Coalition aircraft [had] regularly been the target of hostile fire from the Deh Rawod area…Gunfire from various caliber weapons was observed throughout the day and at night, including mortars and AAA [anti-aircraft artillery] fire…Several compounds in the Deh Rawod area were positively identified as sources of this AAA fire. AAA fire had emanated from these compounds on repeated occasions over the previous two days and the source of the fires did not change. In all cases, the locations of these compounds were such that they could range and threaten coalition ground and airborne forces…As coalition ground and airborne forces approached the area, fire erupted from some of the compounds. By firing, these AAA batteries established that they were manned, armed, and operational. Their proximity to the objectives, landing zones, and blocking positions made them a threat to inbound coalition forces. Consequently, these sites were valid targets and AC-130 aircraft were directed toward them.
Significant efforts were expended to ensure only the compounds that were the sources of fire were targeted. At the first targeted compound, the apparent location of most of the deaths and injuries, AAA fire was directed at the AC-130 as it approached. At one location, however, the AC-130 arrived at a target and found it to be “cold” and elected not to strike it.
The AC-130 was not able to observe the AAA weapon itself. Rather, the ground location of the source of the fire was identified and fires were directed to that area. Just as the weapon itself is not seen, it is also not possible to determine if the fires from the AC-130 have damaged or destroyed the weapon. Consequently, personnel at the weapon’s location were the primary targets. Unfortunately, it [was] also not possible to distinguish men from women or adults from children…
The dead and wounded later observed by coalition forces were mostly women and children. Coalition medical personnel treated the wounded. Four wounded children were medically evacuated by helicopter…Further, the local Afghans maintained that most of the dead had already been buried—although no fresh gravesites were observed.[1]
So read excerpts from the military’s official report of one tragic incident in Oruzgan Province of Afghanistan during the ongoing United States military air operation against the Taliban and the al-Qaeda terrorists they harbored. The civilian deaths were not intentional; the report highlights several preliminary steps taken to avoid just such a result. However, there have been multiple reports of attacks by the American air forces against enemy military targets in Afghanistan that have resulted in the accidental deaths of, and injuries to, civilians. Such incidents during war are deeply troubling, but usually do not violate the international humanitarian laws that govern conduct in war. Nevertheless, the United States military continues to seek out ways to reduce these incidences of collateral casualties while also considering them an unavoidable cost of protecting vital national interests. While much has been done in the way of technology and procedure to minimize undesired suffering of innocents, additional benefit is available from increasing attention to the ethical plight of the military members making decisions about targeting. This is not only right in accordance with morality, international law, and the national values of the United States, but it will also further its national interests.
Even combat in the name of the highest human values, such as liberty and justice, continues to result sometimes in consequences to innocent bystanders that appear inconsistent with those values. Such outcomes in the course of American military operations in Afghanistan continue to pose a particular moral dilemma for Americans, their government, and their military. A public opinion poll in October 2002 concluded that the United States continues to view itself as a virtuous nation that overwhelmingly acts as a force for good around the world.[2] This self-assessment is emphatically reflected in the ranks of the United States military, where all members are trained and required to act legally, especially in the midst of combat. Military members also take great pride in their moral standards, as well as in the virtues they seek to live out. Yet in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against America on September 11, 2001, domestic and international critics have challenged some of the military strikes launched by the air forces of the United States on moral grounds. Some of them seem to ask: “Given the reports of civilian casualties, was that the right thing to do?” Both at home and abroad, the United States is being morally judged, not just by how technologically advanced its bombs may be, nor solely by the standards of international law, but by the rightness of its perceived intents and motives in launching military air strikes, and especially by the “rightness” of the consequences that result from those operations.
This paper will analyze how the United States military currently endeavors as a moral agent to “do the right thing” while preparing for air strikes. While the machines of air war can be further improved, much of the moral burden of avoiding collateral casualties and damage falls on the military decision makers who employ them. Military members make or support many of the decisions about where, when, and how those machines will strike. These decisions often exist in the moral territory beyond the black-and-white bounds of legal standards where multiple right objectives compete for priority. It is also the moral dimensions of accumulated individual decisions that perhaps register the most clearly in any determination of the overall morality of an organization—or a country. Thus, in order to win wars while protecting innocent lives, the people of the United States desire a military that strives to attain the highest moral standards, and military members involved in the targeting decision process deserve the best moral preparation and decision-making tools their nation can provide.
While the military and the media have focused repeatedly on the technological advances that have increased the precision of attacks from the air, the present research has examined the moral aspects of the military’s procedures to minimize the incidences of unintentional civilian deaths and injuries resulting from attacks from the air. The author will argue that the United States has developed an approach that is strongly grounded in international law, but one that offers opportunities for improvement when viewed from a moral perspective focused on the decision-making process. These improvements do not seek to prescribe specific standards for weighty moral matters surrounding the issues of collateral casualties and damage. Instead, the intent is to examine the institutional setting within which individuals make very difficult decisions under very difficult conditions. This paper then offers recommendations intended to better equip current and future military specialists and leaders to consider and weigh the moral implications of the issues they face involving the avoidance of collateral civilian casualties. These recommendations may not only further reduce collateral casualties, but also strengthen the moral grounding for future American military actions and better support the national interests of the United States.
This paper begins with a brief survey of the nature of undesired civilian death and injury resulting from wartime attacks from the air, and then examines the goals and the characteristics of air operations in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Following this is a review of the moral principles and legal standards that exist, against which the wartime actions of the United States are often compared. Next, the paper describes the process currently employed to plan air strikes, citing as primary sources the official doctrine, training, policy, and procedures used by the United States Air Force and the United States Central Command, which is the joint combatant command executing OEF. This process description is followed by considerations from the fields of applied ethics and decision analysis as they pertain to identifying possible issues in the decision support provided to military members who must make very difficult moral judgments in the targeting process. Finally, from this examination, the paper offers insights and recommendations to improve this moral decision support for military specialists and decision makers who work both to avoid unintended harm to innocents and to pursue national objectives.
There are several issues to clarify regarding some of the terms used in this paper. “Air forces” refer to the aircraft, personnel, and resources of the Air Force, Navy, and Marines that form the vast majority of the fixed-wing component of the United States military. Also, this paper assumes that the persons negatively affected by an incident of collateral casualties or damage are innocent civilian non-combatants, hereafter referred to as “civilians” or “innocents.” While civilians can theoretically be divided into subcategories, with some arguably non-innocent, there will always be innocent civilians in any conflict and they are the focus of this paper. Although a worthy endeavor, this paper will not include an exploration of the moral or legal complexities involved in determining a victim’s innocence or status as a non-combatant. Furthermore, the question of effects on combatants who have been effectively defeated or are out of action (hors de combat) is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. The paper also addresses only the military’s role in the decision processes described. Under the laws of the United States, the elected and appointed civilian members of government oversee and direct its military forces. As such, they play key roles in forming and dictating guidance and in making critical decisions in the execution of military operations. However, the military members must still interpret the guidance, formulate advice for high-level decisions, and make many decisions delegated to their level.
The author’s choice to use “collateral casualties” or “civilian casualties” in conjunction with or instead of “collateral damage” also requires explanation. “Collateral damage” is a term often used for the group of undesired consequences resulting from a military attack and involving either people or property. For those individuals who have lost family members or friends in incidences of “collateral damage,” or who have been injured themselves, the term “damage” does not seem to acknowledge the fact that there has been a tragic loss of health or life. While the United States military has used this term in the past, the Department of Defense frequently used the term “civilian casualties” during OEF press briefings.[3] In its published guidance to its legal advisors, the United States Air Force uses references similar to and including “collateral casualties and damage.”[4] Similarly, out of respect for those civilians who have tragically suffered and in deference to potential sensitivities toward the use of anodyne language to describe their travail, the author will refrain from using the term “collateral damage” to refer to instances of civilian deaths or injuries. Sometimes collateral damage to property, though a possible consequence of air strikes, may not be mentioned at all in order to place the emphasis on the civilian casualties, which carry greater moral importance.
Throughout, this paper will draw on both civilian and military resources. Several of the official documents referenced in this paper were written by the United States Air Force. However, while the Air Force is the lead military service for developing technology and processes in many areas related to air strikes, in time of war all United States military services fight together as a joint force. This paper is written in that same spirit of “jointness.”
[1] United States Central Command, “Unclassified Executive Summary: Investigation of Civilian Casualties, Oruzgan Province, Operation FULL THROTTLE, 30 June 2002,” Press Release 02-09-03, http://www.centcom.mil/
CENTCOMNews/Reports/Investigation_Oruzgan_Province.htm (accessed September 6, 2002).
[2] Peter Ford, “Is America the ‘Good Guy?’ Many Now Say, ‘No,’” Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/specials/oneyearlater/livesChanged_good.html (accessed December 4, 2002).
[3] United States Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing Transcript: Rear Adm. Stufflebeem’s Briefing,” October 24, 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/t10242001_t1024stu.html.
[4] United States Air Force, Air Force Operations and the Law: A Guide for Air and Space Forces (Washington, DC: Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Department, 2002), 37.