<< Chapter One

Chapter Two - Swadhin Asom or Brihot Bangladesh

Paresh Barua has a four-room apartment in a three-storied building in Dhaka’s Green Road. The apartment is on the top floor of the building. In the ground floor there is an air-conditioned grocery shop called “Rahman Traders” and opposite the building is a pathological clinic called “Skylab.”

As revealed by John Barua, ULFA cadre during interrogation after his arrest

Birth of the ULFA

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was formed on 7 April 1979—some two months before the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) observed its first twelve-hour strike on 8 June 1979 to protest against illegal migration into Assam. Therefore, although the ULFA did not come into existence as a result of the Assam agitation [56] —as generally understood—the fact of the matter is that it has its roots in the same socio-political space that engendered the agitation. Consequently, it was formed as a militant manifestation of the movement against illegal migration. Indeed, the commonality of agenda with the AASU led the ULFA to draw its initial sustenance from the student organization. Writing about the cohesion in the ranks of the ULFA and the AASU, Udayon Misra states:

The fact, however, is often overlooked that right from the inception, the ULFA maintained close links with the AASU and the AGP, occasional differences notwithstanding, and during the first few years most of the ULFA recruits were drawn from the ranks of the AASU. Though today the ULFA seems to have moved away from its original plank of Assamese nationalism to a position where it speaks for the “people of Assam,” yet its main appeal springs from the idea of some form of regional nationalism where all those who have made Assam their home would be bound together by a kind of overall Assamese ethos. In a revision of its earlier stand on “denationalization” of the different ethnic communities, the ULFA now extends its support to the struggle of the different ethnic minorities in the state and views such struggles as part of the greater struggle for an independent Assam. [57]

Assam of the late seventies was a curious mix of heady politics, chauvinism, and regionalism. The ULFA grew out of the birth pangs of the common Assamese sentiment of the period. This is so despite the fact that at no point in time can the ULFA claim to have had more than 10 percent of support from the populace. The ULFA—indeed the four [58] men who swore the organization into existence—simply took upon itself the task to decree for the Assamese people. Characterizing the relation between the Assamese populace and the ULFA, Sanjiv Barua, a noted political scientist, refers to the term “intertexuality.” Explaining the meaning of “intertexuality” in an interview, Barua states:

Literary theorists use the term “intertexuality” to talk about the complex ways in which one text (e.g., a story, a poem or a film) is related to another text. The term allowed me to get out of the simple-minded question of how many Assamese supported Assam’s independence. Because while the answer to the question may be less than 1 percent, it would not explain ULFA’s influence. The point is that issues that ULFA raised were connected (in complex ways) to issues that had been central to Assamese mainstream social discourse. [59]

The ULFA’s aims and objectives—save the ultimate step of secession—work out as a super-set of the demands for which the AASU and the unarticulated voice of the general populace have been clamoring. Ire over illegal migrants from Bangladesh was a paramount consideration in 1979, the year of the ULFA’s birth.

While it is not exactly known as to when the ULFA penned its “aims and objectives” and “qualification for membership,” or whether the present form is an appended version of an earlier rendering, the fact of the matter is that the very first clause in the membership criteria left the door open to all nationalities. This clause expansively states that a member “must be a permanent resident of Assam. However, volunteers from other countries will be recognized conditionally.” [60] It is interesting to note that the ULFA does not preclude the permanent albeit technically illegal migrant from Bangladesh—the express target of its natal ire.

In the ULFA’s “aims and objectives,” however, the following is expressed:

The people of Assam confronted with the aforesaid problems such as influx of foreigners and massive exploitation of its natural resources and determined as national identity problem after summing up them. Against the gross injustice for sheer survival as a nation, as a people and as individuals, the people of Assam many times launched democratic and unarmed peaceful movement. However, India ruthlessly suppressed and crushed them ignoring the value of democratic movement. Especially in 1979, democratic and unarmed peaceful movement against the influx of foreigners and economic exploitation, the occupation force of India killed seven hundred unarmed agitationists where the majority were teenage students. Though the people of Assam and leadership of the struggle have a strong stand for peaceful and amicable solution of the conflict, India has always been trying to force a military solution…thus the unarmed peaceful movement against the influx and economic exploitation transformed to an armed national liberation struggle. [61]

Although mention has been made of the “unarmed peaceful movement against the influx of foreigners” and the sacrifice which was made by the students during the agitation years in its “aims and objectives,” the ULFA soon began to renege on its founding ideologies. This has found expression in not only the organization’s latter day silence on the question of illegal migration from Bangladesh and the general debate that surrounded the question of the influx, [62] but in its proclamations as well. According to Samir Das, the ULFA redefined the concept of Assamese by stating that “the Assamese (Asamiya) are a people of all communities, the mixture of people who are determined to work for all-round progress of Assam.” [63] According to Das this meant that “the scope of the concept no longer remains restricted to those who speak Assamese as their mother tongue. Obviously, the immigrants from Bangladesh being the largest group of immigrants are ‘an indispensable part’ of the revised notion of Asamiya.” [64]

Indeed, in another portion of the ULFA document, the redefinition is final with a complete abdication of the central idea that gave it birth. It reads thus:

The contribution of the people of East Bengal origin in Assam towards increasing the state’s economic output is indeed noteworthy. It is this community, which produces the state’s vegetables, mustard, sesame and 82 per cent of the total jute. This is the main group of peasants who can produce plenty out of small areas of land…We would like to state here for everybody’s information that the movement led by the All Assam Students’ Union and Gana Sangram Parishad from 1979 to 1985 is viewed by the ULFA as one based on emotion. [65]

Furthermore, the ULFA of the day has not only jettisoned their ideology but seems to have—if a reading of its recent writings are anything to go by—gone one step further by replacing illegal migrants from Bangladesh with illegal migrants from India. So, while it seems to be acknowledging the fact that Assam is in the throes of a demographic reconfiguration, the ULFA provides a completely different reason for the problem. In an editorial in its newsletter it states:

The Indo-Assam conflict is a classical example of the socio-political chaos created by the influx of Indian aliens of this category…According to the recent study conducted by the Omeo Kumar Das Institute of Social Change and Development (OKDISCD), the size of the migration from India to Assam was 15,76,738 till ’91 and it is continuing…the Indian aliens have been desperately trying to establish their own culture and language taking Assam as a part of their homeland, like an extended Jamindari. The people of Assam who have a distinguished cultural identity are threatened necessarily by the social behavior of the Indian aliens and their size…Though it seems to be very unfortunate to express that occupation India is tactically using these aliens to shatter our demography, to hybrid our unique cultural identity and waiting to impose Indianism after crushing all these elements of identity upon a rootless nation. Tripura was made the first laboratory to test such a political onslaught against an independent nation and positive result was accumulated. Fearing the size and capacity of the great Assamese nation, India has been administering different reagents to slice it and to reign comparatively upon small ethnic groups and communities with the help of these aliens near future…India should stop such notorious policy of occupation for the well being of its own people before the time is over. People of Assam will take the resort of anything necessary to secure its own identity, culture and demographic structure. [66]

Although what egged on the ULFA’s present program in order to distort history is not immediately known, the author of this Occasional Paper wonders whether it has anything to do with the statements that the Bangladesh Government has been repeatedly making about the non-existence of illegal migrants in India. Is it that the ULFA has sought to interpret the preliminary findings of the Omeo Kumar Das Institute of Social Change and Development’s study as that stemming from an influx of illegal migrants from India in order to placate some foreign agency which is trying not only to deny the presence of illegal foreign migrants on Indian soil, but also hide an agenda which is even more conspiratorial? Is it that the ULFA was pressured to do so?  It is difficult otherwise to understand the reason for the ULFA’s blatant substitution of the word “Indian” for “Bangladeshi.”

An examination of the mechanisms by which outside forces from Bangladesh and Pakistan are attempting to promote Islamic militancy in Assam must take into consideration the abdication of ideology by one of the most important ethnically based militant organizations in the region, the ULFA, an organization—as has been seen—which came into existence as a foil to the illegal migration from Bangladesh. This is particularly so because it provides an insight into the engineering by which fundamentalist forces are arraying themselves in the face of the demise of ethnic movements. After all, the abdication by the ULFA of its own founding ideology seems to be a unique phenomenon—a militant movement that came into existence to protect the rights of an indigenous people has done a complete about-face in order to endanger its original parish—and ULFA members are allying themselves with the same people they want to oust from Assam. Few parallel developments to this engineering have been witnessed in the history of militant movements. It is, therefore, important to analyze the character of this phenomenon.

Has the ULFA sought to ally itself to the newfound agenda as a matter of mere expediency? Has it given up their earlier cause because of geo-political compulsions that they perceive have gripped Assam? What are the ULFA’s practical considerations for its turnaround? The discussion that follows for the remainder of Chapter Two enumerates several possible reasons.

Geo-political considerations of the ULFA

The theoreticians in the ULFA have kept their ears to the ground and have acknowledged the importance of expanding their parish to the migrant community that has been illegally entering Assam from Bangladesh. Indeed, it seems that one of the very first considerations seems to be that the problem of illegal migration is just too profound for cudgels to be taken up against it. The Census of India (Religion) 1991 has shown that Assam has four districts that have Muslim majority and five others as constituting almost 35 percent of the population. And, although the 2001 Religion census is yet to be declared, an independent analysis that was conducted seems to show that there has been a sizeable growth in population among Muslims in Assam. It records that as a community the Muslims had registered an increase of 16.7 percent growth in 2001 as compared to the 1991 figures. The district-wise figures are:

Although the main constituency of the ULFA continues to be the lower middle class Assamese, it has little option but to expand its base by including the illegal migrants from Bangladesh who are almost one hundred percent Muslims. This seems to be true despite the fact that only a very few cadres of the ULFA are Muslims and the ones which were initially in the organization have left in order to join the Muslim Liberation Front of Assam, Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam, and other Muslim fundamentalist organizations. However, the shuffle of Muslim cadres from the ULFA has by no means indicated that the ULFA is shying away from taking up Muslim interests. Indeed, it is only suggestive of the fact that the Muslim militants are becoming more pronounced in their agenda and are clearly drawing up a line.

Another episode of interest is that the ULFA is now reportedly tutoring the “intending infiltrator” in Assamese so that the absorption into the Assamese population is quicker. This information—according to the Hindustan Times, North East (New Delhi) of 6 June 2002—was revealed by some illegal migrants to forest officials in Assam during an eviction drive. According to the report, the ULFA runs a school in Bangladesh that reportedly teaches Assamese to people from Bangladesh who are desirous of illegally migrating into Assam. Although this report has not been verified by other sources, the fact that such a possibility may exist cannot be denied. This is primarily because of the presence of the ULFA in Bangladesh. And, therefore, a school on the aforesaid lines could well be in existence, run by members of the ULFA, not as a matter of organizational policy but for the personal expediency of some selected cadres. The demographic compulsions of Assam, therefore, seem to have influenced the ULFA’s agenda in a crucial manner.

The External Hand

The ISI of Pakistan—along with the DGFI of Bangladesh (who reportedly liaise actively on the old-tie network [67] )—have undertaken important missions in India’s North East. Assam—with its unique social mosaic—has provided the intelligence agencies of these two countries with a good opportunity to bleed India “with a thousand cuts.” Consequently, they have undertaken important operations in Assam. Although primary research has indicated that the operations in Assam have been conducted in order to tie down the Indian military to the region from their primary role in Kashmir, recent developments have clearly shown that a larger game plan of destabilization and balkanization seems to be underway as well. This conspiracy has come to light in recent years, especially after the arrest of ISI-sponsored agents in the heart of Assam’s capital. Before this Occasional Paper examines how the ISI has influenced the ULFA, it will profile the Pakistani intelligence agency.

The ISI of Pakistan

A British army officer of Australian origin, Maj. Gen. R. Cawthome, a one-time Deputy Chief of Army Staff, General HQ, Pakistan Army (1948-51), established the Directorate of the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan in 1948. [68] President Ayub Khan included in its role duties pertaining to the safeguarding of Pakistan’s national interests, monitoring opposition politicians, and sustaining his rule in Pakistan.

The ISI is mandated with the task of gathering external and internal intelligence; coordination of intelligence functions of the three armed forces; and surveillance of its cadre, foreigners, the media, politically active segments of the Pakistani society, diplomats of other nations stationed in Pakistan, and also Pakistani diplomats abroad. It is also tasked with the interception and monitoring of communication and the conduct of covert operations inside Pakistan and abroad.

Headquartered in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, a Lieutenant General of the Pakistan army heads the organization. The ISI reportedly has a total of about 10,000 officers and staff members, a number that does not include informants. It has six divisions, each headed by a Deputy Director General with the rank of a Major General in the Pakistan army.

The ISI is of paramount importance at the joint services level. Its importance stems from the fact that it is in complete charge of all covert operations outside Pakistan. The agency also reportedly supplies weaponry, advice, training and other forms of assistance to separatist groups in Kashmir as also to the ones waging a war with the Indian state to liberate North East India.

The 1965 Indo-Pak war provoked a major crisis in intelligence. The war revealed the inefficiency of the intelligence agencies that were until then devoted to domestic investigative work. Ayub Khan set up a committee headed by Yahya Khan to examine the working of the agencies.

The ISI has been deeply involved in domestic politics and has kept track of the various incumbent regime’s opponents. Before 1958 and the imposition of Martial Law, the ISI reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. When Martial Law was promulgated in 1958, all intelligence agencies fell under the direct control of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator.

The Pakistani intelligence agency is presently engaged in covert support to the militants fighting against the Indian security forces in Kashmir. “Operation Tupac” is reportedly the name for the three-part action plan for the liberation of Kashmir, initiated by the late President Zia Ul Haq in 1988 after the failure of “Operation Gibraltar.” According to a report compiled by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of India in 1995, the ISI spent about Rs. 2.4 crore every month to sponsor its activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Although all groups reportedly receive arms and training from Pakistan, the pro-Pakistani groups are reported to be favored by the ISI. At least six major militant organizations, and several smaller ones, are operating in Kashmir. Their force strengths are variously estimated at between 5,000 and 10,000. They are roughly divided between those who seek azaadi (independence) and those who support accession to Pakistan. The oldest militant organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), had spearheaded the movement for an independent Kashmir. But the JKLF has fallen from the ISI’s grace and powerful pro-Pakistani groups—the Hizbul-Mujahiddin, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad—have stolen its thunder. According to press reports, several hundred fighters from Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim countries have also joined some of the militant groups or have formed their own tanzeems (organizations). [69]

                                          The Order of Battle of the ISI
                                                          Director General
                                                        [Lt. Gen. Ehsan Ul Haq]
                                                                    |
                                                      Deputy Director Generals
              

Joint Intelligence     Counter Intelligence    Public Affairs & Services    External             Political                 Joint Intelligence
Finance                                                                                                                                                                    Technical
[Abbas Bukhari]       [Tasneem Aziz]                  [Raushan Beg]           [Javed Iqbal]       [Ghulam Ahmed Khan]      [Istiaque Hussain]

* The North East India desk is manned by a Lt. Col. Abdul Hamid Gilani

One aspect, however, which must be kept in mind, is the tendency among a section of the Indian media and intelligentsia to over-stress the ISI factor. And, while it is not in doubt that the Pakistani intelligence service has infiltrated a number of areas in India, and are consequently responsible for the “prairie fires” that are raging, it has become somewhat of a habit to blame the ISI for everything that ails India. ISI-criers in India must contend with the fact that discretion is the better part of both valor and wisdom. Thus, attribution of responsibility to the ISI in every case is unsound. In the words of a retired Pakistani Admiral whom this author met on 17 June 2003 at the Cooperative Monitoring Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico during the course of a lecture this author was delivering, “I had no idea the ISI is so efficient.” 

The ISI and ULFA

On 6 April 2000, the then Chief Minister of Assam, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, delivered the first comprehensive report in the Assam State Assembly after almost a yearlong engagement with the ISI-sponsored cell inside Assam. The placing of the report, of course, had to await the breaking up of the Pakistani intelligence agencies network in the state. On 7 August 1999, the Assam Police achieved a major breakthrough and arrested four important leaders of the network in Guwahati. The police also arrested twenty-seven other persons belonging to different Islamic militant groups. The important people who were arrested were: 1) Md Fasih Ullah Hussaini alias Hamid Mehmood alias Khalid Mehmood of Hyderabad (Sind), Pakistan; 2) Md Javed Waqar alias Md Musaffa alias Md Mehraj alias Abdul Rahman; 3) Maulana Hafiz Md Akram Mallik alias Musaffa Hussain alias Atabullah alias Bhaijan alias Abdul Awal of Mukam Shahwali village of Jammu and Kashmir; and 4) Kari Salim Ahmad alias Abdul Aziz alias Sadat of Mehilki village of Muzafarnagar of Uttar Pradesh.

The Chief Minister of Assam’s report to the State Assembly—while seeking to provide comprehensiveness to the nature and degree of the ISI threat—was primarily a synopsis of the events that had occurred in the period following the 7 August 1999 arrests of the thirty-one people. In the period following the 7 August 1999 arrests, according to the report the state police had unearthed the modus operandi of the foreign agency. According to the sixteen-page report (which included mug-shots and profiles of the main accused) the activities of the ISI are mainly in the following areas:

·       Promoting indiscriminate violence in the State by providing active support to the local militant outfits.

·       Creating new militant outfits along ethnic and communal lines by instigating ethnic and religious groups.

·       Supplying explosives and sophisticated arms to various terrorist groups.

·       Causing sabotage of oil pipelines and other installations, communication lines, railways, and roads.

·       Promoting fundamentalism and militancy among local Muslim youths by misleading them in the name of jihad.

·       Promoting communal tension between Hindu and Muslim citizens by way of false and highly inflammatory propaganda.

Intelligence reports made available to this author have also indicated that the ISI had sought to smuggle in sixty kilograms of Research Developed Explosives, or RDX, into Assam. This was attempted in the month of August 1999 when the ISI decided to unleash Operation Tehsad in North East India. The motivation was to destroy the area’s oil industry and surface transport. The ULFA was to be supplied the RDX. The ISI gave the ULFA the first installment of the explosives by which they could begin their operations—four explosions took place in three days on rail tracks and trains.

The second consignment was left in the care of two Harkat-ul-Mujahideen cadres at the Sat Gombuz mosque in Bangladesh’s Rajshahi district. The Assam police, however, managed to eliminate Babul Ingti, an ULFA cadre, in an encounter and was able, thereafter, to locate the whereabouts of the rest of the RDX. An Assam police team infiltrated into Rajshahi through West Bengal (with the help of the West Bengal Police) and having got the password from Waqar (which was Kandahar), the team managed to get thirty-two kgs of explosives from the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and returned to Bengal through the Birsa corridor in Malda. Operation Tehsad ended in failure and oil installations could not be hit. However, on the orders of the ULFA Chief of Staff, Paresh Barua, the Volcano unit of the ULFA later destroyed the Thekeraguri oil depot near Jagiroad in Assam.

Reports have also indicated that the Assam police have in its possession evidence to show that the top ULFA leadership is in close touch with certain officials of the Pakistani High Commission in Dhaka. The ULFA leaders have also been traveling to Pakistan regularly for training, indoctrination, and consultation. According to the Chief Minister’s report, confessional statements of many ULFA leaders including the organization’s Vice Chairman, Pradip Gogoi, have stated that the Pakistani officials in their High Commission in Dhaka arrange passports for the ULFA in various Muslim names. The Chief of Staff of the ULFA, Paresh Barua, for instance, travels to Pakistan under the name Kamarudin Zaman Khan, an alias he has been provided with by the ISI.

The ULFA-ISI nexus had, in fact, begun way back in the early 1990s. A list (culled by the Special Branch of the Assam Police) of some of the early events and meetings that had taken place between the two organizations is provided below.

·       In November 1990, the ULFA decides to send Munin Nabis and Partha Pratim Bora alias Javed to Bangladesh to contact the ISI at Dhaka for arranging supply of arms and ammunition. They were instructed to set up a base camp in Bangladesh.

·       Munin Nabis sets up a base camp in Dhaka in 1990 with the help of a Col. (Retd.) Faruque of the Bangladesh Freedom Party and Gani Shapan of the Jatiyo Party. Nabis rents a house at Mogbazar in Dhaka.

·       Munin Nabis assumes the name “Iqbal” and contacts Samsul Siddique, the Second Secretary in the Pakistan Embassy at Dhaka. Contacts with the ISI are established through Siddique.

·       Munin Nabis visits Pakistan to negotiate with a terrorist group headed by a Mustafa Ali Jubardo for the impartment of training to ULFA cadres on payment.

·       The Vice Chairman of the ULFA, Pradip Gogoi, visits Dhaka in January 1991 and contacts an ISI officer called Mr. Haque. Gogoi signs an agreement for the impartment of training to ULFA cadres. He also meets there another ISI officer, a Mr. Jalal.

·       After the agreement with the ISI, Munin Nabis calls a group of ULFA members for training in Pakistan in April 1991. Pradip Gogoi accompanies a six-member group to Islamabad for training with the ISI.

·       Hari Mohan Roy alias Rustar Choudhury of the ULFA, along with ten other ULFA cadres, undergo training in camps organized by the ISI in Pakistan in 1993. Hari Mohan Roy obtains a passport under the name of Jamul Akhtar, son of Akhtar Hussain of Bangladesh.

·       According to a recorded statement of the renegade ULFA leader, Lohit Deury, the ULFA’s Foreign Secretary, Sasadhar Choudhury, had passed on information of the Indian army formation location in Assam to the ISI in Kathmandu.

The ISI had also organized training for the ULFA cadres in association with the Directorate General of Field Intelligence of Bangladesh at a camp located thirty-five kilometers west of the Karnaphulli Hydro-electric project in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 1993. A retired Bangladesh army officer, Brig. Joimullah Khan Choudhury, supervised the training. The ISI had reportedly also imparted specialized training to forty-eight ULFA cadres in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir along with the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam. Furthermore, there is also evidence to suggest that the ISI is activating the border areas in Nepal for relocation of some of the militant camps, especially after the presence in Bhutan has become a problem. The ULFA along with the NDFB have reportedly already set up camps in Jhapa, Tapegung, and Panchthar in eastern Nepal. 

The ULFA’s links with the Sipahi-e-Sahiba was highlighted in a correspondence between a one-time head of the Special Branch of the Assam Police and the Joint Director (North East) of the Intelligence Bureau, India. The letter stated:

Intelligence input received recently indicates that ULFA has got links with Sipahi-e-Sahiba of Kabul Afghanistan, which is also funding the outfit for its training programme in the training camp in Halowaghat in Mymensingh district of Bangladesh as well as for the purchase of arms. A letter written by Commander-in-Chief of the Sipahi-e-Sahiba of Kabul Afghanistan to Commander-in-Chief, Terik-e-Jihad, Chokoria, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh on 08-08-2000 indicates that a sum of Rs.80 lakh has been sent to the bank account no. 804856 of Islamia Bank, Chittagong to meet the expenditure of ULFA training camp located at Halowaghat and also to buy heavy arms for the outfit.

Another documentary evidence is a letter written by Jamaat-e-Islami chief of Bangladesh addressed to the General Secretary, MULTA which indicates that Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan has sent a sum of Rupees 8 Lakh through Jamaat-e-Islami of Bangladesh for assistance of MULTA in carrying out their struggle of establishing Muslim legal rights.

Another intelligence input received indicates that in order to run the training camp at Halowaghat, ULFA has recently opened two new bank accounts (i) Account No: 205341 in Islamia Bank, College Road Branch and (ii) Account No: 543708 in A.B. Bank, Medical Road Branch in Mymensingh District in Bangladesh. Reportedly ULFA is trying to establish a very profitable business of computer hardware and software in collaboration with Fema International, a Swedish computer company and they have made all preparations for opening up a software network sometime in the month of September 2000 in Saber about 30 Kms away from Dhaka… [70]

The Pakistani misadventure in Kargil brought out into the open the ULFA-ISI nexus. [71] According to the Indian army operating in Assam, the ULFA was involved in the passing of information of troop movements to and from Assam to the ISI. The ULFA was also allegedly pressured by the ISI to make anti-Indian statements—primarily supporting the liberation of Kashmir.

It has also been reported that the genocide perpetrated by the ULFA during the closing months of 2000 when they began to systematically target Hindi-speaking Assamese was planned by the ISI. [72] Indeed, intelligence reports have suggested that members of Bangladesh based Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing, the Islamic Chatra Shibir, operated along with the ULFA to perpetrate the acts of terror.

The ULFA has, however, denied any links with the ISI. It stated in its fortnightly newsletter:

Dismissing the continuous accusations of New Delhi and its occupation forces, ULFA Chief of Staff, Mr. Paresh Barua said that the ULFA is not a creation of the ISI. In a press release issued on November 3, Mr. Barua said that ULFA was born on the basis of genuine historical injustice in the womb of  “Mother Assam”, ULFA never danced, not in the present time or would dance in future to the tunes of the ISI or somebody else…The alleged link of the ULFA with ISI and other foreign agencies is only a heinous conspiracy of New Delhi, aimed at nullifying the legitimate liberation struggle of the people of Assam. [73]

One important aspect, however, which must be mentioned about the ULFA, is the refusal of most of the ULFA’s 28^th Battalion cadres to bow to the dictates of the ISI and destroy the oil installations situated in Upper Assam. The 28^th Battalion [74] is situated in Upper Assam and most of the cadres of the battalion have grown up with the oil fields and the installations. As a result, when the ISI wanted the ULFA to attack the oil installations in Upper Assam, the 28^th Battalion cadres disagreed. However, the non-compliance was short-lived and the ULFA fired a mortar shell onto a refinery in Upper Assam’s oil town of Digboi on 8 March 2003 and inflicted considerable damage. The ISI has clearly won the “Upper Assam restraint” round, and analysts are of the opinion that the ULFA is completely in the control of the Pakistani intelligence agency.

Paraphernalia in Bangladesh

Another consideration that could be facing the ULFA is the established paraphernalia it has in Bangladesh. Indeed, Bangladesh—along with Bhutan and Myanmar—is a country that houses the ULFA’s training and liaison camps as well as its safe houses. Moreover, it is in the Bangladeshi cities of Dhaka and Chittagong that the leaders of the ULFA permanently reside. Also, most arms consignments that are dispatched to the ULFA from the Orient are conduited through Bangladesh, especially via the port city of Cox’s Bazaar. The ULFA, moreover, seems to have a working relationship with the Bangladesh government and the present Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Begum Khaleda Zia, is well disposed towards them and is reported to have publicly called the ULFA—as well as other North East militant groups—freedom fighters during her term as the opposition leader of Bangladesh. This seems to be so, despite the fact that the ULFA General Secretary, Anup Chetia, was arrested in Dhaka on 21 December 1997, along with ULFA cadres Lakhi Prasad Goswami and Babul Sarma at a rented house at Mohammadpur in Dhaka on charges of illegal possession of a satellite phone among other material. Chetia is incarcerated in a Dhaka jail. However, Bangladesh has not consented to extradite the incarcerated ULFA leader to India, where he is sought for a number of criminal cases. [75]

Recent Indian intelligence reports have also indicated that there are as many as 155 militant camps in Bangladesh which train and house militants from North East India. A news report has stated:

Notwithstanding Bangladesh’s denials, India has given a list of 155 terrorist training camps operating at various places in that country, many with the help of ISI and Al Qaida and asked it to shut them down, reports Press Trust of India. While conveying its concern over the support by some fundamentalist organizations of Bangladesh to North East terrorists, India at a recent high-level meeting has also sought deportation of 85 insurgents from the neighboring country… “We have information that ISI activities directed against India are on the rise in Bangladesh. ISI men along with Al Qaida operatives are imparting training at several of the camps,” they said. They said that reports suggest that sophisticated weapons are being smuggled into India from various places in Bangladesh including Cox’s Bazaar, Sylhet and Chittagong and ISI operatives are playing a key role in this…Even terrorists operating in Jammu & Kashmir are also being sent via the Bangladesh border because of it being a more porous frontier than the western border… [76]

The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs some years ago published a booklet called Bleeding Assam, [77] where it stated that the leaders of the ULFA are running lucrative businesses in Bangladesh and are living a life of luxury. And, although at least this Occasional Paper will not seek to comment on the veracity or otherwise of such reports (independent inquiries made by the author seem to support that it is not the case that the ULFA leaders are living a life of luxury in Bangladesh), the fact of the matter is that the ULFA has invested a sizeable amount of the money which it receives or extorts from the business houses and the people of Assam into certain commerce making ventures in the erstwhile East Pakistan. And this is particularly true of the ULFA Chief of Staff who resides in a house adjacent to the Egyptian Embassy in Dhaka that belongs to a legislator of the Jatiyo Party. Indeed, Paresh Barua has also been known to stay in Old Dhaka’s Segun Bagicha that is near the Shaji Exports, which is widely believed to be the front office of the ISI. The enigmatic ULFA leader also stays in a DGFI safe house in Dhaka’s Mirpur cantonment. Therefore, unless Paresh Barua is traveling to Bhutan, Pakistan or South East Asia, he is a permanent resident of Bangladesh, and with the full knowledge of the Bangladesh authorities. The Far Eastern Economic Review Senior Writer, Bertil Lintner, who has documented the subterfuges in Bangladesh in a very comprehensive manner, has stated in an exclusive interview to this author (see below) that the leaders of the ULFA move around in Bangladesh escorted by the DGFI, the Bangladesh intelligence service. Analysts have opined on the protection that is constantly provided to the ULFA leaders in Bangladesh. While it seems that attempts have actually been made on the life of Paresh Barua, the ISI-DGFI nexus keeps him and some other important ULFA leaders under constant protection (surveillance), as they fear that they might leave Bangladesh in order to return to India and surrender. The ULFA of the day has no free agency and its policies and actions are wholly determined by the ISI and the DGFI. However, the fact that the ULFA Chief of Staff’s life is in constant danger is not a matter that is in any doubt. Indeed, five attempts have been made on the life of Paresh Barua:

1)     The first attempt was made in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts (Khagrachari) on 16 December 2000. The son of the headmaster of Paresh Barua’s home village in Upper Assam, Jeraigaon was killed in the attack. Chakma groups were utilized for the operation.

2)     The second attack was outside the Basil Leaf Restaurant, Dhaka on 3 March 2001. Paresh Barua’s financier, known as “Rumi Bhai,” was killed. The services of the Dhaka underworld “Seven Stars” were commandeered for the operation.

3)     The third attack was mounted in the house of former Jatiyo Party legislator, Abdul Qashem, whose house is the third house from the Egyptian embassy. Explosives were utilized for the purpose and once again the “Seven Stars” were enlisted to carry out the attack. A surrendered ULFA cadre, Senapati—who earlier had been sent to the ISI School in Muree in Pakistan—was involved.

4)     The fourth attack was in Dhaka’s Segun Bagicha—in front of the Cosmos Travel office where Paresh Barua reportedly runs a travel agency along with Khalek-ur-Zaman. Reports indicate that he had come to collect money when the attack took place.

5)     The fifth attack was reportedly mounted on 27 May 2003 at Bangladesh’s Uttara Model town. According to isolated reports, an Ehsan Ali—a DGFI captain detailed to guard the ULFA Chief of Staff—was seriously injured, while Paresh Barua experienced injuries to his leg. The ULFA Chief of Staff was reportedly meeting a Col. Salam and a Dhaka businessman, Ataur Rehman Babu. Unconfirmed reports have attributed the attack to the ULFA Operations Commander, Raju Baruah, but this is yet to be borne out by facts. In an interview with Paresh Barua, which was conducted by Subir Bhaumik, the ULFA Chief of Staff has stated that the attribution of responsibility to Raju Baruah is an attempt by the Indian intelligence to divide the ULFA. However, recent enquiries made by this author seem to suggest that much has been made of the 27 May attack. Paresh Barua was apparently not hurt and he even reportedly spoke to the former ULFA Publicity Secretary, Sunil Nath, on the night of 28 May. The ULFA Chief of Staff seems to be looking for opportunities to draw attention to himself.

Most of the ULFA camps in Bangladesh abut the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) camps in Tarabon, Satchari, and Fatikchari. And, although this Occasional Paper will discount the large number of North East militant camps in Bangladesh, as the government in New Delhi has set out to do, [78] it has certain irrefutable evidence that both training and liaison camps belonging to the ULFA are in existence in Bangladesh.

The interrogation report of an arrested ULFA cadre, John Barua, makes for interesting reading. This Occasional Paper will reproduce sections relating to Bangladesh.

On the subject’s travel to and in Bangladesh, the report states:

…On 8 October 2001, the subject along with Nayan, Suraj, Bitupan, Lebu and Dipjyoti reached the Sherpur Bus Stand after about one hour of traveling by a “tempo.” [79] After about six-seven hours’ journey by bus they reached Dhaka via Nakla, Phulpur, Mymensingh, Trishal, Bhaluka, Sripur and Tongi. Thence by auto rickshaw they reached Elephant Road by passing through Kataban, Mogbazar, Phakirapul, Stadium Market and Dhaka University. At the tri-junction of Elephant Road and Kataban there is a flower shop called “Pushpanjali” and there are some shops selling aquariums. From this tri-junction, a by-lane goes to the left which when taken for about 100 meters comes upon a building complex…before reaching this complex taking the right by-lane, one reaches a butcher’s shop with glass walls. The next shop is a Public Call office [telephone booth] called “Asif PCO” which is owned by an ULFA cadre, “Lt.” Pranjit Saikia…

…Paresh Barua, Chief of Staff of the ULFA has a four-room apartment in a three-storied building in Dhaka’s Green Road. The apartment is on the top floor of the building. In the ground floor there is an air-conditioned grocery shop called “Rahman Traders” and opposite the building is a pathological clinic called “Skylab.” Paresh Barua stays in this apartment with his wife Bobby Hazarika alias Anwara Begum [80] aged 37-38 years and their two sons Arindam aged 8 and Baby aged 5. Paresh Barua uses a Calora 1000 cc car, which is of Japanese make. The color of the vehicle is coffee brown and Sahidul alias Kalita of Mirza, [81] an ULFA cadre drives the car…the children of Paresh Barua address their parents as Ammi and Abbu [82] and speak Bengali and are accustomed to Muslim culture and tradition…Paresh Barua, Pranjit Saikia, Drishti Rajkhowa and Sahidul go and play football in Dhaka’s Sansad Bhawan every morning from 5 AM to 8:30 AM…

…On 30 October 2001, the subject along with Lebu alias Suraj Sikdar went to the Satchari joint ATTF-ULFA camp, which is located in Habiganj district’s Maulavi Bazaar sub-division. The camp is located inside the Satsoo Tea Estate and is behind the Tripuribasti…Every month about Rs. 30-40,000 are spent for the maintenance of the camp. Pranjit Saikia receives extorted money from Assam from time to time and gives the money to “Sgt. Maj.” Salim of Tinsukia [83] as per requirement…ULFA has procured huge numbers of sophisticated arms and ammunition from foreign countries with the extorted money and has stored these at a hideout in Chittagong. Paresh Barua and the ULFA Foreign Secretary, Sasadhar Choudhury, procured the arms. “Lt.” Amar Singh of Golaghat is in charge of the arsenal…the subject has received the following consignment of arms:

On 8 November 2001: 8 Sniper Rifles

On 20 November 2001: 10 AK 81 Rifles

On 20 November 2001:  10 .56 Pistols…

John Barua has given detailed information about the ULFA paraphernalia in Bangladesh including the training that is imparted to its cadres. However, the revelations of a ULFA cadre, Dwipamani Kalita, alias Seema Biswas, who surrendered before the Assam Police on 20 April 2003 are particularly interesting. [84] This is because of the fact that the cadre—a lady—was responsible for some of the mortar attacks that were taking place all over Assam in the recent months and had flummoxed the authorities. Dwipamani Kalita was responsible for two mortar attacks, which were carried out in the heart of Assam’s capital city, Guwahati. [85] The Occasional Paper reproduces here relevant portions of Kalita’s interrogation report in toto because it gives a first hand account of the ULFA agenda and paraphernalia in Bangladesh.

On 6 April 1998, I [Dwipamani Kalita] joined the ULFA and underwent arms and guerrilla training at the Enigma B camp in Bhutan under the Operations Commander Capt. Raju Barua. Afterwards, I took part in several operations under Lt. Lal Deka, 2^nd Lt. Dristi Rajkhowa and Sgt. Maj. Subhash Sarma in the East and West Garo Hills, Goalpara and Dhubri districts.

While I was taking shelter in the houses of Biraj Koch, Moni Koch and Dipak Koch of village Puthimari under Garobadha Police Station in West Garo Hills, Subhash Sarma told me that the Chief of Staff, Paresh Baruah has summoned me and Sgt. Dilip Roy of Bongaigaon (later killed on 4 April 2003) to go to Bangladesh on a matter of great urgency. We were to leave for Bangladesh under the guidance of an elderly (55 years) Rava person—some Bangladeshi people were also to assist us in reaching the destination. On the way to Bangladesh I was to identify myself as Rojana Begum and Dilip Roy as Islam Uddin. We were not allowed to carry any Indian articles, even wristwatches were not permitted in order to avoid detection.

On 2 September 2001, at about 3:30 PM Dilip Roy and I—on being guided by the elderly Rava man—left Puthimari by a Maruti van and at about 4:30 PM reached near Baghmara. We walked for about 45 minutes and met a Bangladeshi couple. They were waiting for us with a foreign car that looked like an Ambassador’s car. We all boarded the car that proceeded slowly for about 20/25 minutes. We crossed the Indo-Bangladesh border and reached Halowaghat. From Halowaghat we proceeded along a paved road. After a non-stop journey, we reached Narayanganj in the morning and after walking for about 30 minutes by a kutcha [86] road we reached the house of a bearded Muslim man. The elderly Rava man told Dilip Roy and me that we were to work as per direction of the house owner.

Dilip Roy and I were accommodated in a room of a concrete house. In another room there were two NDFB and two NSCN (K) [National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)] activists. The house owner had asked us not to talk with one another.

On 23 September 2001, at about 1 in the afternoon Paresh Barua along with Lt. Ram Gogoi of Dibrugarh, and Khagen Choudhury and two Bangladeshis came to the place and remained there for about 4 to 5 hours. Paresh Baruah told Dilip and me to obey the instructions of the house owner and not to ask any questions. He also told us that we would be given some special training.

After about 5 days in the evening Paresh Baruah along with his driver ULFA activist Khagen Choudhury and one Bangladeshi youth came to our shelter. Lt. Dibyajyoti Mahanta also came with him. Paresh Baruah told Dilip and me that from the next day we would be given training for some days by some persons as arranged by ULFA and that no ULFA member would be with us during the training.

As far as I recollect, on 30 September 2001, at about 5:30 in the morning, two vehicles came to our place. The two NDFB, the two NSCN (K) cadres, Dilip Roy and I boarded one of the vehicles while five other persons boarded the other vehicle. The five persons looked like Army personnel who could speak Bengali. After crossing Faridpur at about 8:30­8:45 AM we reached a place that was said to be Misnupur. At Misnupur we were blindfolded. Then by the same vehicle we proceeded for about 30 minutes and reached a camp where there were about 10 to 15 houses.

The five persons of the other vehicle imparted training with respect to handling and operation of RPG-7 and 60 MM mortar. RPG-7 can be fired from 400 to 500 meters and 60 MM mortar can be fired from a maximum of 1600 meters. At about 9 PM we came back to our shelter place in Narayanganj.

Again on 1 October 2001 we went to the training camp, underwent training and came back. We carried our lunch boxes with us. Thereafter, we were given training on alternate days. We underwent training at Misnupur for 14 days in all. On the last day of the training we had range practice and I fired 12 shells from 60 MM mortar while Dilip fired 3 shells from 60 MM mortar. Due to non-availability of ammunition we could not fire the RPG-7.

The NSCN (K) and NDFB cadre underwent training for only seven days. I do not know their names.

From the language spoken by the instructors one could guess that they were non-Bangladeshi and could be Urdu speaking people. They were smart like army personnel.

During the course of the training Paresh Barua visited us at the training camp. His second visit was on the day of firing. Lt. Dipjyoti Mahanta, driver Khagen Choudhury and two Bangladeshi people who might be from the intelligence department also visited us.

While the mortar training was going on, Sgt. Maj Phanindra Medhi alias Lebu took me and Dilip Roy to a place called Parbatipur in Dinajpur district on alternate days for imparting unarmed combat and other training. The training center was located inside a jungle surrounded by concrete wall. It is a permanent training center having provisions for obstacles etc. It took us about five and a half hours to reach Parbatipur from Narayanganj.

Lebu had taught martial arts to Dilip and me along with about 50 to 60 Bangladeshi youths of the age groups 25 to 30 years. We were taken to Parbatipur for about 10 days. In addition to this Lebu taught us about different firing positions of a pistol, AK-56, AK-81.

On 1 November 2001 we completed our training.

The ULFA’s geo-political compulsions, its connection with the ISI, the organizations paraphernalia in Bangladesh, and indeed, the entire process by which it has abdicated its ideology, has, therefore, only expedited the fundamentalist agenda which is being engineered in Assam. And although it may be said that the ground was already fertile for the growth of Islamic movements in Assam as a result of not only the illegal influx into the state from Bangladesh but also because of the dynamics that egg on Islamic fundamentalism of the day (especially after 11 September 2001), the fact of the matter is that a strong ethnic movement such as the ULFA would have stood in the way of the fundamentalist progress had it not reneged on its founding principles.

But 2003 is not 1979, and even as the ULFA approaches its silver jubilee year, its tryst with violence continues. Indeed, the atmosphere in the North East (with the two factions of the NSCN ceasing hostilities and talking to the Government of India) has not had a mellowing effect on the ULFA leadership, which (if reports are anything to go by) seem to feel that the Naga groups are being worn out by a succession of talks, and would, consequently, not receive anything from New Delhi. Indeed, every time the Naga talks end in stalemate, Paresh Barua has been reported to use the occasion as brownie points over his more talk-seeking political wing cadres. Commenting on New Delhi’s peace process in the North East, an editorial in the ULFA’s newsletter observes:

Time has paced another decade since the capitulation of the Mizo freedom movement. The environment of the surroundings of occupation India is also not as healthy as the past eras. So it will be a futile try for Indian government to solve the ongoing conflicts according to the style of Mizoram. Military pressure will not work specially in case of ULFA to compel it to sit across table. ULFA has already withstood rigorous Indian campaigns and ready to cope against all possibilities with the help of armed resistance may be best ever than anytime.

Hence, what ULFA proposes India is to deal all the conflicts in the region formulating a declared political common minimum strategy rather than playing a cat and mouse game. ULFA doesn’t have any quest to be a party of such a worthless Indian endeavor. The preconditions of ULFA are set as assurances of guarantee to confirm sincerity of occupation India beforehand. India should better understand that a political solution doesn’t necessarily mean capitulation… [87]

 Moreover, even Paresh Barua has now begun to bow to ISI dictates for the destruction of oil installations, etc. The restraint with which he had sought to override such assertions have ended, and the ULFA Chief of Staff is aware that his organization is now completely at the mercy of the foreign intelligence agencies—the ISI and the DGFI. Indeed, certain analysts have opined that the ISI-DGFI will not hesitate to assassinate Paresh Barua if he turns out to be a loose cannon—the increasing reliance with which the ISI-DGFI are presently beginning to   utilize the Islamic groups in Assam seem to be indicative of this danger. The alien chaperons of the ULFA will never let Paresh Barua return to India in order to surrender.

An important factor in the chessboard of Islamic militancy in the region is Bangladesh. The erstwhile East Pakistan—liberated by India in 1971—is presently undergoing a metamorphosis. Indeed, as Bertil Lintner of the Far Eastern Economic Review opines:

A revolution is taking place in Bangladesh that threatens trouble for the region and beyond if left unchallenged. Islamic fundamentalism, religious intolerance, militant Muslim groups with links to international terrorist groups, a powerful military with ties to the militants, the mushrooming of Islamic schools churning out radical students, middle-class apathy, poverty and lawlessness—all are combining to transform the nation. [88]

The once moderate Islamic Bangladesh, founded on the the principles of democracy, secularism, socialism and Bengali nationalism, is today in the throes of forcible conversion—with far reaching ramifications not only for the region but also for the world, which is yet to recover from the effects of 11 September. The next chapter will examine how this conversion is manifesting itself in the erstwhile East Pakistan.

Chapter Three >>