We were instructed by the ISI to assassinate Atal Behari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani.

Abu Bakr Siddiqui alias Abdullah, Surrendered General Secretary,
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (Assam Unit)

Islamic Militancy in North East India

Islamic militancy in North East India is a phenomenon that has been shrouded in relative concealment—little is known about it, and even less has been written. When newspapers and journals have sought to write about it, it was primarily as a result of an agenda that had propaganda as the most important reason. An enumeration of the groups, their doctrines, and their orders of battle, too, has not been seriously undertaken. Consequently, most of what has been documented centers around the subterfuges of the ISI in the region and isolated reports about the training of Muslim fundamentalist organizations of North East India (hereafter MFO) in Pakistan and Bangladesh.  Indeed, the MFO experience in North East India is unique, because unlike the classic cases of Islamic fundamentalism elsewhere in the world—which are clearly aimed at an audience—the North East Indian breed has shunned publicity and has been almost invisible (save in isolated pockets of the periphery), preferring to quietly work their way into the innards of society.

In North East India, the MFOs have been quite clear that their objectives are to be achieved by recourse to a spread of their ideology. As a consequence, very few cases have been documented whereby they have engaged the Indian security forces, or have carried out acts of sabotage that attract both attention and censure. Also, few cases of extortion have been reported (some districts in the Indo-Bangladesh border have, however, reported a couple of cases) and this seems to be primarily so because most of the MFOs are provided for either by the ISI, or fronts of the ISI and other worldwide Islamic fundamentalist networks. In sum, the activities in North East India of the MFOs are clearly not “aimed at the people watching.” [137] Indeed, a close analysis of their modus operandi has revealed that they are avoiding undue attention and are content with the continual advancement that they are making in the spread of their philosophy. The immediate objective of the MFOs, moreover, is not to take on New Delhi head on in the manner that the ULFA and such other ethnic groups are seeking to do, but rather to further the steady progression towards Nizam-e-Mustafa, or even Brihot Bangladesh (Greater Bangladesh).

Most MFOs have an existence of about only a decade or so. The most important groups in Assam, for instance, have been formed during the early nineties; indeed quite a few of them were formed after the destruction of the Babri Masjid in the north Indian city of Ayodhya, although murmurs were felt immediately after the massacre in Assam’s Nellie. [138] Moreover, it took the MFOs a while to attract the sentiments of the Muslim youths, the more militant among them being already members of the ULFA. Indeed, it was only in the last couple of years that the shuffle of Muslim cadres from the ULFA to the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA), and the other MFOs has taken place. This has been so despite the fact that the ISI had issued clear instructions to the MFOs that they were to work in tandem with the ULFA. [139] Whether the ISI direction was motivated by a need to unify the ULFA agenda (which, as has been seen, had already been hijacked by the Pakistani intelligence service) with that of the MFOs is a matter that will have to await further investigations. The fact that the MFOs were quite content to play second fiddle to the ULFA is not in any doubt.  At any rate, the ULFA (as has been seen in Chapter Two) was doing the dirty work for the MFOs. It was aiding the infiltration by including the illegal migrant into its expanded parish, and was even carrying out sabotage activities inside Assam at the behest of the ISI. The ULFA, moreover, has never targeted the illegal immigrant from Bangladesh.

The aims and objectives as displayed in the various documents produced by the MFOs are interesting. Unlike the ethnic militant groups such as the ULFA, the NDFB, or the NSCN, the charter of demands of the MFO does not normally carry a clause of secession from India, though a few have stated goals about the establishment of separate Islamic homelands. Indeed, most of the MFO demands are perfectly valid. The MULTA demands in Assam, for instance, include:

·       Thirty percent reservation in education and employment for Muslims

·       Establishment of a Muslim court in Assam

·       Reservation of seats in the Legislative Assembly for the Muslims of the Barak Valley

The demands of the Islamic Security Force of India (ISFI) are even more interesting. Among others, it has included:

·       To ensure the security of the Muslim community

·       To establish flood relief camps in the Muslim dominated char areas, and to provide relief to the flood-affected Muslims of the area

·       To enforce prohibition in areas which are Muslim dominated

·       To enforce capital punishment on foreign aliens who enter India to carry out nefarious activities

·       To enforce the IM (DT) Act on illegal migrants who have entered India after 1972

Almost all the MFOs have come into existence as a result of a fear that the administration is not sensitive to the plight of the Muslim community. The instances that are generally quoted in this context are:

·       The deletion of names of thousands of Muslims from the Voters list

·       The attacks on Muslims by the Bodos in 1994, 1995, and 1996 in order to discourage them from occupying the char areas

·       Poll violence in Muslim dominated areas during the elections

Indeed, a compendium that has been compiled by this author of the MFOs, their organization charters, orders of battle, and comments has been placed in Appendix One. The compilation, which is the first of its kind, provides a bird’s eye view of all the major MFOs operating in the region. A perusal of the compendium will show that most of the MFOs were formed in the 1990s and in the early part of 2000 (except two student organizations, Students’ Islamic Organization and the Students’ Islamic Movement of India, which were formed in 1985 and 1977 respectively). It will also be seen that apart from the SIMI and the MULTA, which have strengths of 5,000 and 1,500 cadres respectively, most of the MFOs have small strengths; the JEI, for example, has a reported strength of only twenty. However, most of the MFOs have established foreign linkages, with organizations such as the HuM and the MULTA having strong links with the ISI. Furthermore, it will be of interest to note—as the succeeding analysis will show—that although almost all the MFOs have defined objectives and goals, only the MULTA and the HuM have actually carried out militant acts. However, all the MFOs listed in the compendium have carried out religious propaganda and it is not impossible that they could be aiding one another to achieve their goals. The establishment of the umbrella orgnization, the BIM in Bangladesh, which has the MULTA as an important member, could well be a precursor to a more comprehensive effort to unite all of the MFOs in the region. It is also possible that such unification has already taken place, with MULTA representing the other MFOs in a structure along the lines of the BIM.

Besides the aforesaid MFOs, there are other non-militant Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as the Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind (JUUEH), which was formed by the Ulemas of the internationally famous Deoband school. Although it claims to be a non-political organization, the JUUEH has sought to mobilize the Muslim (especially the illegal immigrant from Bangladesh) electorate for particular agendas. In the wake of the arrests of the ISI sponsored HuM members, for instance, the JUUEH has sought to politicize the issue, and on 1 April 2000, it organized a mass rally (17^th Convention of JUUEH) in the heart of Guwahati in a bid to unify the Muslims under one platform. Although the move was with an eye to the general elections, which was held in May 2001, the popular feeling was that it was a sheer “show of strength” to the non-Muslims in Assam.

The ISI and the MFOs

Notwithstanding the variegated nature of the MFOs and their demands, it must be understood that the Islamic militant agenda in North East India did not come about only as a result of the history of the Muslims in the region. Indeed, notwithstanding Nellie and Babri Masjid, an articulation of the agenda had not taken place until the ISI began to make inroads into the territory. The ISI intention of propping up the MFOs was triggered off by the following considerations:

·       To utilize the MFOs as conduits between the ISI and the ethnic militant groups of North East India

·       To further an agenda of Islamization in the region

·       To facilitate the demographic invasion that is presently underway in the region with massive illegal infiltration from Bangladesh

·       To communalize the situation in the region by engineering riots, defiling Hindu places of worship and attacking important Hindu personalities and women [140]

·       To carve out—quite like the Bangladesh Islamic Manch agenda—a Brihot Bangladesh by including areas of Muslim majority with the present geographical boundaries of Bangladesh

The conspiracy of the Pakistani intelligence agency dates back to the late 1940s. An ISI observer writes:

Indeed, so serious had been the conspiracy that at least one theory has suggested that Bangladesh was formed in order to thwart a Sino-Pakistani pincer formation that was thought to be gaining ground in the late 1960s. Discounting the theory of merely an Indo-Pakistani enmity that brought about the dismemberment of Pakistan, Subir Bhaumik writes:

Quoting a senior Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) source—the premiere Indian external intelligence agency—Bhaumik goes on to say that the late P.N. Banerji, the then Chief of RAW’s Eastern division, in a briefing to RAW Field officers at Calcutta in August 1971 had insisted that apprehension of the North East being cut off was primarily the reason for the Indian interest in sustaining the Bengali liberation effort in 1971.

But the absence of the erstwhile eastern seaboard—by way of the erstwhile East Pakistan—has not prevented Pakistan from re-entering the game. Indeed, contrary to what some observers felt, the subterfuges are being pursued with greater enthusiasm, and this time around with the aid of the MFOs, who are well on their way to replacing the ethnic militant movements in the region.

But what is the manner of actual subversion that the MFO has been engineering? Most news reports and writings have focused on the training of the MFOs in Pakistan and Bangladesh, but almost none of them have actually documented the incidents in which the MFOs have been involved (and have been consequently implicated). Reports have also spoken of arrests and surrenders, but once again no open source material has actually documented the cases. And since it is imperative that such documentation be available for an analysis to get underway, the author enumerates here some incidents in which the MFOs have been involved in Assam. Some other forms of documentation—especially reports pertaining to surrender and consequent revelations—are also put forward in order to fully elucidate the MFO agenda in North East India. The author has done a random selection of the incidents, using the Monthly Situation Report of the Special Branch, Assam Police. The period between June 2001 and May 2002—one calendar year—has been carefully examined.

Select Incidents Involving MFOs

On 14 June 2001, some MULTA militants had congregated at the house of Nur Mohammad Sheikh of Belguri [Golakganj PS]. When the Village Defense Party (VDP) Belguri tried to intercept and arrest them, the MULTA militants ran away to evade the apprehension. However, after a chase, the VDP with the help of the local people apprehended Sahjanal Sheikh, Osman Ali, Jaber Ali, Nur Islam, Nur Mohammad Sheikh and Ali Hussain and beat them up. As a result, they sustained serious injuries and later on Osman Ali succumbed to his injuries. Golakganj PS registered a case and arrested the above MULTA militants.

On 17 June 2001, Bilasipara Police arrested MULTA militant Sahar Ali at Bagaribari.

On 23 June 2001, Agamoni police arrested MULTA militant Matiur Rahman along with a stolen motorcycle.

On 11 July 2001, Gossaigaon Police arrested MULTA militant Atowar Rahman of Village No. 11 Balapara, Kokrajhar District and recovered one country made gun hand grenade from his possession.

On 20 July 2001, Golakganj Police arrested MULTA militant Abdul Hussain and recovered one pistol from his possession.

On 26 July 2001 Bagribari Police arrested four MULTA militants, namely Joynul Abedin, Fulchand Ali, Abul Salem, and Kimuddin Sheikh, when they had gone to the house of Sukur Ali of village Jumpara (Bagribari PS) to collect a ransom of Rs. 10,000. Police also recovered one hand made revolver, four rounds of live ammunition, one empty round, and one hand made bomb from the possession of Fulchand Ali.

On 8 September 2001, the Indian Army handed over to the Gossaigaon PS a surrendered MULTA militant who was fired upon by some unknown miscreants causing bullet injuries to the MULTA militant.

On 16 September 2001, the Indian Army handed over one surrendered MULTA militant to the Sipajhar PS with one air gun, long-range pellets of an air rifle. Some incriminating documents relating to the Islamic Security Force of India were recovered from the possession of the MULTA militant.

On 17 October 2001, the Indian Army handed over one MULTA militant at Kaligaon PS [Darrang] with two hand made pistols and four rounds of live ammunition.

On 29 October 2001, the Gauripur Police picked up two MULTA militants and recovered one hand made AK-47 type gun, one round of hand made ammunition, and two swords from their possession.

On 6 November 2001, the Dalgaon Police/CRPF arrested Omar Ali, Asadulla [both under Dalgaon PS] and Rafiqual Islam [Udalguri PS]. The duo was suspected to have links with the MULTA. The police recovered one local made shotgun.

On 12 November 2001, the Bilasipara Police arrested two MULTA militants and recovered one country made pistol and five rounds of live ammunition, including one hand made ammunition.

On 23 November 2001, the people of village Gunaimari [Bilasipara PS] apprehended one suspected MULTA militant, Abdul Barek, and recovered one hand made pistol with three rounds of hand made cartridges from his possession.

On 1 November 2001, the Indian Army—following a tip off—approached the No. 4 Sialmari Nadi Char area [Mangaldoi PS, Darrang] with a view to nab some ULFA/MULTA militants who were present there. A fierce encounter ensued between the Indian Army personnel and the militants. As a result, two MULTA and two ULFA militants were killed in the encounter.

In January 2002, eleven linkmen of the MULTA were apprehended by the Tezpur Police. Two country made pistols and twenty-eight rounds of .303 live ammunition were recovered from them.

On 8 February 2002, the Gauripur Police arrested MULTA militant, Amzad Ali, of village Tiapara in Dhubri district.

On 15 April 2002, the police apprehended two MULTA militants in Dhubri district who had served a demand letter of Rs. 5,000 in the name of the MULTA to the head master of the Lalmati L.P. School.

On 24 April 2002, the Mangaldoi police recovered some incriminating documents of the ISFI from the house of Chinuar Hussain of Chamuapara in Darrang and arrested him in this connection.

On 30 May 2002, the Rupahi Police open fired on a MULTA militant near Rupahi outpost injuring the militant. The police recovered one country made revolver and two rounds of  .38 ammunition from the MULTA cadre.

During the period of study, twenty-four Harkat-ul-Mujahideen militants surrendered before the authorities, as did one MULTA militant.

The Incidents—An Analysis

An analysis of the incidents shows that almost all were apprehensions by the police. The other statistics show that only one armed encounter took place, in which the Indian army shot two MULTA militants. However, the encounter took place alongside the ULFA—which is another pointer in the direction of joint ULFA-MULTA operations inside Assam.

In another incident, the police shot at a MULTA militant. In yet another, a MULTA militant died as a result of a beating he had received at the hands of a VDP. In the entire twelve months, all but one incident related to the MULTA, the lone exception being that of the ISFI. No sophisticated weapons were used by or recovered from the MULTA, and the total sum of money that was sought to be extorted was only about $300.

Moreover, only one MULTA militant surrendered to the authorities as against twenty-four HuM cadres. Interestingly, not a single MFO of the sixteen-odd recorded MFOs operating in Assam were involved, save the lone Islamic Security Force of India. As a matter of fact, the police arrested the person because ISFI documents were found in his person—it is not ascertained whether he was an active member of the ISFI or was acting merely as a “courier.”

What does the random survey indicate about the MFO movement in Assam, which (apart from Manipur) is the most important MFO inflicted state in North East India?

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen in Assam

The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen is one of the most important MFOs in the Indian sub-continent with cross-border affiliations. It was formed in 1986 in Afghanistan with the objective of waging war against the Soviet Red Army’s occupation of the country. After the Russians left, the HuM was utilized by the ISI for subversive activities in Kashmir. The main aim was to liberate Kashmir from Indian control and to merge it with the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. However, during the late 1980s, the ISI exhorted it to undertake militant activities in Assam, and to that end the HuM has been—by way of their cadres elsewhere in India—recruiting Muslim youths from the districts of Goalpara, Barpeta, and Nalbari of Assam, and have been taking them to Bangladesh and Pakistan for arms and ideological training.

One of the pioneering HuM militants, namely Md. Nanu Mia alias Bilal of Dharmapur PS. Sylhet, Bangladesh crossed over to Assam’s Karimganj district in 1989 and worked as a laborer in Silchar. He later shifted to Lutumbai in Meghalaya’s Jayantia district where he worked in a coalfield. It was here that he learned about the use of gelatin sticks and explosives. Later, he was instrumental in bringing more laborers from Bangladesh into Meghalaya. He joined the HuM in May 1992 in Delhi after he came into contact with a HuM militant from Kashmir. Moving back to Bangladesh, Md. Nanu Mia became the Liaison Officer to the Abu Syed, Amir, HuM Bangladesh who was stationed in the Jatrabari Madrassa. His prime task was to collect photographs and other details of newly recruited youths coming in from Assam to join the HuM, and arrange passports, etc. for them for their onward journey to Pakistan. The Jatrabari Madrassa located in Dhaka is the hub of all HuM activities in Bangladesh. It oversees all trans-border HuM movements (sometimes it lends its services to other MFOs as well). Most of the border crossings would take place through Saladona Ghat, Dandir Ghat, Atinda Ghat, etc. from where Bosirhat would have to be reached with the help of a middleman who would have to be paid US $ 6.

The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen surrenders in Assam merit an examination. Why is it that an MFO with active cross border linkages and alliances in places such as Pakistan and Bangladesh (among other places) would have its cadres surrender in such large numbers? According to the interrogation reports of some of the HuM militants, the conspiracy that was hatched for Assam was quite sinister with a number of youths from Assam being trained in Pakistan. Indeed, according to reports the Naib Amir of the HuM in India hails from Assam’s Goalpara district and is presently in Pakistan. But, official communiqués have suggested that almost the entire HuM organization in Assam has capitulated to the authorities, an interesting phenomenon for an outfit that grew out of the direct subterfuges of Pakistan. [144] In order to understand this phenomenon, the Occasional Paper must retrace its steps back to 1999 when the ISI backed plan to engineer infiltrations and sabotage in Assam and other Indian states came to light. As has been documented in an earlier chapter, the first four HuM militants to be arrested in Assam [10 August 1999] were:

1)     Md. Fasiullah Hussaini alias Hamid Mahmood alias Khalid Mehmood son of Syed Habibulla and resident of Hyderabad (Sind), Pakistan

2)     Md. Javed Wakhar alias Md. Musaffa alias Md. Mehraj alias Abdul Rahman Danish resident of Muzafarnagar, Uttar Pradesh

3)     Maulana Hafiz Md. Akram Mallick alias Musaffa Hussain alias Atabulla alias Bhaijan alias Abdul Awal son of Md. Abdul Aziz of Village Mukam Shahwali, Kupwara, Jammu & Kashmir

4)     Qari Salim Ahmed alias Abdul Aziz alias Sadat son of Abdul Rashid resident of Village Mehilki, District Muzafarnagar, Uttar Pradesh

The Occasional Paper will profile the four for a better understanding of the conspiracy.

Md. Fasiullah Hussaini

Md. Fasiullah Hussaini is a HuM militant. After joining the HuM in 1991, he took forty days’ arms training at the Pak-Afghan border. In 1993, Fasiullah, a commerce graduate, went to Abu Dhabi where he worked as a storekeeper in Collovino Gulf Petrol Company. After his return to Pakistan in 1998, he rejoined the HuM and underwent explosives training in Manshera, NWFP (Pakistan). In March 1999, a seventy-member group of Mujahideens comprised of the HuM, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hijbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar, and al-Fatah made three unsuccessful attempts to cross over to Jammu and Kashmir. Md. Fasiullah was one of the members who were being sponsored by the ISI for carrying out subversion in Jammu and Kashmir. On 15 July 1999, as advised by Fazlur Rahman Khalil, Amir, HuM of Pakistan, Md. Fasiullah traveled to Bangladesh by air. The Amir of HuM, Pakistan had given him $500 and assigned him the task of blowing up the Leh-Kargil highway and making his way into Kashmir in order to carry out further subversive activities. On his arrival in Dhaka, Md. Fasiullah met two other HuM militants, Akram and Salim. On 21 July 1999, the three of them traveled by air to Sylhet where they were joined by another HuM militant, Musaffa. The four of them crossed over to India via Zakiganj border on 28-29 July 1999 and reached Guwahati, the capital of Assam, on 29 July 1999.

Md. Javed Wakhar

Md. Javed Wakhar is a Pakistani HuM militant. He was originally a laborer in Uttar Pradesh’s Mansurpur village where he worked until June 1998. A Standard V Madrassa educated person, Md. Javed Wakhar was allured by his cousin Qari Salim to join the HuM. He was told that he would receive a handsome payment if he underwent arms training in Pakistan. On acquiescing, Md. Wakhar accompanied Qari Salim to Delhi and thence to Dhaka via Katihar, Malda (where they visited the Jama Masjid which is located in Uttari Birajpur Mohalla and met Imam Abdul Quddu, who arranged for a guide by the name of Nazir Sheikh to help them cross over illegally into Bangladesh’s Nawabganj). On a successive trip to Dhaka, Md. Javed Wakhar along with three other HuM militants—Akram, Salimullah, and Farman—went to Karachi by air, traveling on false documents. In Karachi, they met Hashim, the Nazim of the HuM office in Karachi, and eventually reached Batrasi via Islamabad (where he met the Amir of HuM) where he underwent forty days’ arms training and fifteen days’ explosives training. On 25 July 1999, Md. Javed Wakhar received a phone call from Akram asking him—as per the directions of Qari Salim—to reach Sylhet immediately. On reaching Sylhet, Akram, Qari Salim, Fasiullah, and Md. Wakhar crossed over to Assam on 29 July 1999 and billeted themselves in Hotel Eden in Guwahati’s Panbazar.

Maulana Hafiz Md. Akram Mallick

Md. Akram Mallick also joined the HuM in a similar manner as the above two individuals. He went over to Pakistan for arms training via Bangladesh. After his return from Pakistan, Md. Akram Mallick accompanied Qari Salim and Abdul Rahman, Amir of the HuM, Mumbai to Rajshahi with a huge consignment of explosives and left it with one Imam Abdul Jabbar. On 29 July 1999, he and three others (mentioned above) crossed over to Assam and took up position in Guwahati.

Md. Akram Mallick also gave information about the training that is imparted to the HuM militants in Pakistan. According to him:

The training was at Batrasi near Mansera in Pakistan’s NWFP. The camp-in-charge was a person by the name of Waqqas. The camp consisted of a few tents, an RCC building, and a building with a tin roof. According to Md. Akram Mallick, the training was of the following type:

·       Tashisiya: Physical Training

·       Jindula: An intensive training course of five to six months’ duration which included training in heavy weaponry

·       Takhasusad or Barudi: A specialized training of five to six months’ duration which included tactics and bomb manufacturing

·       Alhadique

·       Khasuchi

·       Jasuchi

Qari Salim Ahmed

Blind in both eyes, Qari Salim Ahmed had worked as a teacher in a Madrassa and then as Alim in Durul Ulum Shawala Madrassa in Jammu and Kashmir’s Kupwara district. Traveling to Pakistan, he had met with the Amir of HuM of Pakistan who advised him to organize the HuM in Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, and Assam. Indeed, Qari Salim was instrumental in the recruitment of many youths into the HuM. During his stay in Dhaka—on his return from Pakistan—Salim received a consignment of explosives—thirty-four kg RDX, nine timer devices, thirty pieces of detonators, three time pencils, and five blasting machines from an ISI operative located in Bangladesh. As mentioned in the profile of Md. Akram Mallick, he took the consignment to Abdul Jabbar in Rajshahi. The explosives were meant for sabotage activities in India. However, a joint Assam-West Bengal Police team intercepted the consignment as it was being smuggled into India on 14 August 1999.

Harkat Surrenders in Assam

Six HuM militants who had trained in Batrasi in Pakistan surrendered at Guwahati on March 2001. Nineteen activists of the HuM’s (Assam unit), some Pakistan trained, surrendered to Assam Police in August-September 2001. Abu Bakar Siddiqui, General Secretary of the HuM (Assam Unit), also surrendered to the authorities. He had returned to Assam via Bangladesh after taking arms and explosives training in Pakistan during December 1998. In 1998 he had taken some Muslim youths of Assam to the Rohingya Islamic Front training camp in the Arakans for arms training. Indeed, this was the beginning of the spree of surrenders by militants of the organization, which—as explained earlier—has led to almost a total depletion of the HuM in Assam. An interesting aspect in the surrenders is that no arms and ammunition were surrendered.

But does the profile along with the training and the motivation of the HuM explain the surrenders? Some reports have indicated that a few HuM militants were not treated well by the minders in Pakistan (Assamese and Bangladeshis do not match the build of the Pakistanis and Afghans and were consequently derided for their small builds) and this did not go down well with the HuM militants from Assam. Moreover, some of the HuM (even MULTA) militants returning from Pakistan have stated that they were of the opinion that they were taken to Pakistan for training which would aid them in alleviating the sufferings of their fellow Muslims on return. Instead, the ISI and the HuM minders of Pakistan and Bangladesh instructed them to assassinate Indian leaders and kill people of the Hindu community. Among the plethora of disenchantments that normally accompany surrenders, the ill treatment and the contradictions that they were faced with à la their duties back in Assam were touted as reasons for surrender.

MFOs in Assam—A Prognosis

The author wishes to analyze the aforesaid situation (especially in terms of the random case studies taken) in the following manner:

·       Either there is no problem by way of the MFOs in Assam (given that only two groups seem to be marginally active, and one of them is capitulating with mass surrenders), or there is something afoot which does not augur too well.

·       After all, what can be the reason for the activity that has been witnessed by way of travel to and from Bangladesh and Pakistan? Is it conceivable that all the training that almost all the MFOs are receiving in Pakistan and Bangladesh are going to seed with MFOs sitting around doing absolutely nothing?

·       In the opinion of the author, the events of 11 September 2001 have to some extent quieted the MFO. Indeed, to paraphrase the US President when he commented on al-Qaeda’s strikes of May 2003 in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, the MFOs are hiding but not idle.

·       MFOs in the Indian sub-continent have been known to change names, etc. in order to elude detection. Indeed, militant groups in Kashmir have been known to disappear immediately after they engineer an operation. Two important Pakistani based groups—the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Harkat-ul-Ansar—reportedly renamed themselves in March 2003 as Khaddam-ul-Islam and Jamiat-ul-Ansar, respectively. According to a report in the Khabren, a Pakistan based Urdu daily, Maulana Farooq Kashmiri and Fazlur Rehman Khalil would continue to remain as chief and secretary general of the Jamiat-ul-Ansar. Now, the Amir of the HuM, Pakistan—whom almost all of the HuM militants from Assam met in Pakistan—bears the same name as the secretary general of the new Jamiat-ul-Ansar (the erstwhile Harkat-ul-Ansar). Is it possible that the mass surrenders by the HuM militants were a precursor to the renaming? Is it that the HuM members  (in the aftermath of the arrests, the authorities had profiles of almost all the cadres) wanted to begin a new MFO with a clean slate? Is it at all possible that this was being done in order to hoodwink the authorities into thinking that the HuM is still alive but defunct, while all along recruitment to its new incarnation continues?

·       The fact that the MULTA is not surrendering is interesting. The activity of the MULTA can be analyzed in its operational (and otherwise) conjunction with the ULFA and the fact that it is now a member of the Bangladesh Islamic Manch. Is it possible that the MULTA represents other MFOs in Assam in the Manch?

·       As aforesaid, militants of the MULTA or any MFO operating in Assam are not engaging themselves in mass scale extortion. The reason, in the opinion of the author, continues to be that the MULTA and most of the MFOs are provided for, by trusts and fronts which conduit monies from the ISI, al-Qaeda, and other such international networks with coordinates in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Yemen, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

·       The MULTA—in comparison to the ULFA or the NDFB—is a quiet militant organization, and the modus operandi—as aforesaid—seems to be not to take on the Indian security forces, but to expand their base as quietly as possible without attracting attention. Nevertheless, their travels to and from Bangladesh and Pakistan for the purpose of training is continuing. A recent news report has stated that a twenty-eight-man team of the MULTA led by its “Second Lt.,” Abdul Jalil, has recently entered Assam after completing a three-month arms training course. [145] The report also mentions that the MFO has purchased as many as fifty-five houses at Hamra Bazar in Sylhet district of Bangladesh for housing the organization’s leaders and recruits who visit Bangladesh for arms training.

Indeed, the author will not take anything to be amiss if militants of the MULTA begin to surrender in the manner of the HuM. The HuM network was rendered defunct with the arrests of the important leaders, and, therefore, theoreticians of the HuM and the ISI perhaps thought it was better to surrender the militants (the ones which could be spared and utilized for spreading a disinformation campaign to the authorities after surrendering) and let an impression be created that the organization has collapsed, rather than have the authorities continue to turn on the heat on the outfit as was done in the aftermath of the August 1999 arrests. “Preserve what one can and live to fight another jihad” seems to be a plausible explanation to the surrenders. The outright capitulation of an organization such as the HuM—with its powerful cross-border connection—does not make sense without recourse to such an explanation.

Abu Bakr Siddiqui’s Revelation

At any rate, the author has conducted an exclusive interview with the surrendered HuM General Secretary, Abu Bakr Siddiqui alias Abdullah. [146] Relevant extracts of the interview are put forward:

Marriages and Modules

It is quite clear, therefore, that the motivation of the HuM (as must be that of the other MFOs in Assam) is to gather and grow. The training, the movements, the indoctrination, the recruitments and the caution—all seem to point towards one inevitable objective, to “engulf and devour.” Indeed, as has been seen in the above interview of the surrendered General Secretary of the HuM in Assam, the instructions to the MFOs from their foreign minders are ambiguous (apart from directives such as the ones about the assassination of important Indian leaders), and it is indicated that they are to await not only a position of strength but also an opportune moment. The opportune moment will include the demise of the ethnic militant movements in the region and the demographic change that will soon be upon the region. Reports have already indicated that new social formations called the Sema Miyas have come up in Nagaland which are the progeny of the illegal Bangladesh migrant and the Sema tribe of Nagaland. The NSCN (K)—the group that has ceased its hostilities—has sent out strictures to the Muslim settlers in the Naga inhabited. In a press release on 16 January 2001 it appealed to the Nagas to maintain a strict watch on the Muslim community. The Nagaland Government was blamed for its failure to check the Muslim influx into the state. The organization also issued the following guidelines to the Muslims living in the Naga inhabited areas

·       Marriage of Muslims with the local Nagas would not be recognized and violators will be expelled.

·       Loud speakers were banned in Masjids.

·       The number of Muslims allowed to reside in each region of Nagaland was restricted to 2,500.

·       All Muslims were directed to possess identity cards “issued by the Organization.”

But what is even more disturbing are the latest reports that the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan are forming “modules” inside Assam, which are comprised of ten to twenty illegal migrants from Bangladesh. These “modules” that are to act as “sleepers” have been given huge sums of money and arms and ammunition, and every so often the ISI minders make trips to ascertain the “readiness” of these “modules.” Although the “modules” have not yet been activated, the role that they are reportedly to play is quite sinister. According to reports that are available, the “modules” on being activated will start a communal riot, act as agent saboteurs in a situation, and even target members of the Muslim community in order to arouse communal passion.

Al-Qaeda and Assam

Unconfirmed reports have also spoken about the presence of al-Qaeda in Bhutan and North East India. While it is true that almost all North East militant organizations have established camps in Bangladesh, the report that al-Qaeda has entered Bhutan may not be very reliable as even the ULFA is now in the process of leaving the Himalayan kingdom. However, the presence of al-Qaeda scouts and itinerant cadres in North East India cannot be ruled out. This is particularly so, because reports have suggested that Islamic militant organizations from the region are being trained by the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, and al-Qaeda. A newspaper quotes police and intelligence sources in a recent report.

The Role of the Madrassa

One important source for the MFOs is said to be the Madrassa. Indeed, history attests to the role of the Madrassa in the birth of the Taliban in Pakistan. Madrassas—certain analysts hold—are responsible for the initial training that is imparted to the jihadi. And, although whether this is so is a matter that will have to be examined, one aspect concerning the Madrassa is that it has begun to proliferate in a big way in the region, with certain Madrassas in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat uncovering huge caches of arms and ammunition. The seizures were made in two Madrassas in the above Indian states following an interrogation of six people who were arrested in connection with the attack on the USIS in Calcutta. [148] This has occasioned a serious controversy in India, with Madrassas being looked upon as suspect everywhere. And this is so, despite the fact that the Indian Deputy Prime minister has stated, “Madrassas all over the country should not be accused of fundamentalist activities.”

The fact that Madrassas are proliferating in the region is not a matter that can be contested. Bangladesh, for instance, has about 64,000 Madrassas, perhaps an imperative for an under developed country which has very few modern educational institutions and a huge population. But, Madrassas per se cannot be accused of churning out war machines—they have an important role in providing basic education to the poor Muslim children who do not have the wherewithal for a more specialized and formal education. However, the students who graduate from these religious seminaries have been known to be lured by the fundamentalists, and ill-equipped as they are with little sound education which would allow them a suitable profession, they fall prey to the attraction of jihad. The primers, for example, that are being taught in some Pakistani Madrassas state that the Urdu letter jeem stands for jihad; tay for tope (cannon); kaaf for Kalashnikovs; and khay for khoon (blood).

Madrassas in Assam —or elsewhere for that matter—are primarily of two types: a) Hafizia, and b) Kharizia, where religious teachings based on the Koran are being imparted to young children belonging to the Muslim community. In the Hafizia Madrassas, students receive the title of “Hafiz” (Kazi) after completing three years of recitation of the Koran. In Kharizia Madrassas, students receive the title of “Kari” after the completion of the course in two years. After graduating from these Madrassas, the students are qualified for admission into Dar, Deoband (Uttar Pradesh), or in senior Madrassas such as Baskandi in Cachar district and Garigaon in Guwahati. All the Madrassas provide boarding and lodging to the students who are of the age group three to twenty years.

The curriculum at the various levels of teaching in a Madrassa is:

·       Senior Madrassa Level (Std V-VII): Diniyat, Fika, Akait, Arabic, Urdu, Hindi, English, General Mathematics, General Science, Social Studies, Modern Indian Language [Assamese/Bengali], Work Experience

·       Senior 1-4^th Year (Std VIII-XI): Koran with translation and explanation, Al-Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), Usool (principles of jurisprudence), Arabic language/grammar, Modern Indian Language, English, Urdu, Tariq (Islamic history with Indian history of Mughal period) and Persian as an additional paper

·       Degree Level (1^st to 3^rd Year): Tafsil (explanation of Koran), Hadith, Fiqh, Usool, Arabic, Literary History of Arabs, Persian, Social Studies and Science

·       Mumtazul Mahadasin [MM Title Level]: Six Hadith, Tafsil and Islamic History

The State Madrassa Education Board  (MEB) recognizes most Madrassas in Assam, and inquiries have not revealed the presence of any teachers from Bangladesh or other countries (teachers have to be recruited as per Assam Madrassa Education Provincialisation Act 1995) in the state. Moreover, the Madrassas are not proliferating at a rate that may not have a correlation with the growth rate. An independent survey of Madrassas and Mosques in Assam was undertaken in 2002. The Occasional Paper reproduces the statistics.

District-Wise Details of Madrassas and Mosques