

The bulletin of the Program in Arms Control,
Disarmament, and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Volume VIII / Number 1 / Fall 1993

Swords and Ploughshares

3 Thinking about Coping with Conflict
Edward A. Kolodziej

7 The Puzzle Pieces of Germany
Peter Fritzsche

10 The Prospects for Peace in Northern Ireland
William F. Kelleher

12 Book Review—Peacekeeping:
Challenges for the Future
Paul F. Diehl

This publication is supported in part by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and is produced by the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The original design was created by the Office of the Associate Chancellor for Public Affairs/Office of Publications.

The University of Illinois is an equal opportunity/affirmative action institution.

Editor: Jeremiah D. Sullivan
Associate Editor: Merrily Shaw
Copy Editor: Sheila A. Ryan
Designer: Merrily Shaw

Introduction

by JEREMIAH D. SULLIVAN

The revolution of 1989–1991 that began by sweeping away the communist governments of Eastern Europe and ended with the demise of the Soviet Union left behind widespread feelings of euphoria and optimism. This mood dissipated quickly as the emerging “new world order” proved to be anything but peaceful. Intrastate and ethnic conflict erupted on a scale that overstrained the United Nations and found traditional security alliances inadequate. Political leaders, scholars, and experts struggle to comprehend the void left by the end of the superpower confrontation and to find a new framework for deciding how, when, and where to respond to interstate and intrastate conflict. This issue of *Swords and Ploughshares* examines some of the dilemmas confronting the world today.

In the opening article, international relations theorist Edward A. Kolodziej summarizes a vision spelled out in a forthcoming book on coping with conflict that he edited with colleague Roger E. Kanet. The article argues that the Westcentric system comprising the United States, its NATO allies, and Japan has emerged in the post-Cold War era as a self-made security community in the sense of the political theorist Karl Deutsch. A central quality of this community is that its members have learned collectively that unilateral solutions to security and national welfare are essentially unachievable. The community can serve as an example for the rest of the world if current challenges can be met. Primary among these are maintaining interest of the members of the Westcentric system in resolving conflicts in states outside the system and the need to incorporate Russia and China within the system over the long run. The economic well-being of developing states and the closely coupled problem of world population growth are critical challenges facing the Westcentric system as well.

In the article that follows, historian Peter Fritzsche looks at the current mood inside Ger-

many, a state trying to put itself back together after four decades of separation. What seemed in 1989 to be a well-defined task has become a miasma of uncertainty, passionate debate, and psychological divide. The author observes that Germans have become uncertain about their self-image as well as Germany’s future role in Europe and in the world. In many ways, the divide between east and west in Germany is now deeper than in the past. The mounting cost of reconstructing East Germany has cast doubts on the German model, which had been seen as the economic engine of all of Europe. It remains to be determined what the new Germany will actually be, a proposition that is unsettling to many.

In the third article of this issue, anthropologist William Kelleher looks at one of the most persistent conflicts in modern times—Northern Ireland. The release in December 1993 of a Joint Declaration by the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland was a dramatic development that has been labeled by some as the best chance for peace in Northern Ireland in a quarter of a century. The history that lies behind this declaration, the different perceptions of the unionists and nationalists, and the many competing players that stand between the Joint Declaration and peace in Northern Ireland are analyzed by the author.

The final selection of this issue of *Swords and Ploughshares* is a review by political scientist Paul Diehl of a recent book on peacekeeping published in Australia. Peacekeeping is an area of international security to which small and medium states have made valuable contributions to UN operations. The perspectives of such states are important as the major states are lately accepting a greater role in UN field operations at the same time the organization finds itself expanding beyond classical peacekeeping into the uncharted realm of peace-making.

Short Takes

“ . . . Whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force[?]”

Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist Papers*, No. 1.

“In times past, Germans spoke of the “Berliner Luft,” the clear and crackling air of their capital city. . . . Nowhere else in Europe are the depths and heights of history so keenly visible.”

Karl E. Meyer, “Germany’s Once and Future Capital,” *New York Times*, June 25, 1991.

“A geographical line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper.”

Thomas Jefferson commenting on “the Missouri Compromise” in a letter written to John Adams, 1819.

“Peacekeeping emerged first of all as a result of the Cold War, which, of course, began soon after the [UN] Charter was signed. The ink was hardly dry on the signatures when differences emerged!”

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Indarjit Rikhye commenting on the development of the UN peacekeeping role, “Conversations: Speaking with Indarjit Rikhye,” *United States Institute of Peace Journal*, June 1991.

► Coping with armed conflict remains one of the most important challenges

confronting the peoples and states of the world society in the post-Cold War period.

► A Westcentric system has emerged as the single largest and most powerful grouping of states and peoples in the post-Cold War world.

Thinking about Coping with Conflict

by EDWARD A. KOŁODZIEJ

The following passage was extracted from the concluding chapter of a volume edited by Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet. The book was recently completed under a grant from the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Coping with armed conflict remains one of the most important challenges confronting the peoples and states of the world society in the post-Cold War period. The end of the superpower conflict has hardly resolved the security problems arising from the use of force or of coercive threats by groups and states to get their way. Most security threats arise today from within the boundaries of states, including separatist or subnational conflicts for self-determination, ideological, and group conflicts for control of central governments, and internal rivalries over rank and power. Viewed from the perspective of an increasingly interdependent and emerging global society, these multiple arenas of conflict and the diverse and disputed stakes driving them underline the need to rethink how the states and peoples of the globe might cope with them.

The problem of coping with conflict in the post-Cold War era resolves itself into the question of what actors, disposing what resources, playing what roles, and pursuing what strategies are best suited to ameliorate a conflict. In other words, what mix is likely to move a conflict at one level of real, incipient, or potential armed conflict to one less disposed toward coercive resolution of differences between groups and states? What combination is likely to move a lethal struggle, particularly between endur-

ing rivals, toward the Deutschian paradigm of a security community based on shared values and animated by principles, norms, institutions, and joint processes of decision in the service of peaceful change?

Deutschian Ideal

The Deutschian ideal is a normative aim rather than a concrete guide to move rivals up the security ladder from coercive to noncoercive resolution of differences. For some states, like the United States and Canada, Deutsch's notion of a security community can be said to have been realized. These states might be enlisted in coping efforts since they need no assistance in addressing their differences through noncoercive mechanisms. At the opposite extreme, the political chaos abroad in Somalia or in the former Yugoslavia destroys previous social and political restraints on force and thrusts the rivals headlong toward a state of nature. Under these Hobbesian conditions, no social compact exists to contain the conflict and no sense of a reliable security community prevails.

Most states and peoples find themselves in security communities somewhere between these polar opposites, ranging from noncoercive consensual cooperation to a relationship of coercive cooperation between rivals. Moving from a primitive to a mature security relationship—defined by the greater or lesser amount of violence and coercion characterizing the relationship—is very difficult. Positive movement implies the contributions to peace not only of the principals to the conflict, but of a large and disparate number of state and non-state actors with each playing differing roles, disposing varied resources, and pursuing converging, if not always consciously articulated, strategies to effect peaceful changes. Coping does not come cheap or easy, nor can universally applicable coping measures be devised that would be appropriate and effective in diminishing violence in all underdeveloped security communities in the post-Cold War era.

Westcentric System

A Westcentric system, composed of the United States, its NATO allies, and Japan, has emerged as the single largest and most powerful grouping of states and peoples in the post-Cold War world. Why should these states and their populations contain or constrain recalcitrant and often well-armed opponents in seeking to advance peacekeeping, peace-making, and even nation-building where external intrusion is resented and resisted and where ethnic and communal strife is enduring? Since Western military power is unrivaled and no grouping of

non-Westcentric states can challenge their global ascendancy, why should these states and their distracted and necessarily self-interested peoples bother with coping duties?

Seeming challenges to the Westcentric system do not alter the global predominance of the Western states and, specifically, that of the United States. The outcomes of local rivalries, as in Somalia, no longer have real or perceived negative implications for the security of the Westcentric system. Nor do the members of this coalition see their vital interests immediately at risk in these controversies. Even if Iraq's absorption of Kuwait had proved successful, it would be difficult to argue that Western security and welfare interests had been dealt a fatal blow. Insulation and disengagement would appear then to be the appropriate watchwords for Western capitals to follow. Certainly this is a new condition in the affairs of these states against the background of two world wars and a long Cold War.

If the Western states and peoples and nation-states can learn to resolve their national differences and create security regimes resistant to internal and external challenge, then others involved in conflict are not necessarily locked into interminable strife except at their own choosing. These mature security regimes, however anarchical their internal structure, rest solidly enough today on the learned principle that unilateral solutions to national security problems are essentially ruled out. If states and their peoples can be led to accept the view that there are no lasting unilateral solutions for national welfare, then this learning process and the conceptual revolution can relax the security dilemma confronting all states and work over time to make states more permeable and susceptible to consensual solutions to security as a consequence of their pursuit of welfare needs. Finally, the consensual and cooperative effects of this learning and institutional process can, potentially, be harmonized through the convergence of domestic governments based on democratic majorities to legitimate their authority, the rule of law, the protection of civil liberties, and respect for minority rights and human rights.

Coping Process

These long-term trends frame the post-Cold War coping process. Although they do not guarantee its extension and internal strengthening, they do afford the Westcentric segment incentive to resist the temptations of isolation and withdrawal. Experience suggests that coping with conflict is not inevitably fraught with failure. For the first time since the formation of

the nation-state system, large bodies of nationally disparate peoples live within a self-made security community that approximates the Deutschian ideal.

Several additional considerations also encourage the ascendant coalition after the Cold War to adopt an outward strategy propelled by self-interest. First, the Westcentric states and peoples cannot ensure their long-term security, prosperity, or open societies unless—and at a minimum—key powers currently outside this grouping are fully integrated and made satisfied members of the post-Cold War system, most notably—but not exclusively—Russia and China.

Russia's successful incorporation into a post-Cold War Westcentric concert requires that the post-Cold War balance of power satisfy the concerns of the public and influential elites in Russia, particularly those bearing on external security and economic reconversion within a global market system. The first order of business is the preservation of the Russian state and the strengthening of its capacity for economic reform and democratization. The West has been slow and tentative in addressing these imperatives either in the form of sufficient economic assistance to underwrite the transition to a market economy and democratization, or in defining Russia's security role in its region of Europe and how Russia might contribute to multilateral peacekeeping missions. None of these tasks will be easy, but neglecting or half-heartedly confronting them creates a vacuum in which forces working for a return to Russia's Communist past or to an even older nationalistic and xenophobic tradition in Russian history would be bolstered. Unchecked, these forces would create disruptive forces capable not only of incalculable harm to the interests of the Russian people, but also of potentially great damage to the Westcentric peoples.

What is arresting is the absence of any Western-Russian program of mutual planning and assistance beyond NATO's currently inchoate policy of a partnership for peace. At a minimum Moscow should participate as an equal member of the G-7—renamed the G-8—to ensure that its long-term partnership with the West is underscored and that its needs are an integral part of the West's security and economic agenda. Russia's eventual membership in NATO should not be ruled out.

No less important is China's eventual inclusion in the Westcentric coalition. This is not as farfetched an aim as it may appear, despite obvious differences of history, culture, and political experience between the West and China.

► The outcomes of local rivalries, as in Somalia, no longer have real or perceived negative implications for the security of the Westcentric system.

► Mature security regimes rest solidly on the learned principle that unilateral solutions to national security problems are essentially ruled out.

► The Westcentric states cannot ensure their long-term security unless key powers currently outside this grouping are fully integrated and made satisfied members of the post-Cold War system.

► The post-Cold War era is not a post-nuclear world.

► The economic well-being of the Westcentric peoples depends both on the political stability of the developing states and on their long-term economic and technological advancement.

► Developing states are poorly positioned to address the needs of their rapidly expanding populations.

The process of a working, cooperative relationship acceptable to the peoples of the West and China has been in train for more than a century and half. What began as a coercive relation—the Opium War—can be transformed, if Western relations with Japan are any guide, into increasingly cooperative relations across security, economic, and even cultural domains. Chinese Communist leaders, with little prompting or prodding from the West, took a major and irreversible step toward the Western world in launching what has now proven to be the remarkably successful market reforms of the Chinese economy as early as 1978, shortly after the death of Mao Tse-tung. Irredentist territorial claims are being met; Hong Kong will revert to Chinese rule in 1997. Settling the Taiwan question will obviously take longer, but fears of war to forcefully integrate Taiwan with the mainland are now muted and distant.

There is room for optimism for an increasingly greater Western-Chinese accord if market forces, in league with continued and increasingly denser contact with the West, are permitted on both sides. In turning to markets to spur Chinese economic and technological development and to open China to the world, China's leaders have relinquished—certainly relaxed—their hold on China's future economic and internal development. In abandoning the high exchange costs of a planned economy, they have been forced to bow increasingly before demands for increasing economic freedom from Beijing's control. This process of economic liberalization infects politics, too. The Tiananmen Square massacre is witness to this liberalization process, temporarily arrested, but inevitable if modernization is to proceed forward. Authoritarian government may well persist for some time in China; more problematic is the proposition that its continuance is without substantial cost to long-term economic growth and technological development that depend on free market choices. The anticipated convergence of the Taiwanese and Chinese markets and their integration in a larger global system set the stage for their parallel political liberalization. These trends will very likely not be sustainable unless China and the West follow an open-door policy and refuse to isolate the currently embattled Chinese leadership and the Chinese people, especially those elements pressing for reform.

Proliferation

Second, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and conventional, and the diffusion of long-range delivery systems around the globe urge arms control and disar-

mament regimes responsive to the needs of the Westcentric system and those outside its territorial limits. The prospect of rogue states or terrorist groups coming into possession of nuclear weapons can no longer be dismissed as an imagined fear. The post-Cold War era is not a post-nuclear world. These new nuclear players are not susceptible to the same deterrent threats that kept the superpower struggle in stable balance.

Third, the economic well-being of the Westcentric peoples depends both on the political stability of the developing states, principally its major powers, and on their long-term economic and technological advancement. The first is a precondition of the second since economic growth must rely on stable political conditions to ensure continuing and expanding economic interchange and encourage long-term investment. While the bulk of trade and economic exchange occurs today principally between the peoples of the developed states, the expansion of economic activity to the Southern Hemisphere enjoys the fastest growth potential for these economies and is critical for the support for their long-term economic health. While it would be too much to argue that the developed states have an equal interest in economic growth for all peoples throughout the globe, opportunities for market expansion are attractive, especially in those regions of the globe where political stability has been achieved.

Population Growth

Developing states are poorly positioned to address the needs of their rapidly expanding populations, which may well double in the next century. Whereas the countries of the Northern Hemisphere were able to rely on the industrial revolution and technological advancements to escape this Malthusian dilemma, the peoples of the developing world lack the resources and access to modern technology to solve this problem without outside assistance as a consequence of their poverty. Economic and social stagnation and retrogression in the developing world spur immigration to developed regions and incite internal ethnic, national, and communal strife within the affected states.

On the other hand, if population and economic growth go hand in hand in the developing world, the problem of environmental and ecological damage to the earth's atmosphere, as well as to its ground and water resources, will also be exacerbated. Forests, grazing fields, and croplands available for sustainable growth are rapidly shrinking. Heavy industri-

alization pollutes the world's ground and water resources. The former states of the Soviet Union and its East European allies created monumental ecological damage in their determined drive to industrialize. The developing states risk making the same debilitating mistakes, the repercussions of which are likely to be no less global. There is no technical solution to their abatement or resolution short of a political accord with the principal states to share the costs and burdens of addressing these problems.

Conflict and Environmental Problems

The relationship between growing global environmental problems and armed conflicts is dual edged. On the one hand, many conflicts set limits to international accords on environmental issues. Conflicts, if widespread and particularly deadly and brutal, result in large-scale ecological harm. On the other hand, as industrialization and consumer demand rise in the developing world, cooperative accords to protect the global environment will become increasingly difficult. Burden sharing will become increasingly thornier and resistant to solution. As environmental and ecological problems become more urgent, they will inevitably generate new sources of conflict as states and groups take actions to protect their local environments.

Finally, there is the possibility of the infection and spread of local conflicts that could adversely affect the cohesion of the Westcentric coalition. Western inaction essentially condoned power grabs by Serbian and Croatian forces and ethnic cleansing; toleration invites other groups to resolve their grievances by toughening their bargaining postures and giving vent to their hatreds by force and violence. Failing to contain such infectious conflict promises to be costly and risky.

The dilemma facing the Western states is that immunization from these various forms of infection is not possible, and nursing these conflict zones to health will not be easy or assured. There is no escape from addressing them. The self-interest of the Westcentric states and peoples compels them to cope with conflict beyond their immediate borders if for no other reason than that their long-term security, material welfare, and open, democratic ways of life depend on the progressive development of a global security community in pursuit of the elusive Deutschian ideal and the diffusion of shared values and wealth on which such a community necessarily rests. The Westcentric states and their allies in the world society ignore these coping challenges at their own peril.

What does seem feasible instead is continuing coping with conflict that yields steady movement along a broad and irregular front toward the Deutschian ideal. Conflict between peoples and states will surely continue, but resort to violence or threats can become increasingly less useful and persuasive in deciding matters of mutual interest, even where differences of values and aims persist. Coping can count.

■

Edward A. Kolodziej is research professor of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the author of Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience and Its Implications for the International System and, most recently, coeditor, with Roger E. Kanet, of The Cold War As Cooperation. Author of more than one hundred articles on foreign and security policy, he is currently working on a book about global security after the Cold War.

► As environmental and ecological problems become more urgent, they will inevitably generate new sources of conflict.

► The Westcentric states and their allies in the world society ignore coping challenges at their own peril.

The Puzzle Pieces of Germany

by PETER FRITZSCHE

Like toys in a playroom after too many rainy afternoons, the pieces of Germany do not quite fit together anymore. They are in disarray, or they are lost or broken and torn. Just four years after the Berlin Wall crumbled, the certainties and guideposts of the previous four decades have fallen apart as well. It is not at all clear how Germany will be put back together again or what the newly reunified Germany will look like in the twenty-first century. And while it is now commonplace for observers to paint the picture of the post-Cold War era in darker and more somber colors, brush strokes that attest to widespread economic hardship and civil unrest throughout Europe, the real news is that a robust national identity, a domestic political consensus, or an all-embracing European security compact may not emerge at all.

For the foreseeable future at least, the only certainty will be uncertainty itself; the encompassing frames that had established political order for the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic—Socialist Internationalism, the Free World—have both been wrecked. The result is not the end of historical events, but quite possibly the end of *History*, the identifiable plot that gives narrative coherence to the passions and tragedies of modern time. Indeed, it is striking to see how little sense political actors in Germany have of where they are and where they are going. This loss in the ability to draw maps, to chart directions, to put together the puzzle pieces is the most distinctive trait of the end of the century.

New Capital; Mixed Messages

Nothing indicates the lack of clear political direction in Germany better than the passionate debates about the starting point: the unexpectedly contentious 1991 vote in favor of moving the capital from Bonn to Berlin, the tardiness of planning the move in the years since, and the ongoing controversies over redesigning a once divided city into a new political center. While Berlin pulled off a narrow legislative victory over Bonn in June 1991, and visitors will likely find the offices of the chancellor and the Bundestag in Berlin sometime after the year 2000, the new capital continues to deeply divide citizens. For many West Germans, Bonn sent just the right message to Germany's friends. The capital was situated in a modest

university town close to the French border. Since 1949, it stood for German integration with the West and seemed to promise continuous rounds of consultation with friends and allies. Bonn was the sort of place where bureaucrats oversaw Germany's economic prosperity; it did not encourage dreams of imperial ambition. Berlin, on the other hand, conjures up memories of Prussian militarism and republican failure. As close to Poland as Bonn is to France, Berlin also signals a more eastern-oriented, increasingly independent, and possibly overbearing German foreign policy.

Supporters of the move to Berlin retort that the city has served the West as a beacon of freedom and perseverance since 1948; there is no reason to abandon the city to its prewar past. Moreover, Berlin has always boasted some of the richest cosmopolitan cultural fare anywhere in Europe. Its identity simply cannot be reduced to Prussianism or militarism. Bonn or Berlin—the debate rehearses completely different versions of German history and German identity.

Even within the precincts of Berlin, Germans are trying on all sorts of incompatible identities. In the summer of 1993, for example, a remarkable exhibition was held in the heart of the old city. A local civic group erected a full-scale replica of the baroque Hohenzollern palace, the ruins of which had been dynamited and carted off by the East Germans in 1951. Tens of thousands of curious Germans have visited the site, generating a groundswell of support for actually rebuilding the palace. Even if the multimillion dollar reconstruction never takes place, the hoopla around the *Stadtschloss* and the busy traffic in old-fashioned postcards, coffee table photo albums of turn-of-the-century Berlin, and nostalgic travel accounts to former East Prussia indicate a desire to return to a wonderful, pregnant 1890s moment when German history was full of possibility and had not yet turned tragic. Even the bright yellow canvas that drapes the replica of what had been a rather forbidding gray-stone palace suggests a sunny, friendly, but completely untenable version of the past. Nonetheless, making an end run around recent history and resuming at a point where the opportunities seemed endless is alluring indeed.

A Deepening Divide

The *Stadtschloss* has plenty of detractors too: federal bureaucrats propose to build a gleaming new city of steel and concrete, part of their plan to make Germany "normal" again, while former East Berliners bristle at the rapid pace at which their parts of the city are being dis-

► Just four years after the Berlin Wall crumbled, the certainties and guideposts of the previous four decades have fallen apart as well.

► Nothing indicates the lack of clear political direction in Germany better than the passionate debates about the starting point.

► Bonn was the sort of place where bureaucrats oversaw Germany's economic prosperity; Berlin conjures up memories of Prussian militarism and republican failure.

mantled and their past, however difficult and painful, is simply swept away. By all accounts, the psychological divide between East and West Germany is deepening, and nowhere is this more evident than in Berlin. At the same time, West Berliners are reconceiving the city as multicultural metropolis that traces its legacy to the 1920s rather than the 1890s and finds its icon in Marlene Dietrich, not Heinrich Zille. It is just this cosmopolitanism that so disturbs nationalists, mostly young people who want to hear nothing about Germany's responsibilities to its past or to its neighbors and who look forward, now that Germany has recovered independence from the superpowers, to fashioning a crudely separate ethnic identity. These nostalgic forays into the past, in which the ghosts of Nazism and Stalinism should not make appearances, are offensive enough, but they also illustrate just how self-styled and contentious the search for German identity has become. It is a typical post-Cold War paradox that the reunification of Germany into a single state has spawned so many mutually exclusive definitions of the nation and its history.

What Is the New Germany?

Politicians are as ill-prepared as architects and city planners to answer the question: What kind of Germany will be built? Neither the ruling Christian Democrats nor the main opposition party, the Social Democrats, seem to have a long-term agenda for the country. The difficult economic troubles of the present naturally consume politicians, but they also engender an increasingly cynical and opportunistic view of politics. Corruption scandals in each of the big parties have had the effect of leveling ideological differences in the eyes of ordinary voters, who have come to hold politicians in greater and greater contempt. Chancellor Kohl's cabinet, for example, has been decimated by one forced resignation after another. The Social Democrats have not had better luck; Bjorn Engholm, their Kennedy-esque chancellor candidate, stepped down this spring after being caught in a web of misleading statements about his knowledge of a payoff affair. Even the *marxisante* left, which along with the Social Democrats had held fast to a vision of a more humane and egalitarian society, has been uncertain and inarticulate since reunification.

Whereas the Cold War had created an agenda and order to politics and counterpolitics, thereby enforcing a kind of ideological coherence, the years since 1989 have left political players confused. As the establishment flounders, voters have become increasingly attracted to alternatives: nationalist and right-wing sects

have flourished; so have civic groupings such as the antiracist candlelight vigils, which deliberately circumvent the traditional parties. At the same time, the "party" of nonvoters continues to grow, as recent regional elections have attested. With a series of important state elections culminating in national parliamentary elections at the end of 1994, the political scene will turn even more volatile. The lingering impression is that the political establishment in Bonn, which oversaw reunification with such confidence and self-satisfaction just a few years ago, is increasingly besieged by private doubt and public contempt. Bonn is not Weimar, to be sure, and the political splits in the Federal Republic are not nearly as deep as those that once divided the post-World War I generation, but the shift in political balance from the center to the periphery is reminiscent of events seventy years ago.

Economic Pressures

Mounting political and spiritual confusion comes at a time of worrisome economic insecurity. Anti-inflationary measures, sternly enforced by a Bundesbank concerned over huge transfer payments to the East, have kept interest rates high and the German mark overvalued, with the effect that business growth at home is sluggish and international demand for German exports has lagged. At 7.5 percent, unemployment (in West Germany) is at a postwar high. These marketplace hardships have cast more and more doubt on the overall adequacy of the German economic model. Germany, like the rest of western Europe, has put in place an elaborate program of social security that balloons labor costs. While quality workmanship has generally kept German goods competitive, export levels have fallen, and once confident corporate leaders like Mercedes-Benz face the twin nightmares of burdensome corporate debt and declining overseas demand. At the same time, the German economy has been unable to generate new jobs, although this problem is more severe in France and Great Britain.

International competition, the continuing burden of reconstructing East Germany, and the increasingly heavy price of maintaining social programs have all threatened to undermine the broad consensus supporting domestic economic policy. For some observers, the much heralded German model, which President Clinton still praised during the 1992 election campaign, is as hollow as the "Massachusetts Miracle." There is no doubt that more and more Germans are questioning the ability of the state to maintain previous levels of social expenditures, but the worst prognostications

► The psychological divide between East and West Germany is deepening.

► Whereas the Cold War had created an agenda and order to politics and counterpolitics, the years since 1989 have left political players confused.

► The shift in political balance from the center to the periphery is reminiscent of events seventy years ago.

are probably overblown. Few Germans would endorse the American equation of low overhead labor costs and extremely sparse social services, a combination that has left secondary education in a scandalous state, the inner cities entirely neglected, and the nation as a whole without the political means to invest in the future. However high the price of European social welfare, the price of American-style social anarchy appears much higher. A glance across the North Atlantic puts real limits on German economic revisionism.

The reappearance of stagflation (inflation plus lingering unemployment) and the alarming economic costs of reunification will invariably intensify political contests. But what will really add drama to German politics in the 1990s is the sense of reinvention. Whereas the last great economic recession, in the wake of the 1947 oil embargo, corresponded to a rhetoric of limits in which fiscal and neoconservatives by and large set a more policy-oriented agenda, the crisis today is as much psychological and cultural as it is economic and is accompanied by wholesale ideological rearrangement. Marxism, which has guided the leftist critiques of capitalism for more than one hundred years, is moribund; the eager technocrats of liberal capitalism have been dwarfed by the intractability of social and economic problems; and a syncretic variety of nationalisms has made remarkable headway. Germany's political future has not been so unpredictable since the end of World War II.

Germany's International Role

What adds to the sense of vertigo as cherished political assumptions dissolve and once stable political groupings feel mortally threatened is the unavoidable role that Germany will play internationally. The heated debates about sending a few hundred German "blue helmets" under a United Nations mandate to Somalia obscure just how engaged—willing or not—Germany has already become. The anti-inflationary monetary policies of the Bundesbank, for example, have embroiled Bonn in all sorts of conflicts with other members of the European Community who want German interest rates to come down in order to boost the value of their own currencies. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt recently warned Kohl's government about pursuing fiscal policies too independently, too carelessly; the price would be to renew European mistrust of Germany, which is surprisingly close to the surface anyhow. Just how much the cabinet's political finesse can achieve is unclear, however; the sheer economic bulk of the new Germany in comparison

to the other major players in the community has strained formerly close alliances to France and eroded European support for the Maastricht Treaty.

Germany is also the major European investor in Eastern Europe and, by far, the largest host to war refugees from Yugoslavia and asylum seekers from the Balkans and beyond. Even as Germany polices its borders more carefully and tightens its asylum laws, the fact remains that Eastern Europe is suddenly very close. Throughout the nineteenth century, the East served Germany much as the West served the United States: as a natural frontier. Thousands of immigrants from what is now Poland and Czechoslovakia migrated to work in the mines and factories of the Ruhr or the finishing industries of Berlin. Political conflicts closed off Eastern Europe after World War I and again after World War II, so that only since 1989 have the economic and cultural exchanges that were terminated abruptly in 1914 resumed. This German reopening to the East does not have to be seen in dangerous and militarist terms only, but it promises to outfit Germany with international roles and national agendas that will ensure that the old political compacts and established players of the Cold War era are disassembled forever. Growing turmoil in Eastern Europe, stagnant job growth at home, and a tight schedule of elections in 1994 will only add to the confusion. The puzzle is scattered about the floor, and the pieces are more numerous, sharper edged, and larger than before.

■
Peter Fritzsche is associate professor of history at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and an authority on fascism and other aspects of German history. He received a Humboldt Fellowship to write a book on imperial Berlin and the metropolitan experience and spent the 1992-93 academic year in Berlin. Fritzsche is the author of Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization of Weimar Germany (1990) and Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (1992).

► However high the price of European social welfare, the price of American-style social anarchy appears much higher.

► Germany's political future has not been so unpredictable since the end of World War II.

The Prospects for Peace in Northern Ireland

by WILLIAM F. KELLEHER

By the fall of 1993 it seemed that several of the most enduring conflicts of the twentieth century might draw to a close. South Africa had put aside its constitutional commitment to apartheid, and plans were under way for a transition to democratic rule. Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization had agreed to terms for negotiation. Only Northern Ireland, the oldest, continuous violent conflict of all, seemed unresolvable. But before the year ended, there were dramatic developments concerning Ireland as well.

On December 15, 1993, on the heels of disclosures that the British government had been talking secretly with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) for three years, the British and Irish governments issued a "Joint Declaration" on Northern Ireland, a statement promoted on both sides of the Atlantic as the best chance for peace in twenty-five years. The most dramatic part of the declaration was a demand that the IRA agree to lay down its arms in exchange for a place in talks on the future of Northern Ireland. Thus far the IRA has not said either yes or no.

A History of Struggles

Is there a new chance for genuine peace in Northern Ireland? The answer hinges on much more than the IRA and requires an understanding of Irish history. Like South Africa and Israel, Northern Ireland is a settler society. During the sixteenth century England colonized the territory of Ireland that in 1921 became the state of Northern Ireland. In the early seventeenth century England consolidated its rule in the area through an infusion of English soldiers and Lowland Scot Presbyterians, who radically dispossessed the longtime inhabitants of the northeast corner of the island. The creation of this settler colony left the colonized without a specific history and, in time, without a specific language. After colonization, the Irish were faced with understanding themselves in terms of the definitions and codes of the colonial state that ordered their everyday lives. This settler history created serious conflicts in everyday life. The very naming of reality—geographical spaces, political identities, issues of justice and injustice—became a cultural battlefield and continues to be so today. Ireland was settled through strategies that invoked stereotypes in which the dominant group, the ancestors of contemporary unionists, successfully portrayed the colonized to be so out of step with civilization that colonization was needed. Traces of this past live in Northern Ireland today and make it diffi-

cult for the nationalists—the Roman Catholics—to gain equality.

Recent attempts to negotiate a future for Northern Ireland exemplify the long and difficult process required to work through such all-encompassing political problems. What is at stake is not only the mapping of territory but also the very identity of communities and individuals. Northern Ireland's unionists, almost entirely Protestant and accounting for slightly less than 60 percent of the province's population, want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. The unionists identify themselves as British. Northern Ireland's nationalists, almost entirely Roman Catholic, want Northern Ireland to become part of a united Ireland—to be integrated into the Republic of Ireland. These people identify themselves as Irish. Nationalists account for slightly more than 40 percent of the population and are almost three times as likely to be unemployed as unionists even though equally well educated. Each group has a very different understanding of the history of Anglo-Irish relations and the history of Northern Ireland. Each is internally divided by class, geographical region, and political party affiliation, but the stark differences between unionist and nationalist world views make bridging these divisions enormously difficult.

Evolution of the Negotiation Process

The Downing Street Declaration attempts to address these problems by committing the governments of Britain and Ireland to discussions leading to the creation of political institutions that would overcome existing divisions in Northern Ireland. The declaration builds upon the 1985 Hillsborough Agreement, which in turn received its impetus from the New Ireland Forum of 1983–84. The forum was a response to the rise of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, in Northern Ireland electoral politics following the IRA hunger strikes of 1981. The forum was instigated by John Hume, the leader of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) of Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein's chief rival. The SDLP and the three main constitutional nationalist parties of the Republic of Ireland—those not supporting violence—participated in what became a yearlong public examination of consciousness for Irish nationalists and a search for a political identity that would unite unionists and nationalists while recognizing their differences. The forum examined a variety of studies and viewpoints on the economic, social, and political implications of Irish unity and sought submissions from the general public and various individuals and groups as part of its search. The unionist parties declined to participate, although a few individual unionists did.

► The British and Irish governments issued a "Joint Declaration" on Northern Ireland, a statement promoted on both sides of the Atlantic as the best chance for peace in twenty-five years.

► Like South Africa and Israel, Northern Ireland is a settler society.

► The very naming of reality—geographical spaces, political identities, issues of justice and injustice—became a cultural battlefield and continues to be so today.

The result was a new opening in the political culture of Ireland. The report of the New Ireland Forum recognized the distinctive unionist identity on the island of Ireland and, in conceding the objective basis for unionist fears of a united Ireland, elaborated the need for a new Irish constitution should there ever be a unitary state. It stated that both the nationalist and unionist identities would be irrevocably protected and preserved should there ever be a united Ireland.

Initially British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher rejected the opportunity offered by the forum report, but just over a year after its release she signed the Hillsborough Agreement with the Irish Taoiseach, Garrett Fitzgerald. This agreement reinforced the unionist position in Northern Ireland by reiterating that no change could occur in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority of its population. However, it also heartened nationalists by establishing an Inter-Governmental Conference that enabled the Republic of Ireland to put forward views and proposals to the British government on a number of issues pertaining to Northern Ireland, including security, the Police Authority, and prison policy. Dublin had no actual decision-making power, just a right of consultation, but the Hillsborough Agreement was path-breaking in that through an international agreement the government of the Republic of Ireland recognized the distinct identity of unionists, and on its part the British government acknowledged that the political problems in Northern Ireland transcend the boundaries of Northern Ireland and must be addressed in the context of the whole of the island.

Rejectionism and the Downing Street Declaration

Despite the breakthrough represented by the Hillsborough Agreement, the situation in Northern Ireland has continued to deteriorate. Nationalist alienation from the government of Northern Ireland has continued, and a devolved government, one with some independence from the British Parliament and much desired by the unionists, has not come to pass. Unionists have rejected the Hillsborough Agreement outright. They have been unwilling to recognize the Irish dimension of the problem despite the new openness of the constitutional nationalists. The talks that have occurred between unionists and the British government have been what the unionists call “talks about talks,” talks about the terms in which negotiation can take place. These “talks about talks” have failed. The unionists, unable to accept the Republic of Ireland’s role as a consultant, withdrew in the summer of 1993.

This rejection by the unionist parties motivated John Hume to change strategies. Largely responsible for the evolutionary process that had made the “talks about talks” possible, Hume, an elected

member of both the British and the European parliaments and a vocal opponent of the IRA, chose to engage the revolutionary element of Irish nationalism. He began to talk with Gerry Adams, the president of Sinn Fein. These discussions led to a peace proposal that Hume and Adams forwarded to the British and Irish governments, giving them sixty days to respond before the results would be made public. Within a month the British and Irish governments issued their Joint Declaration.

The Joint Declaration offers twelve points setting out the constitutional principles and political realities that are intended to move forward the process initiated by the Hillsborough Agreement. The Joint Declaration reiterates many of the points made in the Hillsborough Agreement, but there are several different emphases. The declaration specifies that the two governments will respect the diversity of the people living in Northern Ireland while creating institutions that would enable them to work together in all areas of common interest. It states that “the achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence,” and declares that “democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully in democratic politics and to join in dialogue in due course between the Governments and the political parties on the way ahead.” In short, Sinn Fein and the Ulster Defense Association, the umbrella organization of the loyalist paramilitary groups, are invited to participate in talks on the future structures of Northern Ireland provided they renounce violence.

Sinn Fein, the major target of the Joint Declaration, represents the IRA, which is at war with the state—the status quo. The loyalist paramilitary groups fight to preserve existing structures and in doing so carry out sectarian warfare, killing Catholic civilians in an effort to stop a political movement with which they disagree. The IRA targets military installations, vital commercial institutions, and individuals working directly or indirectly for the British Security Forces. It has caused more than 2.5 billion dollars of damage with its bombing campaign in England during the past fifteen months. Some of these “economic bombs” have killed men, women, and children. The IRA has instilled terror on the United Kingdom mainland, as well as in Northern Ireland.

Response to the Declaration

The loyalist paramilitaries have rejected the Joint Declaration, as has the Democratic Unionist Party of Reverend Ian Paisley. Sinn Fein, representing the IRA, responded by calling for clarification of the declaration’s terms and sought di-

► The talks that have occurred between unionists and the British government have been what the unionists call “talks about talks.”

► Largely responsible for the evolutionary process that had made the “talks about talks” possible, Hume chose to engage the revolutionary element of Irish nationalism.

► The loyalist paramilitaries have rejected the Joint Declaration.

rect talks with the British government on the matter. Sinn Fein wants to know what exactly is meant by “cease-fire” and what is Britain’s timetable for negotiations. Are they to turn in their arms or to stop violent acts only? They strongly disagree with “the unionist veto”—the ability of the unionists to prevent the unification of Ireland because they are the majority in the northeastern six counties. Sinn Fein and the IRA do not recognize the legitimacy of the border that has divided the island into two distinct political units since 1921. They are unwilling to undertake a cease-fire unless, in time, the British government declares its willingness to persuade the unionists to submit to an all-Ireland vote on Northern Ireland’s future. They suspect any cease-fire without such guarantees, in part because of past experience. In 1974–75 the IRA responded to British overtures for peace talks, and the results were disastrous for all concerned. IRA men were jailed, loyalist sectarian killings increased, and the IRA, contrary to its avowed strategy, countered with severe sectarian violence, a sequence of acts that embarrasses the IRA to this day. With the IRA demoralized and nearly defeated, the old leadership was removed and Sinn Fein and the IRA were taken over by younger men, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness chief among them, who continue to lead the movement today. Militarily and politically the organizations are much more sophisticated and powerful than they were in 1975, as are the loyalist paramilitary groups.

The Downing Street Declaration remains open but unfulfilled. Sinn Fein and the IRA have said neither yes nor no. A “yes” might lead to division in their ranks. The current leadership adheres to a brutal pragmatism. They see their acts as terrible, horrible necessities but believe these deeds move the political process along. However, there are those in the ranks who want to continue until total victory is won. Let us hope that the pragmatism of the “brutal pragmatists” will win the day and that there will not be one more name to add to the list of more than 3,300 dead and 30,000 maimed, the toll all three sides—the British Security Forces, the loyalist paramilitaries, and the IRA—have taken over the last twenty-four years.

■

William F. Kelleher is assistant professor of anthropology and a member of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security and the Unit for Criticism and Interpretive Theory at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is currently completing a book on culture, class, colonial relations, and political conflict in Northern Ireland.

Book Review—

by PAUL F. DIEHL

Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future.
Hugh Smith (ed.) (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies, 1993)

This collection of twenty-one essays is the product of a 1993 conference sponsored by the Australian Defence Studies Centre in Canberra, Australia. Most of the articles in the collection discuss the implications of various aspects of recent or ongoing peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia for future operations. The book contains the most up-to-date analyses of changes in UN peacekeeping brought about by the end of the Cold War. Heavily weighted toward the military perspective on peacekeeping, the analyses tend to concentrate on the managerial and logistical aspects of peacekeeping. Professional military officers will find this focus valuable, as may the United Nations Secretariat and national military establishments around the world that are reorienting their efforts in response to changing missions.

Unfortunately, the book contains little macroscopic analysis of the contexts under which peacekeeping troops may be deployed. Although logistical concerns are significant in peacekeeping operations, they are dramatically affected by whether the conflict is between states or is a civil war. Issues of neutrality and the degree of support from the major powers are also key factors in the success or failure of peacekeeping operations; these elements too are largely ignored in the volume. As precise as the essays are in military matters, the collection as a whole falls victim to the weakness of many works on peacekeeping—it lacks appropriate recognition of political and geopolitical factors.

The first ten articles and several of the remaining essays discuss the implications of new directions in peacekeeping for Australia’s role in UN operations. The result is a volume that is essential for scholars of Australian defense policy and especially the conference sponsor, the Australian Defence Studies Centre. Unfortunately, this parochial focus limits the global importance of the volume. Apart from scholars who are interested in the role of small states in UN peacekeeping, readers may find little here that can be applied to other countries or that offers new insights into the peacekeeping process.

The book opens with four chapters that provide a global overview of recent changes in UN

▶ Sinn Fein and the IRA do not recognize the legitimacy of the border that has divided the island into two distinct political units since 1921.

▶ Although logistical concerns are significant in peacekeeping operations, they are dramatically affected by whether the conflict is between states or is a civil war.

peacekeeping. The second chapter, by Cathy Downes, examines the end of the Cold War and the changes—diffusion in power, state implosion, the expansion of the scope of international security, and increased recourse to collective security—that caused peacekeeping forces to assume new roles with less restraint on the use of military force in contrast to traditional peacekeeping operations, and roles that may not require the consent of host states. Subsequent chapters by Peter McAuley and Graeme Dobell treat two rarely explored topics: the role of civilian police and the role of the media in peacekeeping operations. McAuley's analysis of civilian police is particularly topical in that many new peacekeeping operations, especially those concerned with election supervision, assume certain law-and-order functions traditionally left to the civilian police. In his essay, Dobell argues that the media are vital in maintaining public support for an operation, and he notes the difficulty of balancing concerns for free access for the media with those of security. However, Dobell misses the key point that local public support and therefore media attention are critical primarily at the outset of an operation and only later if major problems arise. At other times, the public is largely unaware of the operation and so global public opinion exercises little impact on UN or national policies.

The middle part of the book consists of two essays each on peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia. Particularly notable is the chapter by Peter Kieseker, which details the relationship of private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and peacekeeping troops in humanitarian assistance. The author makes the key point that PVOs, which have become vital to many new peacekeeping missions, are often familiar in detail with the situation on the ground and the actors in the conflict. Units involved in peacekeeping operations would therefore do well to consult and coordinate their activities with these groups. Michael Maley's article on Cambodia highlights some equally important administrative and technical problems experienced by UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia). In his chapter, Brigadier General Roderick Cordy-Simpson, the chief of staff to the commander of the Bosnian peacekeeping operation, offers a sobering assessment of that mission. Specifically, he notes the impossibility of protecting Sarajevo without a large increase in the number of UN troops stationed there and the need to integrate peace-making with peacekeeping to find a permanent solution to the crisis.

► Local public support and therefore media attention are critical primarily at the outset of an operation.

► Small states will still be the linchpins of future peacekeeping operations.

Chapters 11 through 15 offer the perspectives of states other than Australia to UN peacekeeping operations—Fiji, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the United States. Small states have played a critical role in supplying personnel for past peacekeeping operations. Even with the end of the Cold War and greater major power involvement in peacekeeping, small states will still be the linchpins of future peacekeeping operations.

Subsequent chapters discuss the challenges that face the United Nations in implementing peacekeeping operations. These challenges include the financial difficulties, as pointed out by Bruce Osborn in his chapter, as well as the contention in Alain Forand's chapter that the UN staff has a poor understanding of actual operations and often exercises poor coordination with peacekeeping troops on the ground. The concluding chapters outline future threats and challenges, although there is little here that will surprise the readers or offer new information to general observers of the international scene.

Overall, this volume is essentially a study of Australian peacekeeping, with few insights beyond that. The analyses presented in the book are likely to become dated rather quickly.

■
Paul F. Diehl is professor of political science and a member of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the author or editor of six books, most recently International Peacekeeping (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), and more than fifty articles on international conflict, UN peacekeeping, and arms control.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and
International Security
330 Davenport Hall
607 South Mathews Avenue
Urbana, IL 61801
(217/333-7086)
