Return to Section III: French Colonialism in Africa

French Colonialism In Africa Post-WWII

The beginning of the end of French Colonialism in Africa resulted from Charles de Gaulle coming to power in and the creation of the Fifth French Republic in 1958. In fact in a quote from an interview with a US ambassador to Gabon and Jacques Foccart, whom is considered the father of France-African relations, Foccart states:

The Community that Foccart spoke of was the second of two plans de Gaulle had in mind for French African colonies in the post World War II era²¹.

Initially, de Gaulle had tried to force the African colonies into two separate conglomerations, one consisting of those colonies in West Africa and the other of those in Equatorial Africa. This plan was resisted and eventually evolved into the Communaute or Community. De Gaulle envisioned the member states of the Community as believing in one president (the president of France), one senate and one nationality. The president would have decision-making powers over such critical areas as defense, economy, foreign relations, currency and the procurement of strategic minerals²². The nation-states would have a large amount of internal power, but submit and bend to the will of the president. Every former colony of France in Africa except for Guinea accepted and embraced the terms of the Community. Incidentally, Guinea was completely cut-off from all French aid and to this day the debate still rages over whether this course of action or those taken by all other French colonies was better²³.

However, as the quote above mentions, it was a very short time until the member states of the Community began to demand their own independence. After 1960, only Djibouti remained a colony of France while all other Sub-Saharan holdings had become independent. In what became one of de Gaulle’s legacies to France, he made the continuation of strong relationships with the former African colonies a primary concern. This "special relationship" with the former colonies was preserved even after de Gaulle left office. In fact it has continued well into the 1990’s and only recently has it begun to fade. Thus, de Gaulle concentrated his efforts on keeping France as the primary influence in Africa while also making sure that the former colonies were independent enough to satisfy themselves²⁴. To this end, de Gaulle pushed for and ended up with "co-operation" agreements with every former French colony in Africa, except Guinea of course.

In order to facilitate of the needs of these "co-operation" agreements with the numerous former colonies, de Gaulle created the Ministry of Co-operation in 1961. This ministry was specifically designed to be distinct from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was intended to show the former African colonies that they were not going to just be viewed as nations, but as nations with special ties and relationships with France²⁵. In fact the Ministry of Co-operation was only the first of many steps taken by France to ensure that it would have continued influence over its former colonies after their independence.

One special status that former African colonies of France have is in the economical realm. After World War II, the French created the Franc Zone to help the burgeoning economies of its African colonies. The Franc Zone consists of a currency co-operation agenda between France’s Ministry of Treasury and fourteen African countries. In fact, the Franc Zone, which uses a currency called the CFA franc, is regarded as, "The first pillar on which France rested its neo-colonial structure." The Franc zone’s design was to incorporate three major elements: first the ability to easily transfer funds; second the ability to easily convert currency at a fixed rate in the zone; and finally to centralize all of the monetary reserves of the African colonies in one location, namely the French Treasury. Because of these elements the Franc Zone gives three main advantages to its constituents: one, an increased amount of currency stability which results in decreased inflation rates; two, a direct conduit that allows foreign trade; and three, it increases the amount interdependence that the African countries have due to the common currency²⁶.

On the other hand, the Franc zone did have some drawbacks. These drawbacks mainly stemmed from the fact that the CFA franc, as time went on, became more and more overvalued. This in turn caused massive trade deficits in the African countries and was a fiscal drain on the French budget. This increasing overvaluation of the CFA franc finally resulted in a devaluation of the currency by 50% in 1994. This devaluation was devastating to the economies of the African countries that depended on the CFA franc but was necessary to appease the IMF and World Bank²⁷. The French Treasury has continued and most likely will continue to play a pivotal role in the administration of the Franc Zone because it allows the French to retain some economic ties to their former colonies and it is a prime factor in making the former colonies achieve some kind of economic reform.

While there were other institutions created in order to continue de Gaulle’s plan of French-African interdependence, none were as effective and as long lasting as the Ministry of Co-operation and the Franc Zone. These were the primary tools used to influence the former colonies and bend them to the will of the French. However, de Gaulle also used military interventions in order to show the African colonies and the world that just because France did not have colonies in name, she was still protecting, controlling and using her former colonies. Interestingly, most of the interventions presided over by de Gaulle came after a dramatic decrease in French soldiers stationed in Africa. Due to the monetary requirements of the creation of its nuclear weapons program and because the training and outfitting of African military forces produced suitable replacements, France reduced its conventional forces in order to not exceed its military budgets. This is evident by looking at the number if French soldiers stationed in Africa in 1962, which was approximately 70,000 and then examining the number stationed in Africa in 1964, which had dropped to approximately 21,000. The decrease did not end here, because by 1970 there were only 6,500 French military members stationed in Africa²⁸.

While the French continued to decrease its military presence on the African continent, it did not shirk away from its responsibilities, both perceived and actual, via its defense agreements with the former colonies. In fact the reduction in military presence coincided with the creation of a special military command whose sole purpose was fast reaction and deployment to Africa whatever the need may be. In practice, the French military forces that were active in Africa under de Gaulle’s tenure were mainly used to defend African governments that were being endangered by revolutionary movements. De Gaulle sent in French troops to aid governments in Cameroon in 1960-1961, Mauritania in 1961, Gabon in 1962, Congo in 1960 and 1962, Chad between 1960 and 1963, Niger in 1963, and following a brief period of non-intervention, missions in 1967 in CAR and 1968 in Chad²⁹. Perhaps the most astonishing military action that occurred under de Gaulle was the French support of the separatist Biafrans in Nigeria in 1968.

During this rebellion, the Biafrans tried to secede from Nigeria and take with them the primary oil-producing region of Nigeria. France, and de Gaulle in particular, viewed the splitting of one of the major powers in Africa as a good thing, and encouraged the Biafrans by sending them food, supplies and weaponry. The Biafran secession eventually was defeated and the conquered territory taken back. This occurred in 1970, shortly after the resignation of de Gaulle, partly because of his support of the Biafrans, and the appointment of Georges Pompidou as President of France.

Go on to Section V: French Involvement in Gabon