Frameworks of State–Society Relations
by Tracy Kuperus

South Africa is experiencing an unprecedented political transition. The outcome of this process is far from certain, but it is hoped that democracy will embrace everyone, particularly those who have been denied their basic civil rights since the arrival of colonialism.

The road to South Africa’s present political dispensation has been long and arduous. It was the history of a white minority ruling over the lives of a black majority. The white minority’s construction of racial policies and their implementation by the South African state explain much of South Africa’s past, present, and future. Although the South African state (under National Party rule) was regarded as the main protagonist of apartheid, countless other societal organizations were engaged in formulating and implementing it. My research addresses one particularly influential societal institution, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). This article examines briefly how the DRC’s relationship to the South African state changed in conjunction with the development of racial policies from 1934 to 1994.

When the role of dominant societal institutions is assessed with regard to the origin of apartheid and their connection to the state, the DRC undoubtedly merits special attention. Dubbed “the National Party in prayer,” the DRC has been linked to the rise and fall of racial policy in South Africa. It is also the largest and most influential of the three Afrikaans-reformed churches in South Africa, representing 37 percent of the white population and 65 percent of the Afrikaner population.

Many other important societal institutions exist in South Africa, including trade unions, English-speaking churches, and liberation movements. I focus on the DRC to the exclusion of other societal organizations in an effort to demonstrate how powerful the white Afrikaner minority was when it collaborated with the state during the last century.

Politics and the Dutch Reformed Church
The DRC played an important legitimizing role throughout the apartheid years. From its construction of “apartheid theology” to its influence within the Afrikaner Broederbond, the DRC, notwithstanding frequent denials by its clergy, was an extremely political player.

The DRC’s history began in 1652 with the arrival of the Dutch settlers who established a small colony at the Cape for the Dutch East India Company. In the 1700s, the DRC’s membership grew, but mainly among the white population in the Cape. The DRC spread out to the other four provinces of South Africa during the Great Trek of 1836. In the late 1800s, the DRC made important decisions about segregated church structures that played a prominent role concerning apartheid policy’s formulation in the 1900s.

The DRC’s political involvements began in the 1920s when it advanced an ideological justification of apartheid. From 1927 to 1993, the church promoted political and religious agendas that coincided with the needs of the Afrikaner people. Throughout the century, the DRC found its interpretation of Afrikaner needs accepted by the state to such an extent that, in the later decades of the twentieth century, church and state became nearly identical in their desire to preserve Afrikaner interests.

To understand state-DRC interaction, one must examine how and why the DRC’s relationship to the state changed vis-à-vis the development of racial policy throughout the different political eras, beginning with white oligarchy, moving to Afrikaner authoritarianism, and then to the final stage of possible democratization. To do this, a state-society framework is devised.

State-Society Framework
The dominant themes within state-societal literature are the dichotomous relationship of state-society relations (engagement-disengagement) and the assumed relationship of conflict between state and society. The state-civil society framework presented here acknowledges a continuum of state-society relations that may be generalized across all cases of such relations. It also argues for the possibility of “mutual collaboration with dual autonomy,” a situation where state and society are engaged but both retain the autonomy to formulate policy strategies. The existence of this relationship is refuted, or more typically ignored, by many scholars.

I argue that state-society relations can be described in terms of cooperation, conflict, or a mix of cooperation and conflict. Six possible stages of state-society interactions, ranging from extreme cooperation to extreme conflict, are possible: (1) mutual collaboration, (2) mutual engagement, (3) conflictual engagement, (4) mutual disengagement, (5) enforced disengagement, and (6) resistance-revolutionary disengagement.

Which of these six interactions is present at a given time can be determined by looking at the indicators of policy collusion-conflict and official negotiation. The greater the amount of policy collusion and official negotiation, the greater the amount of engagement and the possibility of mutual collaboration. Likewise, the greater the amount of policy conflict and the lesser the amount of official parlay, the greater the amount of disengagement and likelihood of resistance-revolutionary disengagement. In the three time periods studied (1934–1947; 1948–1978; 1979–1994), the DRC’s relationship to the state changed from one of mutual disengagement to mutual collaboration to mutual engagement.

Phases of State-DRC Interaction
In the first phase (1934–1947), state-society relations can be described as mutual disengagement because the DRC and the state acted autonomously regarding the development and implementation of racial policy. Although cooperation between the two entities occurred, they pursued different agendas and held differing opinions on the formulation and implementation of racial policy.

More specifically, the DRC promoted vertical segregation, or apartheid. Its clergy argued that the total segregation of races was not only practical, but biblical. The church argued that apartheid would lead to the general uplifting of races in South Africa, and it was a policy “willed” by God. Specific policies promoted by the DRC included legislation prohibiting racially mixed marriages and mixed residential areas and legislation encouraging Christian-National education and black “reserves.”

The state, advocating less stringent forms of the above policies, rejected the DRC’s totalist vision of racial policy. State leaders, favoring horizontal apartheid, felt that total, vertical segregation was impossible because whites depended on a black labor force to guarantee profits in manufacturing and mining. In the end, the perceived differences between the DRC and the state on racial policy reached a point where Afrikaner civil society grew intolerant of the state and sought political change.

In the second phase (1948–1978), state-society relations can be described as one of mutual collaboration because the DRC and the state were virtually identical and closely intertwined. They were committed to achieving two goals: (1) white (mainly Afrikaner) supremacy in the political and economic arena and (2) economic prosperity through Afrikaner “capitalism.”

Although the DRC and the state mutually collaborated, they held slightly different views on the implementation of racial policy until 1960. Thus they exhibited “collaboration with dual autonomy.” After 1961, the two entities became socially indistinguishable, with the DRC following the state’s lead. Both entities played a legitimizing role regarding the apartheid system, and both agreed on the formulation and direction of apartheid policy. More specifically, church and state felt that apartheid could be practically and biblically justified. Apartheid was portrayed as a just policy because it encouraged the self-determination and uplifting of all races in South Africa. This collaboration between church and state was evident in the similarity of DRC-state positions on specific racial policies like the Mixed Marriages Act (1949), the Population Education Act (1950), the Group Areas Act (1950), and the Bantu Education Act (1950), as well as the amount of official and covert interaction between church and state.

In the third phase (1979 to 1994), the DRC and the state displayed a relationship of mutual engagement. Mutual engagement meant that the two entities held similar opinions on the majority of policy issues. In fact, the DRC continued to give its unequivocal support to the state. However, situations arose periodically where the state and the DRC maintained varying preferences on goals and policy direction. In essence, the state in these years took the lead in promoting the attainment of white survival and economic prosperity through reform while the DRC appeared to lag behind, adhering to the goals and policy directives of the previous era, that is, white supremacy and a “people’s economy” through separate development.

In this period, the state engaged in democratic reform primarily because of the effects of economic sanctions and an unsteady political environment. Beginning in February 1990, the state legalized antiapartheid organizations, abolished many, but not all, apartheid laws, and engaged in multiparty negotiations and rule (the Transitional Executive Council). National Party politicans in this era declared apartheid unjust in its implementation.

The Dutch Reformed Church followed a similar path. Its clergy offered a qualified rejection of apartheid, and they embraced reform of segregated church structures. It was obvious, however, that the DRC adopted reform reluctantly at the state’s insistence. In the fifteen years of mutual engagement, the DRC never led the state on any reform initiative. This was because the DRC identified far too readily with the conservative faction among its membership and leadership, a faction that continued to rally behind the goals of white supremacy and Afrikaner capitalism. Thus, while the state was able to ignore the conservative faction, mainly because it had left the National Party in 1982 to form the Conservative Party, the DRC was the institution that heeded its voice. For example, the DRC refused to support reforms like the March 1992 referendum or structural church unity that offended conservative members. In addition, it openly denounced issues like economic sanctions and mass action in order to appease the conservative faction.

Overall, the concept of mutual engagement, rather than mutual collaboration, describes the relationship of the DRC and the state in these years because even though the two entities remained engaged, significant policy difference arose over particular issues (in this case, neo-reform) such that the DRC lagged behind the state.

In sum, this research addresses the changing historical relationship of the DRC and the state regarding the development of racial policy in South Africa from 1934 to 1994. The South African case study provides worthwhile findings regarding nondichotomous state-civil society relations.

Tracy Kuperus is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. Kuperus spent the 1992–93 academic year in South Africa collecting data for her dissertation. During that year, she was supported by a Foreign Language and Areas Studies Fellowship from the Center for African Studies and received support during one summer as an ACDIS/MacArthur scholar.