United States National Interests and Views of the International Community

Humanitarian tragedies created by incidents of collateral casualties and damage provide sufficient motivation in and of themselves to minimize their occurrence. However, political ramifications provide additional motivations to “do the right thing.”

The United States has acknowledged that all the training, efforts, expertise, and technological innovation described in Part Four have not been sufficient to keep innocent people from dying as it wages war in Afghanistan. Yet this government and its military are confident of their intent, as reflected by the comments below:

The truth is, no military in the history of war has done more to protect the innocent than we have in Afghanistan. On many occasions, legitimate targets were bypassed because of potential collateral damage. The U.S. restrained its force well beyond that required by the law of armed conflict.[127]

We know that victory will not come without a cost. War is ugly. It causes misery and suffering and death, and we see that every day. And brave people give their lives for this cause, and, needless to say, innocent bystanders can be caught in crossfire. …There are instances where in fact there are unintended effects of this conflict, and ordnance ends up where it should not. …That’s true of every conflict. As a nation that lost thousands of innocent civilians on September 11^th, we understand what it means to lose fathers and mothers and brothers and sisters and sons and daughters. But let’s be clear: no nation in human history has done more to avoid civilian casualties than the United States has in this conflict. …Let there be no doubt; responsibility for every single casualty in this war, be they innocent Afghans or innocent Americans, rests at the feet of Taliban and al-Qaeda.[128]

The United States has also stated clearly that the motive behind its fight against terrorism in Afghanistan was to protect American national interests and to secure peace and freedom for Afghanistan and the world.[129] However, the international community has not fully agreed that the United States’ intentions and motivations are pure. Therefore, they have not always accepted the unavoidability of collateral casualties and damage in the war. The quotations above and the frequency with which their themes are repeated are evidence that the United States highly values the perception of others, seeking to be viewed as an upright agent in world affairs. Despite that, some reports of collateral casualties and damage in Afghanistan have had untoward effects on the world’s perception of the United States.

At the end of the third week of the military operation in Afghanistan, the United States Department of State assessed that overseas media commentators were expressing a growing concern over the reports of Afghan civilian casualties. Many analysts were “alarmed and impatient” amid reports of civilian casualties and air strikes gone awry. Some concluded that the international coalition faced possible erosion due to public outcry against these consequences and the perceived lack of clear progress against al-Qaeda and the Taliban at that time.[130] Some European press labeled the air strikes “counterproductive” and determined that the results were not “proportional to the costs [and] risks.”[131] Much of the Arab and Muslim media essentially accused the United States of reckless “savagery and barbarism,” although sometimes these allegations were based on the assumption that “thousands” of Afghan civilians had already died.[132] The Department of Defense publicly asserted that many reports of civilian casualties were inflated or invented.[133] This assertion has since been somewhat substantiated by many of the unofficial assessments like those mentioned in Part Two. In the fourth week of operations, Saudi Arabia spoke out on the side of the United States, announcing that it placed “nearly 100 percent” of the responsibility for the deaths of innocent Afghanis on the leadership of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.[134] In a matter of weeks, the Taliban and al-Qaeda were scattered and with them went the focused criticism of the United States’ conduct of the war.

However, a more significant blow to international support for OEF came in the early morning hours of July 1, 2002, when the strikes in the Deh Rawod area of the Oruzgan Province occurred. These strikes, partially described by the excerpt of the government report that opened this paper, were reported by the New York Times to have killed at least fifty-four innocent villagers. This occurrence marked a distinct shift in world reaction to collateral casualties and damage in Afghanistan.[135] Immediately after the attack, USA Today postulated that the incident could have “collateral damage” effects on the new administration of Afghanistan.[136] The paper quoted General Wesley Clark, the now retired, former NATO commander during the war in Kosovo, as saying: “With each incident you build up resentments from the local population, which…play into the hands of your adversaries. Hamid Karzai has shown broad shoulders so far in absorbing these incidents, but at some point the incidents themselves will discredit him.”[137] Indeed, President Karzai of Afghanistan issued a statement the following day demanding the United States use “all necessary means” to avoid further civilian casualties in his country.[138] The United Nations spokesman in Kabul echoed this call as he emphasized that protection of civilian lives must become a primary concern in the war against terrorism.[139] During the same timeframe, the Afghan foreign minister stated in an interview with the New York Times that his administration must be given a larger role in determining how air strikes would be conducted. He went on to say: “If things do not improve, well, I will certainly pray for the Americans and wish them success, but I will no longer be able to take part in this.”[140]

The New York Times also reported that the Deh Rawod incident had resulted in a focused anger in Afghanistan that was actively undermining the good will of the United States. In addition, the United Nations Mission in Kabul commissioned its own review of the attack, but the resulting report was never publicly released. Instead, it was provided directly to the Afghanistan and United States governments amidst claims that an interim version of the report alleged misconduct by the United States.[141] Nevertheless, the Afghanistan president quickly announced his conviction that those claims were incorrect.[142]

While feared political repercussions from the collateral casualties and damage at Deh Rawod did not fully mature, this incident illustrates the threat of political damage to national interests that can result from civilian deaths and injuries. Karzai’s government was already heavily criticized for other reasons. The additional blame for what was perceived as “wanton” civilian casualties could have delivered a significant setback to the United States’ objectives in that region and the overall War on Terrorism, and may have reshaped the world communities’ perception of America. A January 2003 news report highlighted another aspect of the continuing danger of anger over civilian casualties. This article, based on interviews with Afghan families and intelligence sources, asserted that al-Qaeda is successfully drawing new, revenge-thirsty recruits from families who have suffered losses of innocents during OEF.[143] Such a frightening development points urgently to the need to reduce potential political effects and yet another reason for the United States to continue its efforts to minimize collateral casualties and damage resulting from air strikes.