commercial reactors. Thus France needed to find more uranium than it had at home, but there was a small catch. De Gaulle and other French leaders did not want to depend on any other major foreign country for this uranium. Political independence from allied sources precludes reliance on North American sources, and Australian unease with nuclear testing in the Pacific made it a potentially unreliable source. Thus France needed a source of uranium that it could control so that its supply would always remain un-interrupted. To solve the French dilemma, French leaders began to look to her African colonies.

In particular, two of the French colonies looked extremely promising in the acquisition of uranium, Niger and Gabon. It was in 1956 that uranium was actually discovered in Gabon, exploration for uranium had begun there years earlier. It was also in 1956 that exploration began in Niger for uranium, mining began there in 1970. With these two countries, France now had a reliable source of uranium, until independence came along.

With France having to give the African countries of Niger and Gabon their formal political independence, the French were in a bind with regard to uranium. However, the French used the ties it would create with all of its former colonies to make sure that it would continue to receive uranium from both Niger and Gabon. This is evident in that all of the companies that were mining uranium, SOMAIR and COMINAK in Niger and COMUF in Gabon, were majority owned by COGEMA, the French nuclear fuel company. The French now had what they wanted, a source of uranium for its military and civilian nuclear energy programs that was very reliable. But how stable were the countries of Niger and Gabon?

As it turns out, because of the French, Gabon was very stable. The only major event that has marred the stability of Gabon, was an unsuccessful coup in 1964. It was during this coup that, some Gabonese military officers ousted Leon Mba, the French installed leader of Gabon, from power. A new provisional government was created but it lasted only a day. France sent in some of its military forces to restore Leon Mba to power. The French claimed that the Vice-President of Gabon enacted the French-Gabonese defense agreement and France had sent troops in under those auspices. However, this could not have possibly happened because the same Vice-President was with the American ambassador to Gabon until after the French troops had landed. Why would the French break international law and risk international wrath for the under-developed country of Gabon? Perhaps France wanted to keep its supply of uranium constant and unaffected.

On the other hand, Niger has been one of the most unstable countries in Africa since its independence. When Niger faced a coup d’etat in 1974 that deposed its French chosen leader, Hamani Diori France was notoriously absent. There was no French military intervention to restore Diori to power. At this time, Niger had begun to produce uranium for France, were the French not concerned with this turn of events?

However, the answer is a simple one, the French were facing their own political crisis at the time. The coup occurred during the period of time after the death of Georges Pompidou but before a new President of France was elected. So military intervention could have occurred but the French were preoccupied with the upcoming election. By the time that the election was completed and Giscard d’Estaing was entrenched in power in France, Colonel Kountche was also firmly entrenched in Niger. Col. Kountche also pursued a close relationship with France, attending Francophone Summits and keeping Niger’s uranium flowing to France. So in this special case, the fact that the French were facing their own political crisis and the fact that by the time it was over the new government in Niger had become trusted in France was the cause for the lack of deployment of French troops to overturn the coup in Niger in 1974.

Overall, the desire for uranium from a dependable market source that the French could control led to the French actions in Niger and Gabon. Charles de Gaulle’s main philosophy was for France to be independent from all other countries, especially the superpowers. This meant militarily and economically independent. In order to be militarily independent France developed the force de frappe. France also was to be energy independent and thus began construction of a vast number of nuclear power plants. Both the force de frappe and the new power plants needed uranium to become active and viable. Thus in order to be independent France needed uranium. To buy this uranium from the US or any other country France could not control would defeat the purpose of acquiring the uranium at all. So France turned to her former colonies where she still had means to influence the governments in power there. In Niger and Gabon, France was able to obtain the uranium it needed to be independent, but more importantly, France could control these sources of uranium through the Ministry of Co-Operation, the defense and technical agreements, and the Franc Zone. If something threatened the stability of those governments, but more importantly the mining operations, France sent in troops to intervene. It is inconceivable to think that the need for uranium that France felt did not play a role in determining French foreign policy in Africa.

Go on to Section XII: Conclusion